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  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/fkie_nvd/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from fkie_nvd</title>
  <updated>2026-11-22T16:40:44.678037+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-131780</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-131780</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T14:17:29.180000+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Themify Themify Builder themify-builder allows Reflected XSS.This issue affects Themify Builder: from n/a through 7.8.5.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-131780"/>
    <published>2026-11-22T14:17:28.593000+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99804</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-99804</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T11:17:10.803000+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>io_uring/io-wq: save worker type before dropping its reference</p>
<p>io_wq_cancel_tw_create() inspects cb-&gt;func after calling
io_worker_cancel_cb(). For an existing worker, that call can drop the
last worker reference and wake io_worker_exit(). If the canceling task
is preempted, the worker can be unlinked and freed by kfree_rcu() before
the callback function is inspected. KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free
read in this path.</p>
<p>Save whether the callback belongs to an unpublished continuation worker
while its reference is still held, then use the saved result for the
conditional free. This preserves the existing accounting and frees only
the worker allocated for the canceled continuation.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99804"/>
    <published>2026-11-20T08:18:38.063000+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99800</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-99800</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T11:17:10.623000+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>io_uring: free the task context after a grace period</p>
<p>A task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work()
running the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or
io_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else
branch:</p>
<p>percpu_counter_sub(&amp;tctx-&gt;inflight, 1);
    if (unlikely(atomic_read(&amp;tctx-&gt;in_cancel)))
            wake_up(&amp;tctx-&gt;wait);
    put_task_struct(tctx-&gt;task);</p>
<p>The first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(),
and on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for
the remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed
along with the task_struct. It used to work out because
io_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds
across io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock.</p>
<p>Free the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in
io_put_task() before the count is dropped.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99800"/>
    <published>2026-11-20T08:18:37.647000+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99798</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-99798</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T11:17:10.487000+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>io_uring: defer foreign io-wq enqueues to task_work</p>
<p>An IOPOLL ring without DEFER_TASKRUN can be reaped by a task other than
the one that submitted the I/O. If a polled request is marked
REQ_F_REISSUE, io_free_batch_list() calls io_queue_iowq() with the
original tctx. Ordinary task exit can tear down tctx-&gt;io_wq after
draining only the tracked requests. The live request pins the task, but
not its io-wq, so the foreign task can race io_wq_put_and_exit() and
enqueue through a freed or NULL queue.</p>
<p>Forward foreign userspace enqueues to the owning task before accessing
tctx-&gt;io_wq. Use a dedicated task_work callback so reissues still go
straight to io-wq, and fail them if task_work is running in cancellation
mode. Preserve the existing PF_KTHREAD cancellation path. This also
covers the other callers of io_queue_iowq() without changing the
worker-owned enqueue path.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99798"/>
    <published>2026-11-20T08:18:37.427000+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99794</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-99794</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T11:17:10.353000+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>Bluetooth: L2CAP: Reject signalling responses in invalid states</p>
<p>A peer can send configuration messages while an
incoming channel is in BT_CONNECT2, before the
security or deferred accept gate has completed. A
configuration response can then promote the channel
to BT_CONNECTED. Configuration responses can also
act on channels that are closing, and a late connection
response can move a disconnecting channel back to
BT_CONFIG.</p>
<p>Accept connection responses only while waiting in
BT_CONNECT. Answer configuration requests in
BT_CONNECT2, but defer our own request until
BT_CONFIG so configuration cannot complete before
the gate. Ignore configuration responses outside
BT_CONFIG and BT_CONNECTED, and only complete
configuration in BT_CONFIG.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99794"/>
    <published>2026-11-20T06:18:18.887000+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99793</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-99793</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T11:17:10.220000+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>Bluetooth: L2CAP: Only accept connection responses to outstanding requests</p>
<p>An outgoing channel waits in BT_CONNECT until security
and the feature mask exchange complete, and only then
sends its connection request. A peer can answer it
before that with a connection response matching our
source CID. The channel then moves to BT_CONFIG,
completes configuration and becomes connected before
security has completed. If security then fails,
l2cap_security_cfm() leaves the connected channel
alone, so it stays up on a link that did not reach
the required security level.</p>
<p>A connection response with a zero source CID is
matched by identifier. Another channel can hold the
same identifier for a response it still has to send,
so the lookup can pick the wrong channel.</p>
<p>Only accept a connection response while our request
is outstanding, and only look at such channels when
matching by identifier.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99793"/>
    <published>2026-11-20T06:18:18.770000+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99792</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-99792</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T11:17:10.083000+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>smb/server: prevent file publication after tree disconnect</p>
<p>TREE_DISCONNECT closes the tree's published file handles before marking and
removing the tree connection. A concurrent CREATE that already holds a tree
reference can therefore publish its file after the close pass. When CREATE
drops its reference, the tree can be freed while the published file still
points to it.</p>
<p>Mark and remove the tree connection before closing its files, and serialize
both new-open and durable-reconnect volatile ID publication with that state
transition. An opener is then either published in time for the close pass
or rejected after disconnect with STATUS_NETWORK_NAME_DELETED.</p>
<p>Keep a tree reference while a file carries its tree pointer. This protects
asynchronous users that can defer the file's final destruction past tree
disconnect.</p>
<p>The close pass can race the successful FP_NEW to FP_INITED transition.
Take the opening request's file reference atomically with that transition.
This keeps the file alive until request completion even if teardown removes
the ID immediately.</p>
<p>BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in proc_show_files (fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c:126)
  Read of size 4 at addr ff11000101540f80 by task poc/153</p>
<p>Call Trace:
    proc_show_files (fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c:126)
    seq_read_iter (fs/seq_file.c:231)
    proc_reg_read_iter (fs/proc/inode.c:299)
    vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:574)
    ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:7…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99792"/>
    <published>2026-11-20T06:18:18.627000+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99785</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-99785</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T11:17:09.950000+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>9p/trans_virtio: reject mount tags longer than NAME_MAX at probe</p>
<p>p9_virtio_probe() reads a 16-bit mount tag length (tag_len) from the
device config and kzalloc()s tag_len + 1 bytes for chan-&gt;tag with no
upper bound. A malicious or compromised host can present a tag of up to
65535 bytes; that tag is later copied into the single-page sysfs buffer
by p9_mount_tag_show() (memcpy(buf, chan-&gt;tag, tag_len + 1)), a
host-controlled out-of-bounds write of up to ~64 KiB past the PAGE_SIZE
attribute buffer.</p>
<p>Reject an overlong tag at probe time. A 9p mount tag is a name-like
identifier, so bound it by NAME_MAX (255): that limit is independent of
the sysfs/seq_file page size and is far above any legitimate mount tag,
which keeps p9_mount_tag_show() safe at the root without hard-coding a
seq_file implementation detail.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99785"/>
    <published>2026-11-20T06:18:17.700000+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99773</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-99773</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T11:17:09.797000+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>drm/drm_crtc: ensure dma_fence_ops remain valid during device unbind</p>
<p>In [1], sashiko reported the following issue:</p>
<p>=== snip ===
Looking at how these fences are managed, drm_crtc_create_fence()
creates a dma_fence without taking a reference to the drm_device or
drm_crtc. Because the sync_file framework exposes this fence to
userspace, the fence can outlive the CRTC.</p>
<p>The dma_fence contract requires that data accessed by dma_fence_ops
(like get_driver_name) must remain valid for an RCU grace period after
the fence is signaled. However, drm_crtc_cleanup() and the subsequent
freeing of the device do not wait for an RCU grace period via
synchronize_rcu().</p>
<p>If userspace calls ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO) concurrently with a device
hot-unplug:</p>
<p>CPU1 (Userspace)
sync_file_get_name()
  ops = rcu_dereference(fence-&gt;ops);
  if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag())
    // Preempted or delayed here</p>
<p>CPU2 (Driver Teardown)
Signals the fence (setting fence-&gt;ops = NULL)
Destroys and frees the CRTC without waiting for an RCU grace period</p>
<p>CPU1 (Resumes)
  ops-&gt;get_driver_name(fence) -&gt; drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name()
  crtc = fence_to_crtc(fence); // Casts to the freed CRTC
  return crtc-&gt;dev-&gt;driver-&gt;name; // Use-after-free</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Does the CRTC or DRM device need to be kept alive for the RCU grace
period, or should the fence hold a proper reference to prevent the
use-after-free when get_driver_name() and get_timeline_name() acc…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99773"/>
    <published>2026-11-20T06:18:16.143000+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99761</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-99761</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T11:17:09.660000+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>batman-adv: stop originator purge worker before freeing TT</p>
<p>batadv_mesh_free() releases the translation tables via batadv_tt_free()
before batadv_originator_free() stops orig_work. The purge worker can
therefore still run while the TT is torn down. When an originator times
out, batadv_purge_orig_ref() calls batadv_tt_global_del_orig(), which
loads tt.global_hash and walks all buckets while taking their locks:</p>
<p>CPU0                          CPU1
  batadv_tt_free()              batadv_purge_orig()
                                  batadv_tt_global_del_orig()
                                    hash = ...tt.global_hash;
    batadv_tt_global_table_free()
      batadv_hash_destroy(hash);
                                    spin_lock_bh(&amp;hash-&gt;list_locks[i]);</p>
<p>Disable orig_work at the beginning of batadv_mesh_free(), directly after
the mesh was marked as deactivating. The second
disable_delayed_work_sync() in batadv_originator_free() is harmless because
it is free'd anyway.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99761"/>
    <published>2026-11-20T06:18:14.500000+00:00</published>
  </entry>
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