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    <title>Most recent entries from github</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 15:33:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-24pj-f32f-p9j2</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-24pj-f32f-p9j2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This CVE has been rejected.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;This CVE has been rejected.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-24pj-f32f-p9j2</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Oct 2024 06:30:47 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-27mw-82g8-phjj — SvelteKit : XSS via untrusted cache-control header in prerendered page</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-27mw-82g8-phjj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @sveltejs/kit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications that prerender pages and use `setHeaders` to set a `cache-control` header from an untrusted source are vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SvelteKit inserts the header value into a `&amp;lt;meta http-equiv=&amp;#34;cache-control&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` tag without escaping it. An attacker who can influence this value at prerender time can break out of the `content` attribute and inject HTML or JavaScript into the generated page. The injected code can then execute when users visit the page.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix escapes the header value before inserting it into the generated HTML. Upgrade to `@sveltejs/kit` version 3.0.0 or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Avoid forwarding untrusted `cache-control` header values with `setHeaders` on prerendered pages. Use a fixed, trusted cache policy instead.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @sveltejs/kit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications that prerender pages and use `setHeaders` to set a `cache-control` header from an untrusted source are vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SvelteKit inserts the header value into a `&amp;lt;meta http-equiv=&amp;#34;cache-control&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` tag without escaping it. An attacker who can influence this value at prerender time can break out of the `content` attribute and inject HTML or JavaScript into the generated page. The injected code can then execute when users visit the page.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix escapes the header value before inserting it into the generated HTML. Upgrade to `@sveltejs/kit` version 3.0.0 or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Avoid forwarding untrusted `cache-control` header values with `setHeaders` on prerendered pages. Use a fixed, trusted cache policy instead.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-27mw-82g8-phjj</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 20:43:30 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2vf8-hmhp-gw9x</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-2vf8-hmhp-gw9x</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This issue was addressed through improved state management. This issue is fixed in tvOS 17.4, iOS 17.4 and iPadOS 17.4, macOS Sonoma 14.4, watchOS 10.4. An attacker with physical access may be able to use Siri to access sensitive user data.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;This issue was addressed through improved state management. This issue is fixed in tvOS 17.4, iOS 17.4 and iPadOS 17.4, macOS Sonoma 14.4, watchOS 10.4. An attacker with physical access may be able to use Siri to access sensitive user data.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-2vf8-hmhp-gw9x</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 08 Mar 2024 03:31:25 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2xv8-gjwh-fv8p — CrateDB's Blob HTTP handler bypasses authorization</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-2xv8-gjwh-fv8p</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: io.crate:crate&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Component:** `io.crate.protocols.http.HttpBlobHandler`
**Affected:** verified against CrateDB 6.2.7 (latest at time of report; the bug has existed since the blob HTTP handler was introduced)
**Impact:** any authenticated user can read or delete any blob whose SHA-1 digest they know, and can plant new blobs unconditionally, in any blob table, regardless of `GRANT`s.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CrateDB has two ways to access blob storage: SQL (`SELECT ... FROM blob.&amp;lt;table&amp;gt;` and friends) and the blob HTTP API (`GET|PUT|DELETE /_blobs/{table}/{digest}`). The SQL path goes through `AccessControl`, which is what enforces privilege grants; that&amp;#39;s why `SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs` fails for a user who has no grants on the table.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The HTTP path authenticates the request but never asks `AccessControl` whether the authenticated user is allowed to touch the table. So a user with no grants gets `MissingPrivilegeException` from SQL and `200 OK` plus the blob bytes from `GET /_blobs/secret_blobs/&amp;lt;digest&amp;gt;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Where it lives&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`server/src/main/java/io/crate/protocols/http/HttpBlobHandler.java`. The dispatcher:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
// HttpBlobHandler.java:176
private void handleBlobRequest(@Nullable HttpContent content) throws IOException {
    if (possibleRedirect(index, digest)) {
        return;
    }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (method.equals(HttpMethod.GET)) {
        get(index, digest);
        reset();
    } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.HEAD)) {
        head(index, digest);
    } else if (method.equals(HttpMet…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: io.crate:crate&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Component:** `io.crate.protocols.http.HttpBlobHandler`
**Affected:** verified against CrateDB 6.2.7 (latest at time of report; the bug has existed since the blob HTTP handler was introduced)
**Impact:** any authenticated user can read or delete any blob whose SHA-1 digest they know, and can plant new blobs unconditionally, in any blob table, regardless of `GRANT`s.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CrateDB has two ways to access blob storage: SQL (`SELECT ... FROM blob.&amp;lt;table&amp;gt;` and friends) and the blob HTTP API (`GET|PUT|DELETE /_blobs/{table}/{digest}`). The SQL path goes through `AccessControl`, which is what enforces privilege grants; that&amp;#39;s why `SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs` fails for a user who has no grants on the table.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The HTTP path authenticates the request but never asks `AccessControl` whether the authenticated user is allowed to touch the table. So a user with no grants gets `MissingPrivilegeException` from SQL and `200 OK` plus the blob bytes from `GET /_blobs/secret_blobs/&amp;lt;digest&amp;gt;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Where it lives&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`server/src/main/java/io/crate/protocols/http/HttpBlobHandler.java`. The dispatcher:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
// HttpBlobHandler.java:176
private void handleBlobRequest(@Nullable HttpContent content) throws IOException {
    if (possibleRedirect(index, digest)) {
        return;
    }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (method.equals(HttpMethod.GET)) {
        get(index, digest);
        reset();
    } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.HEAD)) {
        head(index, digest);
    } else if (method.equals(HttpMet…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-2xv8-gjwh-fv8p</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 19:55:07 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-335x-5wcm-8jv2 — Backoffice User can bypass "Publish" restriction</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-335x-5wcm-8jv2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: Umbraco.CMS&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Impact
Backoffice users with send for approval permission but not publish permission are able to publish in some scenarios.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Explanation of the vulnerability 
Backoffice users without permission to publish content, but only to send for approval, can bypass the restriction by modifying the request body of the &amp;#34;Send for Approval&amp;#34; request.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: Umbraco.CMS&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Impact
Backoffice users with send for approval permission but not publish permission are able to publish in some scenarios.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Explanation of the vulnerability 
Backoffice users without permission to publish content, but only to send for approval, can bypass the restriction by modifying the request body of the &amp;#34;Send for Approval&amp;#34; request.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-335x-5wcm-8jv2</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 13 Dec 2023 13:21:51 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-36xx-7vf6-7mv3 — Silverstripe Framework: Members with no password can be created and bypass custom login forms</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-36xx-7vf6-7mv3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: silverstripe/framework&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a new `Member` record was created in the cms it was possible to set a blank password. If an attacker knows the email address of the user with the blank password then they can attempt to log in using an empty password. The default member authenticator, login form and basic auth all require a non-empty password, however if a custom authentication method is used it may allow a successful login with the empty password. Starting with this release, blank passwords are no no longer allowed when members are created in the CMS. Programatically created `Member` records, such as those used in unit tests, still allow blank passwords. You may have some `Member` records in your system already which have empty passwords. To detect these, you can loop over all `Member` records with `Member::get()` and pass each record into the below method. It might be sensible to create a [`BuildTask`](https://api.silverstripe.org/5/SilverStripe/Dev/BuildTask.html) for this purpose.
  ```php
    private function memberHasBlankPassword(Member $member): bool
    {
        // skip default admin as this is created programatically
        if ($member-&amp;gt;isDefaultAdmin()) {
            return false;
        }
        // return true if a blank password is valid for this member
        $authenticator = new MemberAuthenticator();
        return $authenticator-&amp;gt;checkPassword($member, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;)-&amp;gt;isValid();
    }
  ```
  Once you have identified the records with empty passwords, it&amp;#39;s up to you how to handle this. The mos…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: silverstripe/framework&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a new `Member` record was created in the cms it was possible to set a blank password. If an attacker knows the email address of the user with the blank password then they can attempt to log in using an empty password. The default member authenticator, login form and basic auth all require a non-empty password, however if a custom authentication method is used it may allow a successful login with the empty password. Starting with this release, blank passwords are no no longer allowed when members are created in the CMS. Programatically created `Member` records, such as those used in unit tests, still allow blank passwords. You may have some `Member` records in your system already which have empty passwords. To detect these, you can loop over all `Member` records with `Member::get()` and pass each record into the below method. It might be sensible to create a [`BuildTask`](https://api.silverstripe.org/5/SilverStripe/Dev/BuildTask.html) for this purpose.
  ```php
    private function memberHasBlankPassword(Member $member): bool
    {
        // skip default admin as this is created programatically
        if ($member-&amp;gt;isDefaultAdmin()) {
            return false;
        }
        // return true if a blank password is valid for this member
        $authenticator = new MemberAuthenticator();
        return $authenticator-&amp;gt;checkPassword($member, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;)-&amp;gt;isValid();
    }
  ```
  Once you have identified the records with empty passwords, it&amp;#39;s up to you how to handle this. The mos…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-36xx-7vf6-7mv3</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 31 Jul 2023 22:00:58 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3cc2-h3v6-rqpq — SiYuan: Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking on the admin-only network proxy endpoint (`/ws/network/proxy`) via explicit `Che…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3cc2-h3v6-rqpq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**High**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Package
gomod `github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions
3.7.3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patched versions
*(none yet — leave blank until a fix is released)*&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
`/ws/network/proxy` is an admin-only WebSocket forward-proxy endpoint (target URL and headers fully attacker-specifiable via query parameters). Its `websocket.Upgrader` explicitly overrides `CheckOrigin` to unconditionally return `true` — disabling the origin validation that the `gorilla/websocket` library otherwise enforces **by default**. WebSocket handshake requests are not subject to CORS preflight at all (unlike `fetch`/XHR), so origin validation for WebSocket endpoints has to be done deliberately by the server; here it has been deliberately turned *off* instead. Combined with the endpoint&amp;#39;s own query-parameter-driven proxy target, this is a textbook Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) primitive on a capability that amounts to an authenticated network pivot through the SiYuan kernel process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// kernel/api/network.go:501
upgrader := websocket.Upgrader{
    CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true },
}
clientConn, upgradeErr := upgrader.Upgrade(c.Writer, c.Request, upgradeHeaders)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Route registration (admin-role-gated):
```go
// kernel/api/router.go:614
ginServer.Handle(&amp;#34;GET&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/ws/network/proxy&amp;#34;, model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, wsProxy)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The proxy target is fully attacker-controllable via query parameters, decoded and dialed dire…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**High**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Package
gomod `github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions
3.7.3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patched versions
*(none yet — leave blank until a fix is released)*&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
`/ws/network/proxy` is an admin-only WebSocket forward-proxy endpoint (target URL and headers fully attacker-specifiable via query parameters). Its `websocket.Upgrader` explicitly overrides `CheckOrigin` to unconditionally return `true` — disabling the origin validation that the `gorilla/websocket` library otherwise enforces **by default**. WebSocket handshake requests are not subject to CORS preflight at all (unlike `fetch`/XHR), so origin validation for WebSocket endpoints has to be done deliberately by the server; here it has been deliberately turned *off* instead. Combined with the endpoint&amp;#39;s own query-parameter-driven proxy target, this is a textbook Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) primitive on a capability that amounts to an authenticated network pivot through the SiYuan kernel process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// kernel/api/network.go:501
upgrader := websocket.Upgrader{
    CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true },
}
clientConn, upgradeErr := upgrader.Upgrade(c.Writer, c.Request, upgradeHeaders)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Route registration (admin-role-gated):
```go
// kernel/api/router.go:614
ginServer.Handle(&amp;#34;GET&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/ws/network/proxy&amp;#34;, model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, wsProxy)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The proxy target is fully attacker-controllable via query parameters, decoded and dialed dire…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3cc2-h3v6-rqpq</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 22:46:18 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3jp4-mhh4-gcgr — Kimai has an Open Redirect via Unvalidated RelayState in SAML ACS Handler</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3jp4-mhh4-gcgr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: kimai/kimai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SAML authentication success handler in Kimai returns the `RelayState` POST parameter as a redirect destination without validating the host or scheme. After a user successfully authenticates via SAML, they are redirected to an attacker-controlled URL if the IdP includes a malicious `RelayState` value. This enables phishing attacks that steal credentials or session tokens post-SSO.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*Requires SAML to be enabled (non-default configuration).*&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vulnerable file: `src/Saml/Security/SamlAuthenticationSuccessHandler.php`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// Line 27-33
$relayState = $request-&amp;gt;request-&amp;gt;get(&amp;#39;RelayState&amp;#39;, $request-&amp;gt;query-&amp;gt;get(&amp;#39;RelayState&amp;#39;));
if (\is_scalar($relayState)) {
    $relayState = (string) $relayState;
    if ($relayState !== $this-&amp;gt;httpUtils-&amp;gt;generateUri($request, (string) $this-&amp;gt;options[&amp;#39;login_path&amp;#39;])) {
        return $relayState;  // No host/scheme validation — any URL accepted
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The only check is that `RelayState` does not equal the configured `login_path`. Any external URL (e.g., `https://attacker.com`) passes this check and is returned as the redirect destination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The existing unit test `SamlAuthenticationSuccessHandlerTest::testRelayState()` confirms this behavior — an absolute URL in `RelayState` results in a redirect to that URL with no restriction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Steps to Reproduce&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
1. Enable SAML authentication in Kimai
2. Configure a SAML IdP (e.g., SimpleSAMLphp)
3. Initiate IdP-initiated SSO with RelayState=https://attacker.com
   — or i…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: kimai/kimai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SAML authentication success handler in Kimai returns the `RelayState` POST parameter as a redirect destination without validating the host or scheme. After a user successfully authenticates via SAML, they are redirected to an attacker-controlled URL if the IdP includes a malicious `RelayState` value. This enables phishing attacks that steal credentials or session tokens post-SSO.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*Requires SAML to be enabled (non-default configuration).*&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vulnerable file: `src/Saml/Security/SamlAuthenticationSuccessHandler.php`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// Line 27-33
$relayState = $request-&amp;gt;request-&amp;gt;get(&amp;#39;RelayState&amp;#39;, $request-&amp;gt;query-&amp;gt;get(&amp;#39;RelayState&amp;#39;));
if (\is_scalar($relayState)) {
    $relayState = (string) $relayState;
    if ($relayState !== $this-&amp;gt;httpUtils-&amp;gt;generateUri($request, (string) $this-&amp;gt;options[&amp;#39;login_path&amp;#39;])) {
        return $relayState;  // No host/scheme validation — any URL accepted
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The only check is that `RelayState` does not equal the configured `login_path`. Any external URL (e.g., `https://attacker.com`) passes this check and is returned as the redirect destination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The existing unit test `SamlAuthenticationSuccessHandlerTest::testRelayState()` confirms this behavior — an absolute URL in `RelayState` results in a redirect to that URL with no restriction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Steps to Reproduce&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
1. Enable SAML authentication in Kimai
2. Configure a SAML IdP (e.g., SimpleSAMLphp)
3. Initiate IdP-initiated SSO with RelayState=https://attacker.com
   — or i…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3jp4-mhh4-gcgr</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Apr 2026 01:06:06 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3q5f-gmjc-38r8 — ImageMagick: Memory leak in coders/txt.c without freetype</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3q5f-gmjc-38r8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x86 and 9 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a `texture` attribute is specified for a TXT file, an attempt will be made to read it via `texture=ReadImage(read_info,exception);`. Later, when retrieving metrics via the `GetTypeMetrics` function, if this function fails (i.e., `status == MagickFalse`), the calling function will exit immediately but fail to release the texture object, leading to memory leakage.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64, NuGet: Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x86 and 9 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a `texture` attribute is specified for a TXT file, an attempt will be made to read it via `texture=ReadImage(read_info,exception);`. Later, when retrieving metrics via the `GetTypeMetrics` function, if this function fails (i.e., `status == MagickFalse`), the calling function will exit immediately but fail to release the texture object, leading to memory leakage.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3q5f-gmjc-38r8</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Feb 2026 19:13:08 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3rwj-9q84-fmqw</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3rwj-9q84-fmqw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A broken access control vulnerability previously discovered in the Trend Vision One Role Name component could have allowed an administrator to create users who could then change the role of the account and ultimately escalate privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Please note: ths issue has already been addressed on the backend service and is no longer considered an active vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;A broken access control vulnerability previously discovered in the Trend Vision One Role Name component could have allowed an administrator to create users who could then change the role of the account and ultimately escalate privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Please note: ths issue has already been addressed on the backend service and is no longer considered an active vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3rwj-9q84-fmqw</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 02 Apr 2025 18:30:54 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
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