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    <title>Most recent entries from gna-1</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 14:26:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>GCVE-1-2026-20423 — flowintel: Unauthorized Disclosure of Linked Case References in Case History</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20423</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flowintel contains an information disclosure vulnerability in its case history feature. When a user views the history of a case they are authorized to access, the history output includes references to other cases (linked, unlinked, or forked) without verifying whether the requesting user has permission to view those referenced cases. This exposes the identifiers and titles of cases that the user should not be able to discover.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability affects multiple output paths:
- Browser-based case history view
- API history endpoint
- Plain-text history download
- Markdown history download
- Report timeline generation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with access to any single case can enumerate the existence and identifiers of other cases by reading the history of a case they can access. This bypasses the intended per-case access control model and may reveal the existence of sensitive investigations, their identifiers, and associated metadata to unauthorized users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The raw audit storage is not modified; the issue is solely in the presentation layer failing to filter references to inaccessible cases before returning history data to the user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flowintel contains an information disclosure vulnerability in its case history feature. When a user views the history of a case they are authorized to access, the history output includes references to other cases (linked, unlinked, or forked) without verifying whether the requesting user has permission to view those referenced cases. This exposes the identifiers and titles of cases that the user should not be able to discover.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability affects multiple output paths:
- Browser-based case history view
- API history endpoint
- Plain-text history download
- Markdown history download
- Report timeline generation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with access to any single case can enumerate the existence and identifiers of other cases by reading the history of a case they can access. This bypasses the intended per-case access control model and may reveal the existence of sensitive investigations, their identifiers, and associated metadata to unauthorized users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The raw audit storage is not modified; the issue is solely in the presentation layer failing to filter references to inaccessible cases before returning history data to the user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20423</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:44:18 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GCVE-1-2026-20422 — flowintel: Information Disclosure of Classification Usage via Missing Access Control</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20422</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flowintel contains a vulnerability in the case and task classification usage endpoints that allows authenticated users to view classification data associated with cases they do not have permission to access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected endpoints, which provide lists of used taxonomies, tags, galaxies, clusters, and custom tags, did not properly enforce object-level access controls. While the endpoints required authentication, they failed to filter the returned data based on the requesting user&amp;#39;s visibility permissions for the underlying cases. This allowed any authenticated user to enumerate classification usage across all cases, including private or restricted cases belonging to other organizations or users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue could lead to the disclosure of sensitive information, such as the existence of specific cases, the types of threats or indicators associated with them, and the relationships between different classification elements, potentially aiding an attacker in reconnaissance or targeting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: &amp;lt; 4.1.0&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flowintel contains a vulnerability in the case and task classification usage endpoints that allows authenticated users to view classification data associated with cases they do not have permission to access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected endpoints, which provide lists of used taxonomies, tags, galaxies, clusters, and custom tags, did not properly enforce object-level access controls. While the endpoints required authentication, they failed to filter the returned data based on the requesting user&amp;#39;s visibility permissions for the underlying cases. This allowed any authenticated user to enumerate classification usage across all cases, including private or restricted cases belonging to other organizations or users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue could lead to the disclosure of sensitive information, such as the existence of specific cases, the types of threats or indicators associated with them, and the relationships between different classification elements, potentially aiding an attacker in reconnaissance or targeting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: &amp;lt; 4.1.0&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20422</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:44:16 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GCVE-1-2026-20421 — FlowIntel Chatbot Shared MCP Session Allows Cross-User API Identity Confusion</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20421</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FlowIntel&amp;#39;s chatbot component used a single shared MCP (Model Context Protocol) session and process-wide environment variable to pass per-user API credentials to a child process. Because the session and the ambient FLOWINTEL_API_KEY environment variable were shared across all concurrent requests, a user&amp;#39;s authenticated identity could be applied to another user&amp;#39;s tool invocation, or a stale/ambient credential could be inherited by a new request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Preconditions:
- An authenticated user with access to the chatbot interface.
- Concurrent or overlapping chatbot tool invocations from different users, or a request made after another user&amp;#39;s credentials were written to the process environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact:
- A lower-privilege user could read data belonging to a higher-privilege user (e.g., private investigation cases).
- A user whose session was invalidated (deleted, password changed, key revoked) could still operate under a previously cached ambient credential.
- The parent process environment was mutated with user-specific secrets, creating a persistent credential leak surface.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FlowIntel&amp;#39;s chatbot component used a single shared MCP (Model Context Protocol) session and process-wide environment variable to pass per-user API credentials to a child process. Because the session and the ambient FLOWINTEL_API_KEY environment variable were shared across all concurrent requests, a user&amp;#39;s authenticated identity could be applied to another user&amp;#39;s tool invocation, or a stale/ambient credential could be inherited by a new request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Preconditions:
- An authenticated user with access to the chatbot interface.
- Concurrent or overlapping chatbot tool invocations from different users, or a request made after another user&amp;#39;s credentials were written to the process environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact:
- A lower-privilege user could read data belonging to a higher-privilege user (e.g., private investigation cases).
- A user whose session was invalidated (deleted, password changed, key revoked) could still operate under a previously cached ambient credential.
- The parent process environment was mutated with user-specific secrets, creating a persistent credential leak surface.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20421</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:44:12 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GCVE-1-2026-20420 — flowintel Privileged Case Task Approval Bypass via Missing User Context and Template Creation</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20420</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flowintel is a case management application that enforces an approval workflow for tasks in privileged cases. Tasks in such cases are required to start in a Requested status, meaning they must receive explicit approval before becoming active.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A logic flaw in the task-creation path allowed tasks to be initialized with a Created status (bypassing the approval step) in two scenarios:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- When a task was created from a template and no acting user was supplied, the privileged-case check was skipped entirely, leaving the task in Created status.
- When a case was created from a template, all copied tasks were unconditionally assigned the Created status regardless of the case&amp;#39;s privileged designation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with the ability to create tasks from templates or to instantiate cases from templates could therefore place tasks directly into an active state within privileged cases, circumventing the intended approval gate. This may expose restricted case content or permit actions that should require supervisory sign-off.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flowintel is a case management application that enforces an approval workflow for tasks in privileged cases. Tasks in such cases are required to start in a Requested status, meaning they must receive explicit approval before becoming active.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A logic flaw in the task-creation path allowed tasks to be initialized with a Created status (bypassing the approval step) in two scenarios:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- When a task was created from a template and no acting user was supplied, the privileged-case check was skipped entirely, leaving the task in Created status.
- When a case was created from a template, all copied tasks were unconditionally assigned the Created status regardless of the case&amp;#39;s privileged designation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with the ability to create tasks from templates or to instantiate cases from templates could therefore place tasks directly into an active state within privileged cases, circumventing the intended approval gate. This may expose restricted case content or permit actions that should require supervisory sign-off.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20420</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:36:10 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GCVE-1-2026-20419 — FlowIntel Alerting: Missing Private Case Authorization Check Allows Connector Owners to Access Revoked Case Data</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20419</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FlowIntel&amp;#39;s alerting module contained an authorization bypass in the alert access control logic. When an alert was linked to a private case, the system relied solely on connector ownership (user or organization) to determine access, without verifying that the requesting user still held valid membership in the associated private case.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This meant that a user who was a connector owner of an alert could continue to read alert details, review history, raw payloads, and action comments, and could perform review-status updates or case-creation actions, even after their access to the linked private case had been revoked or they were never a member of that case.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap existed: after a review-status update or a competing case-creation claim was committed, the response could disclose private case identifiers or review history to a user whose access had been concurrently removed by another session linking the alert to a private case.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact:
- Unauthorized disclosure of private case data (review comments, raw payloads, action history) through alert endpoints.
- Unauthorized modification of alert review status and creation of cases from alerts the user should no longer access.
- Leakage of a competing case identifier to an unauthorized user during concurrent case-creation races.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FlowIntel&amp;#39;s alerting module contained an authorization bypass in the alert access control logic. When an alert was linked to a private case, the system relied solely on connector ownership (user or organization) to determine access, without verifying that the requesting user still held valid membership in the associated private case.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This meant that a user who was a connector owner of an alert could continue to read alert details, review history, raw payloads, and action comments, and could perform review-status updates or case-creation actions, even after their access to the linked private case had been revoked or they were never a member of that case.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap existed: after a review-status update or a competing case-creation claim was committed, the response could disclose private case identifiers or review history to a user whose access had been concurrently removed by another session linking the alert to a private case.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact:
- Unauthorized disclosure of private case data (review comments, raw payloads, action history) through alert endpoints.
- Unauthorized modification of alert review status and creation of cases from alerts the user should no longer access.
- Leakage of a competing case identifier to an unauthorized user during concurrent case-creation races.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20419</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:36:06 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GCVE-1-2026-20418 — flowintel: Stale Authorization Allows Notification Disclosure After Case Access Revocation</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20418</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flowintel contains an authorization flaw in its recurring reminder notification subsystem. When a user is subscribed to recurring notifications for a case, the system does not re-verify the recipient&amp;#39;s current access rights to that case before generating or displaying the notification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a user who previously had access to a private case and later had that access revoked can still:
- Receive recurring reminder notifications containing case-related content.
- View stored reminder notifications in their notification list, including notification counts, even though they no longer have permission to view the underlying case.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability affects both the notification creation path (recurring reminder generation) and the notification display path (listing and counting stored reminders). The issue arises because the authorization check performed at subscription time is not re-applied at delivery or retrieval time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security impact is limited to information disclosure: an unauthorized user may observe case titles, reminder messages, and associated metadata that they no longer have permission to access. No integrity or availability impact is indicated by the patch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flowintel contains an authorization flaw in its recurring reminder notification subsystem. When a user is subscribed to recurring notifications for a case, the system does not re-verify the recipient&amp;#39;s current access rights to that case before generating or displaying the notification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a user who previously had access to a private case and later had that access revoked can still:
- Receive recurring reminder notifications containing case-related content.
- View stored reminder notifications in their notification list, including notification counts, even though they no longer have permission to view the underlying case.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability affects both the notification creation path (recurring reminder generation) and the notification display path (listing and counting stored reminders). The issue arises because the authorization check performed at subscription time is not re-applied at delivery or retrieval time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security impact is limited to information disclosure: an unauthorized user may observe case titles, reminder messages, and associated metadata that they no longer have permission to access. No integrity or availability impact is indicated by the patch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20418</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:36:03 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GCVE-1-2026-20417 — flowintel: Insecure Direct Object Reference in Task Calendar Access Control</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20417</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability exists in the flowintel application&amp;#39;s calendar functionality that allows unauthorized access to private case data. The task calendar queries failed to enforce visibility checks on the parent case associated with tasks. Specifically, tasks assigned to a user or belonging to the user&amp;#39;s organization were returned in calendar views (including browser and API ICS feeds) without verifying whether the user had permission to view the parent case. This allowed users to potentially discover and access details of private cases they were not authorized to view, leading to information disclosure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue affected the default task visibility logic and the assigned-only task queries. The fix ensures that case visibility is rechecked in addition to task assignment or organization membership, preventing the exposure of private case data in calendar outputs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: flowintel &amp;lt; 4.1.0&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability exists in the flowintel application&amp;#39;s calendar functionality that allows unauthorized access to private case data. The task calendar queries failed to enforce visibility checks on the parent case associated with tasks. Specifically, tasks assigned to a user or belonging to the user&amp;#39;s organization were returned in calendar views (including browser and API ICS feeds) without verifying whether the user had permission to view the parent case. This allowed users to potentially discover and access details of private cases they were not authorized to view, leading to information disclosure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue affected the default task visibility logic and the assigned-only task queries. The fix ensures that case visibility is rechecked in addition to task assignment or organization membership, preventing the exposure of private case data in calendar outputs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: flowintel &amp;lt; 4.1.0&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20417</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:35:56 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GCVE-1-2026-20416 — flowintel: Organization Admin Can Delete Platform Admin Accounts Due to Missing Privilege Hierarchy Check</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20416</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flowintel contains an authorization flaw in its user deletion functionality. Organization-scoped administrators (org admins) are able to delete platform-level administrator accounts through both the browser-based admin interface and the REST API.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The existing authorization logic verified that an org admin could only target users within their own organization, but it did not enforce the privilege hierarchy between organization admins and platform admins. As a result, an authenticated org admin could issue a deletion request against any platform-admin account belonging to the same organization, causing the target account, its sessions, and related records to be permanently removed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact:
- Loss of platform-level administrative oversight
- Potential disruption of platform-wide management functions
- Removal of higher-privilege accounts that should be protected from lower-privilege roles&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flowintel contains an authorization flaw in its user deletion functionality. Organization-scoped administrators (org admins) are able to delete platform-level administrator accounts through both the browser-based admin interface and the REST API.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The existing authorization logic verified that an org admin could only target users within their own organization, but it did not enforce the privilege hierarchy between organization admins and platform admins. As a result, an authenticated org admin could issue a deletion request against any platform-admin account belonging to the same organization, causing the target account, its sessions, and related records to be permanently removed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact:
- Loss of platform-level administrative oversight
- Potential disruption of platform-wide management functions
- Removal of higher-privilege accounts that should be protected from lower-privilege roles&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20416</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:35:48 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GCVE-1-2026-20415 — flowintel: Missing Authorization Check Allows Organization Admin to Edit Platform Admin Accounts via Browser Interface</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20415</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flowintel contains an authorization bypass in the browser-based admin user editing interface. The edit_user view in the admin panel verified that a non-platform-admin user could only edit accounts belonging to their own organization, but it did not verify that the target account was not a platform-admin account. As a result, an authenticated user holding an organization-admin role could open the edit form for any platform-admin account and submit modifications, including changes to credentials, roles, or other account attributes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The API layer already enforced a restriction preventing non-admin users from targeting admin accounts, but the browser-based admin view lacked the equivalent check, creating an inconsistent authorization boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact:
- Unauthorized modification of platform-admin account data (integrity)
- Potential lockout or privilege manipulation of platform administrators (availability)
- Escalation of an organization-admin role to effectively control platform-level administration&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flowintel contains an authorization bypass in the browser-based admin user editing interface. The edit_user view in the admin panel verified that a non-platform-admin user could only edit accounts belonging to their own organization, but it did not verify that the target account was not a platform-admin account. As a result, an authenticated user holding an organization-admin role could open the edit form for any platform-admin account and submit modifications, including changes to credentials, roles, or other account attributes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The API layer already enforced a restriction preventing non-admin users from targeting admin accounts, but the browser-based admin view lacked the equivalent check, creating an inconsistent authorization boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact:
- Unauthorized modification of platform-admin account data (integrity)
- Potential lockout or privilege manipulation of platform administrators (availability)
- Escalation of an organization-admin role to effectively control platform-level administration&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20415</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:35:45 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GCVE-1-2026-20414 — FlowIntel Missing Authorization Check Allows Unauthorized Revival of Completed Privileged Cases via Task Reopening</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20414</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FlowIntel contains an authorization bypass in its task management workflow. When a user reopens a completed task (by toggling its completion state or changing its status to a non-finished value) or creates a new task within a completed privileged case, the parent case is automatically revived (un-completed, status reset to Created, finish date cleared). The system failed to enforce the required Admin or Case Admin privilege check before performing this case revival side effect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user with basic task-level permissions (e.g., editor, queuer, or queue admin) could trigger the revival of a completed privileged case through the browser interface or the REST API, without holding the elevated role required for case-level operations. This could disrupt case lifecycle management, clear completion metadata, and potentially expose the case to further unauthorized modifications.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability affects both the browser-based task completion/status-change endpoints and the corresponding API endpoints, as well as the task creation flow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; flowintel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FlowIntel contains an authorization bypass in its task management workflow. When a user reopens a completed task (by toggling its completion state or changing its status to a non-finished value) or creates a new task within a completed privileged case, the parent case is automatically revived (un-completed, status reset to Created, finish date cleared). The system failed to enforce the required Admin or Case Admin privilege check before performing this case revival side effect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user with basic task-level permissions (e.g., editor, queuer, or queue admin) could trigger the revival of a completed privileged case through the browser interface or the REST API, without holding the elevated role required for case-level operations. This could disrupt case lifecycle management, clear completion metadata, and potentially expose the case to further unauthorized modifications.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability affects both the browser-based task completion/status-change endpoints and the corresponding API endpoints, as well as the task creation flow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20414</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:35:40 +0000</pubDate>
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