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    <title>Most recent entries from ossf_malicious_packages</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 14:24:14 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>MAL-2026-20330 — Malicious code in @leadstack/crm-connect (npm)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20330</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @leadstack/crm-connect&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (137530bcdc8f89e583e0beaef05d5faec104a1d279127586fcbf5c884c616d35)
Package advertises itself as a &amp;#39;LeadStack CRM&amp;#39; Node.js connector for lead ingest and routing, but its postinstall script performs a coordinated backdoor deployment on the installer&amp;#39;s host. The script fetches configuration from a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint over plain HTTP (http://72.62.1.108:3000/api/v1/partner/bootstrap), writes the returned env_lines and a SOUL.md profile into a hidden ~/.leadstack directory, then creates ~/.leadstack/runtime and runs `npm install --ignore-engines hermes-agent@0.22.7` into it — pulling an unrelated agent package into a concealed runtime directory. It then invokes `hermes-npm setup` and `hermes setup gateway --install --system --run-as-user root --no-start-now`, installing a boot-persistent root-privileged systemd unit. The unit file is copied to /etc/systemd/system/leadstack-routing.service with `Hermes Agent Gateway` strings rewritten to `LeadStack routing`, and the original unit is disabled and deleted — deliberate concealment of the persistence artifact&amp;#39;s origin. The service is then enabled and started, and the script waits for a Telegram polling-mode channel to come up, configuring an LLM model provider (kimi-coding). The resulting daemon runs as root on every boot and takes commands from a remote Telegram channel, giving the operator of 72.62.1.108 and the Telegram bot full remote c…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @leadstack/crm-connect&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (137530bcdc8f89e583e0beaef05d5faec104a1d279127586fcbf5c884c616d35)
Package advertises itself as a &amp;#39;LeadStack CRM&amp;#39; Node.js connector for lead ingest and routing, but its postinstall script performs a coordinated backdoor deployment on the installer&amp;#39;s host. The script fetches configuration from a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint over plain HTTP (http://72.62.1.108:3000/api/v1/partner/bootstrap), writes the returned env_lines and a SOUL.md profile into a hidden ~/.leadstack directory, then creates ~/.leadstack/runtime and runs `npm install --ignore-engines hermes-agent@0.22.7` into it — pulling an unrelated agent package into a concealed runtime directory. It then invokes `hermes-npm setup` and `hermes setup gateway --install --system --run-as-user root --no-start-now`, installing a boot-persistent root-privileged systemd unit. The unit file is copied to /etc/systemd/system/leadstack-routing.service with `Hermes Agent Gateway` strings rewritten to `LeadStack routing`, and the original unit is disabled and deleted — deliberate concealment of the persistence artifact&amp;#39;s origin. The service is then enabled and started, and the script waits for a Telegram polling-mode channel to come up, configuring an LLM model provider (kimi-coding). The resulting daemon runs as root on every boot and takes commands from a remote Telegram channel, giving the operator of 72.62.1.108 and the Telegram bot full remote c…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20330</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 04:08:47 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MAL-2026-20329 — Malicious code in autoloan (npm)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20329</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: autoloan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (fd149b051db3655d811a5a275af34e47d622cc2a9bcd4e198592c1f449dd3476)
The package ships a postinstall hook (&amp;#34;node beacon.cjs&amp;#34;) and a main entry (index.js) that both execute beacon.cjs on npm install and on require(). beacon.cjs collects installer-side identifiers — os.hostname(), __dirname (the install path on the installer&amp;#39;s disk), process.cwd(), process.version, and the package name — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded endpoint https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc, a bare Contabo VPS unrelated to any documented publisher. The HTTPS request is made with rejectUnauthorized:false, disabling TLS certificate verification. index.js itself exports a Proxy whose properties all return no-op values, so the package provides no real functionality — the install-time and import-time beacon is the sole effect of installing this package. The shape (stub module + hardcoded bare-VPS callback + TLS verification disabled + auto-fire on both lifecycle hook and module load) matches a dependency-confusion / install-tracking beacon rather than a legitimate library.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: autoloan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (fd149b051db3655d811a5a275af34e47d622cc2a9bcd4e198592c1f449dd3476)
The package ships a postinstall hook (&amp;#34;node beacon.cjs&amp;#34;) and a main entry (index.js) that both execute beacon.cjs on npm install and on require(). beacon.cjs collects installer-side identifiers — os.hostname(), __dirname (the install path on the installer&amp;#39;s disk), process.cwd(), process.version, and the package name — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded endpoint https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc, a bare Contabo VPS unrelated to any documented publisher. The HTTPS request is made with rejectUnauthorized:false, disabling TLS certificate verification. index.js itself exports a Proxy whose properties all return no-op values, so the package provides no real functionality — the install-time and import-time beacon is the sole effect of installing this package. The shape (stub module + hardcoded bare-VPS callback + TLS verification disabled + auto-fire on both lifecycle hook and module load) matches a dependency-confusion / install-tracking beacon rather than a legitimate library.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20329</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 02:41:16 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MAL-2026-20324 — Malicious code in @c1-ease/commerce (npm)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20324</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @c1-ease/commerce&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (bfd04dd69116b1d123a66e4b145a0a2c8a75070d8d250f5de931184b1f0ab58f)
The package is a near-empty compatibility shim whose only real behavior is a callback beacon. package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs `node beacon.cjs`, and the main entry `index.js` invokes `beacon.fire()` as a top-level side effect on require. beacon.cjs POSTs host identifiers — `os.hostname()`, the install path (`__dirname`), `process.cwd()`, and `process.version` — to the hardcoded endpoint `https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc` with TLS verification explicitly disabled (`rejectUnauthorized: false`). The rest of the module surface is a Proxy returning no-op functions so a consuming build does not crash. The destination is not associated with the `@c1-ease` scope&amp;#39;s publisher, the beacon fires without caller opt-in on both install and import, and an in-source comment frames a completed build-with-callback as evidence of reach — consistent with a dependency-confusion / namespace-squat probe against internal `@c1-ease/*` package names.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @c1-ease/commerce&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (bfd04dd69116b1d123a66e4b145a0a2c8a75070d8d250f5de931184b1f0ab58f)
The package is a near-empty compatibility shim whose only real behavior is a callback beacon. package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs `node beacon.cjs`, and the main entry `index.js` invokes `beacon.fire()` as a top-level side effect on require. beacon.cjs POSTs host identifiers — `os.hostname()`, the install path (`__dirname`), `process.cwd()`, and `process.version` — to the hardcoded endpoint `https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc` with TLS verification explicitly disabled (`rejectUnauthorized: false`). The rest of the module surface is a Proxy returning no-op functions so a consuming build does not crash. The destination is not associated with the `@c1-ease` scope&amp;#39;s publisher, the beacon fires without caller opt-in on both install and import, and an in-source comment frames a completed build-with-callback as evidence of reach — consistent with a dependency-confusion / namespace-squat probe against internal `@c1-ease/*` package names.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20324</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 02:35:58 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MAL-2026-20328 — Malicious code in @c1-ease/core (npm)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20328</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @c1-ease/core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (97fcefadffcfd5e41abeff4746ebc756b5b0fed7b86728b35cbd0c4a073184ce)
The package consists of a no-op Proxy export (index.js) and a beacon module (beacon.cjs) that fires both from the declared postinstall lifecycle script and on require of the main module. The beacon collects installer host identifiers — hostname, install path, current working directory, and node/npm version — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded endpoint https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc, with TLS certificate verification disabled (rejectUnauthorized:false). The destination is a bare Contabo VPS unrelated to any documented service, and the package provides no functional API: every property access on the exported Proxy returns a no-op function, so the only observable effect of installing or importing @c1-ease/core is transmission of installer identifiers to that endpoint. The scoped name mimicking a generic compatibility &amp;#39;core&amp;#39; shim is consistent with dependency-confusion or typo-bait targeting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @c1-ease/core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (97fcefadffcfd5e41abeff4746ebc756b5b0fed7b86728b35cbd0c4a073184ce)
The package consists of a no-op Proxy export (index.js) and a beacon module (beacon.cjs) that fires both from the declared postinstall lifecycle script and on require of the main module. The beacon collects installer host identifiers — hostname, install path, current working directory, and node/npm version — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded endpoint https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc, with TLS certificate verification disabled (rejectUnauthorized:false). The destination is a bare Contabo VPS unrelated to any documented service, and the package provides no functional API: every property access on the exported Proxy returns a no-op function, so the only observable effect of installing or importing @c1-ease/core is transmission of installer identifiers to that endpoint. The scoped name mimicking a generic compatibility &amp;#39;core&amp;#39; shim is consistent with dependency-confusion or typo-bait targeting.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20328</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 02:38:50 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MAL-2026-20327 — Malicious code in @c1-ease/card (npm)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20327</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @c1-ease/card&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (cf1ed7404d29e131f0f3008773ffedf222e2df2d27753bd0e35655762dfc5821)
The package publishes under the scoped name `@c1-ease/card` with no legitimate functionality: `index.js` exports a Proxy that returns a no-op function for any property access, allowing a victim build that resolves this public package instead of an internal `@c1-ease/*` dependency to continue without crashing. `package.json` declares a `postinstall` hook that runs `node beacon.cjs`, and the same beacon is invoked on `require()` of the module. `beacon.cjs` collects host identifiers — `os.hostname()`, `__dirname` (install path), `process.cwd()`, and `process.version` — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded endpoint `https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc`, with TLS certificate validation explicitly disabled via `rejectUnauthorized: false`. The combination of a scoped-namespace squat shim, an install-time and import-time outbound beacon to a third-party Contabo VPS, and disabled TLS validation is the standard dependency-confusion exfiltration shape.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @c1-ease/card&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (cf1ed7404d29e131f0f3008773ffedf222e2df2d27753bd0e35655762dfc5821)
The package publishes under the scoped name `@c1-ease/card` with no legitimate functionality: `index.js` exports a Proxy that returns a no-op function for any property access, allowing a victim build that resolves this public package instead of an internal `@c1-ease/*` dependency to continue without crashing. `package.json` declares a `postinstall` hook that runs `node beacon.cjs`, and the same beacon is invoked on `require()` of the module. `beacon.cjs` collects host identifiers — `os.hostname()`, `__dirname` (install path), `process.cwd()`, and `process.version` — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded endpoint `https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc`, with TLS certificate validation explicitly disabled via `rejectUnauthorized: false`. The combination of a scoped-namespace squat shim, an install-time and import-time outbound beacon to a third-party Contabo VPS, and disabled TLS validation is the standard dependency-confusion exfiltration shape.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20327</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 02:36:35 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MAL-2026-20326 — Malicious code in @c1-ease/bank (npm)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20326</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @c1-ease/bank&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (15ba6783ba51366782fa289b444f655cd026cc5ac82d3fae5a5e9f256961c954)
The package declares a `postinstall` script that runs `node beacon.cjs`, and `index.js` re-invokes the same beacon on require. The beacon collects `os.hostname()`, `__dirname`, `process.cwd()`, the Node version, and the package name and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded endpoint `https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc`, a bare Contabo VPS unrelated to any declared publisher. TLS certificate verification is explicitly disabled via `rejectUnauthorized: false`. Beyond the beacon, `index.js` exports a Proxy whose every property returns a no-op function; the package advertises itself as a `Compatibility shim` under the `@c1-ease` scope but ships no real functionality, consistent with a dependency-confusion or install-tracking artifact targeting a potentially confusable scope name. Installing or requiring the package causes host identifiers to be sent to an attacker-controlled destination with TLS verification disabled.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @c1-ease/bank&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (15ba6783ba51366782fa289b444f655cd026cc5ac82d3fae5a5e9f256961c954)
The package declares a `postinstall` script that runs `node beacon.cjs`, and `index.js` re-invokes the same beacon on require. The beacon collects `os.hostname()`, `__dirname`, `process.cwd()`, the Node version, and the package name and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded endpoint `https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc`, a bare Contabo VPS unrelated to any declared publisher. TLS certificate verification is explicitly disabled via `rejectUnauthorized: false`. Beyond the beacon, `index.js` exports a Proxy whose every property returns a no-op function; the package advertises itself as a `Compatibility shim` under the `@c1-ease` scope but ships no real functionality, consistent with a dependency-confusion or install-tracking artifact targeting a potentially confusable scope name. Installing or requiring the package causes host identifiers to be sent to an attacker-controlled destination with TLS verification disabled.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20326</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 02:37:08 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MAL-2026-20325 — Malicious code in @c1-ease/autoloan (npm)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20325</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @c1-ease/autoloan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (6cfd8eb78dbbe467272495a7a3ef4392f57d30fe791912d5c2cb0719575c752b)
The scoped package name mimics an internal namespace and ships a postinstall beacon plus an import-time trigger. package.json declares scripts.postinstall=&amp;#34;node beacon.cjs&amp;#34;; beacon.cjs builds a payload containing hostname, installPath, process.cwd(), and process.version and POSTs it to the hardcoded endpoint https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc over HTTPS with certificate validation disabled (rejectUnauthorized: false). index.js (the package main) additionally invokes require(&amp;#39;./beacon.cjs&amp;#39;).fire() at top level and exports a no-op Proxy so any consumer require()/import of any named export succeeds silently, causing the same POST to fire on every load in build and CI environments. The combination of dependency-confusion naming, auto-fire on both npm install and require, hardcoded non-registry VPS destination, and disabled TLS verification is a supply-chain exfiltration beacon regardless of any self-labeling as authorized research.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @c1-ease/autoloan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (6cfd8eb78dbbe467272495a7a3ef4392f57d30fe791912d5c2cb0719575c752b)
The scoped package name mimics an internal namespace and ships a postinstall beacon plus an import-time trigger. package.json declares scripts.postinstall=&amp;#34;node beacon.cjs&amp;#34;; beacon.cjs builds a payload containing hostname, installPath, process.cwd(), and process.version and POSTs it to the hardcoded endpoint https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc over HTTPS with certificate validation disabled (rejectUnauthorized: false). index.js (the package main) additionally invokes require(&amp;#39;./beacon.cjs&amp;#39;).fire() at top level and exports a no-op Proxy so any consumer require()/import of any named export succeeds silently, causing the same POST to fire on every load in build and CI environments. The combination of dependency-confusion naming, auto-fire on both npm install and require, hardcoded non-registry VPS destination, and disabled TLS verification is a supply-chain exfiltration beacon regardless of any self-labeling as authorized research.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20325</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 02:37:58 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MAL-2026-20313 — Malicious code in testing1345py (PyPI)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20313</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: testing1345py&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (dc04d3349dc599ea7ba9a0b603b2afb8ce99af579ba29280f087697aae959d3b)
The sdist&amp;#39;s setup.py overrides build_py.run to call _run_install_demo(), which on Windows invokes testing1345.hello.fetch() during pip install. fetch() downloads https://raw.githubusercontent.com/misdry01/g/refs/heads/main/test.bat — a mutable branch on a personal GitHub account unrelated to any declared publisher — and executes it via cmd.exe with no hash or signature check. The custom bdist_wheel writes testing1345_boot.pth into the wheel root; after install, site.py loads that.pth on every interpreter start and imports testing1345_boot, whose module-level run_once() calls the same fetch(), gated only by a /tmp marker. src/testing1345/__init__.py additionally re-exports fetch as a public API, so any caller of testing1345.fetch() runs whatever bytes the mutable URL currently serves. Whoever controls that GitHub repository therefore obtains arbitrary code execution on the installer&amp;#39;s machine at install time and at every subsequent Python startup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: kam193 (d31c34fe25baf82fd16f49fca26bbb491a517c6c41f93a5b9c3b112fe2194aa8)
During installation, the package downloads and executes a script from a remote location. During analysis, the code was benign, but the package is clearly part of campaign which previously delivered a RAT&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: testing1345py&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (dc04d3349dc599ea7ba9a0b603b2afb8ce99af579ba29280f087697aae959d3b)
The sdist&amp;#39;s setup.py overrides build_py.run to call _run_install_demo(), which on Windows invokes testing1345.hello.fetch() during pip install. fetch() downloads https://raw.githubusercontent.com/misdry01/g/refs/heads/main/test.bat — a mutable branch on a personal GitHub account unrelated to any declared publisher — and executes it via cmd.exe with no hash or signature check. The custom bdist_wheel writes testing1345_boot.pth into the wheel root; after install, site.py loads that.pth on every interpreter start and imports testing1345_boot, whose module-level run_once() calls the same fetch(), gated only by a /tmp marker. src/testing1345/__init__.py additionally re-exports fetch as a public API, so any caller of testing1345.fetch() runs whatever bytes the mutable URL currently serves. Whoever controls that GitHub repository therefore obtains arbitrary code execution on the installer&amp;#39;s machine at install time and at every subsequent Python startup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: kam193 (d31c34fe25baf82fd16f49fca26bbb491a517c6c41f93a5b9c3b112fe2194aa8)
During installation, the package downloads and executes a script from a remote location. During analysis, the code was benign, but the package is clearly part of campaign which previously delivered a RAT&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20313</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 19:30:56 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MAL-2026-20322 — Malicious code in instantscrape (PyPI)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20322</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: instantscrape&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (c686d2223600d1e566907147f1f905b5ecd66809e16c8541262283e425b8bfae)
The package advertises an Instagram scraper but its exported functions are empty stubs. The tarball and wheel ship an 8.4 MB Windows PE (Go-compiled) as src/instantscrape/pip.webp, declared as package_data. The top-level main.py unconditionally calls init() on import; on Windows (os.name==&amp;#39;nt&amp;#39;) this moves the bundled pip.webp to the user&amp;#39;s home directory as pip.exe (filename reconstructed from the reversed literal &amp;#34;exe.pip&amp;#34;[::-1]) and launches it via ctypes.windll.shell32.ShellExecuteW with the &amp;#34;runas&amp;#34; verb, triggering a UAC elevation prompt. A sentinel file name is likewise hidden as a reversed literal (&amp;#34;ses.retsboLneddiH&amp;#34;[::-1] -&amp;gt; HiddenLobsters.ses), and the payload uses a.webp extension to masquerade as an image. setup.py additionally registers a custom install cmdclass that invokes `python src/instantscrape/init_scarper.py` after install, routing the sdist install path to the same dropper module. The combination of an opaque bundled Windows executable, reversed-string filename obfuscation, extension masquerade, an empty advertised API, and automatic elevated execution on import is a trojan dropper, not a scraper library.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: kam193 (080884e1b90e6717f2e13d434608203eb24db65a5071803022d3d12b6a7032d5)
During installation or import, package executes an embedded malicious executable acting as an infostealer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: instantscrape&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (c686d2223600d1e566907147f1f905b5ecd66809e16c8541262283e425b8bfae)
The package advertises an Instagram scraper but its exported functions are empty stubs. The tarball and wheel ship an 8.4 MB Windows PE (Go-compiled) as src/instantscrape/pip.webp, declared as package_data. The top-level main.py unconditionally calls init() on import; on Windows (os.name==&amp;#39;nt&amp;#39;) this moves the bundled pip.webp to the user&amp;#39;s home directory as pip.exe (filename reconstructed from the reversed literal &amp;#34;exe.pip&amp;#34;[::-1]) and launches it via ctypes.windll.shell32.ShellExecuteW with the &amp;#34;runas&amp;#34; verb, triggering a UAC elevation prompt. A sentinel file name is likewise hidden as a reversed literal (&amp;#34;ses.retsboLneddiH&amp;#34;[::-1] -&amp;gt; HiddenLobsters.ses), and the payload uses a.webp extension to masquerade as an image. setup.py additionally registers a custom install cmdclass that invokes `python src/instantscrape/init_scarper.py` after install, routing the sdist install path to the same dropper module. The combination of an opaque bundled Windows executable, reversed-string filename obfuscation, extension masquerade, an empty advertised API, and automatic elevated execution on import is a trojan dropper, not a scraper library.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: kam193 (080884e1b90e6717f2e13d434608203eb24db65a5071803022d3d12b6a7032d5)
During installation or import, package executes an embedded malicious executable acting as an infostealer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20322</guid>
      <pubDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 11:53:10 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MAL-2026-20312 — Malicious code in cijukop (PyPI)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20312</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: cijukop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (74c4c4647ff9c1daa53883b585337472d082a7739bd7b28a87b20c19e7cf641d)
cijukop 1.0.0 ships a nearly empty module (cijukop.py is a stub) and declares its payload through pyproject.toml&amp;#39;s [build-system].requires, which references `header-buffer-binary-shard @ https://package-registry-receiver-stg.depx-research-bf0.workers.dev/pypi/header_buffer_binary_shard-1.0.0.tar.gz`. PEP 517 build frontends resolve and install this URL dependency into the isolated build environment before the sdist is built, executing the fetched tarball&amp;#39;s setup/build hooks on the installer&amp;#39;s machine. The source is an anonymous Cloudflare workers.dev endpoint rather than a package index or publisher domain, there is no version pin and no hash/integrity check, and whoever controls the URL can change the delivered bytes at any time. Because the shipped module is inert, this off-registry build-time dependency is the package&amp;#39;s only functional effect on install.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: kam193 (660712af586b310107ab85cfce6bb9240b434344c4331e3b055ec8862bb6766f)
The package uses fake http-downloaded dependencies to track downloads, and has no other purpose.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research &amp;amp; co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Campaign: 2026-10-vacsdk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reasons (based on the campaign):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- dependency-conf…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: cijukop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: amazon-inspector (74c4c4647ff9c1daa53883b585337472d082a7739bd7b28a87b20c19e7cf641d)
cijukop 1.0.0 ships a nearly empty module (cijukop.py is a stub) and declares its payload through pyproject.toml&amp;#39;s [build-system].requires, which references `header-buffer-binary-shard @ https://package-registry-receiver-stg.depx-research-bf0.workers.dev/pypi/header_buffer_binary_shard-1.0.0.tar.gz`. PEP 517 build frontends resolve and install this URL dependency into the isolated build environment before the sdist is built, executing the fetched tarball&amp;#39;s setup/build hooks on the installer&amp;#39;s machine. The source is an anonymous Cloudflare workers.dev endpoint rather than a package index or publisher domain, there is no version pin and no hash/integrity check, and whoever controls the URL can change the delivered bytes at any time. Because the shipped module is inert, this off-registry build-time dependency is the package&amp;#39;s only functional effect on install.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Source: kam193 (660712af586b310107ab85cfce6bb9240b434344c4331e3b055ec8862bb6766f)
The package uses fake http-downloaded dependencies to track downloads, and has no other purpose.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research &amp;amp; co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Campaign: 2026-10-vacsdk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reasons (based on the campaign):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- dependency-conf…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-20312</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 19:45:12 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
  </channel>
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