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    <title>Most recent entries from osv_ocaml</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 14:23:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>OSEC-2026-28 — Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via path traversal in `/conferences/ocaml/**`</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-28</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;`GET /conferences/ocaml/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` on ocaml.org concatenates the raw request target onto `OCAMLORG_V2_PATH` (`/v2`) and serves it with `Dream.from_filesystem`, bypassing the path validation that `Dream.static` performs. An unauthenticated request containing `..` segments escapes `/v2` and reads arbitrary files as the server process, which runs as `root` in the container.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Please note that the live deployment of https://ocaml.org is in a dedicated Docker container which does not contain any secrets. Thus the vulnerability is in the ocaml.org source code, but there has been no impact for the live deployment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/ocamlorg_web/lib/handler.ml:1544 (commit ocaml/ocaml.org@31249f2d69fcb243284d3a6a2b91c0a4963f25b5)`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ocaml
let v2_asset req =
  let&amp;lt;/&amp;gt;? path =
    try Some (Config.v2_path ^ Dream.target req) with _ -&amp;gt; None
  in
  let&amp;lt;/&amp;gt;? () = if Sys.file_exists path then Some () else None in
  Filename.(Dream.from_filesystem (dirname path) (basename path) req)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The route is public (`src/ocamlorg_web/lib/router.ml:186`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ocaml
Dream.get &amp;#34;/conferences/ocaml/**&amp;#34; Handler.v2_asset;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Config.v2_path` is `OCAMLORG_V2_PATH`, set to `/v2` in the production image (`Dockerfile:68`). `Dream.target` is the request target as received; nothing rejects `.` or `..` components.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Timeline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- 2026-10-31 report via https://github.com/ocaml/security-advisories
- 2026-11-02 fixed via https://github.com/ocaml/ocaml.org/pull/3942 and deployed ocaml.org&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;`GET /conferences/ocaml/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` on ocaml.org concatenates the raw request target onto `OCAMLORG_V2_PATH` (`/v2`) and serves it with `Dream.from_filesystem`, bypassing the path validation that `Dream.static` performs. An unauthenticated request containing `..` segments escapes `/v2` and reads arbitrary files as the server process, which runs as `root` in the container.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Please note that the live deployment of https://ocaml.org is in a dedicated Docker container which does not contain any secrets. Thus the vulnerability is in the ocaml.org source code, but there has been no impact for the live deployment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/ocamlorg_web/lib/handler.ml:1544 (commit ocaml/ocaml.org@31249f2d69fcb243284d3a6a2b91c0a4963f25b5)`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ocaml
let v2_asset req =
  let&amp;lt;/&amp;gt;? path =
    try Some (Config.v2_path ^ Dream.target req) with _ -&amp;gt; None
  in
  let&amp;lt;/&amp;gt;? () = if Sys.file_exists path then Some () else None in
  Filename.(Dream.from_filesystem (dirname path) (basename path) req)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The route is public (`src/ocamlorg_web/lib/router.ml:186`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ocaml
Dream.get &amp;#34;/conferences/ocaml/**&amp;#34; Handler.v2_asset;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Config.v2_path` is `OCAMLORG_V2_PATH`, set to `/v2` in the production image (`Dockerfile:68`). `Dream.target` is the request target as received; nothing rejects `.` or `..` components.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Timeline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- 2026-10-31 report via https://github.com/ocaml/security-advisories
- 2026-11-02 fixed via https://github.com/ocaml/ocaml.org/pull/3942 and deployed ocaml.org&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-28</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 13:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OSEC-2026-30 — Ephemeron data is freed while still referenced when the key is an `Infix_tag` closure</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-30</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In OCaml before 4.14.5, when the key of an ephemeron is a closure with `Infix_tag` (a function of a mutually recursive group that is not the first function), the mark phase does not keep the ephemeron&amp;#39;s data alive, although the key is alive. The clean phase does treat the key as alive, so it leaves the data field filled. The sweep phase then frees the data block. After a major collection the ephemeron&amp;#39;s data field still points to the freed block.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This looks like the part of [#7810](https://github.com/ocaml/ocaml/issues/7810) that PR [#9742](https://github.com/ocaml/ocaml/pull/9742) did not cover. PR [#9742](https://github.com/ocaml/ocaml/pull/9742) fixed the clean phase and the minor collector. It did not change `mark_ephe_aux`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Please note that the CVSS score high is under the conditions:
- *if* the application is using ephemerons,
- and *if* the application is available over the network,
- and *if* the attacker can find a way to exploit the memory safety issue in an attack chain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Reproduction&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ocaml
[@@@alert &amp;#34;-old_ephemeron_api&amp;#34;]
let infix n = let rec f () = n and g () = f () in g&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;let build key n =
  let e = Ephemeron.K1.create () in
  let w = Weak.create 1 in
  let d = ref n in
  Ephemeron.K1.set_key e key;
  Ephemeron.K1.set_data e d;
  Weak.set w 0 (Some d);
  (e, w)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;let run key =
  let (e, w) = build key 1 in
  Gc.full_major ();
  Printf.printf &amp;#34;tag=%d weak=%b check_key=%b check_data=%b\n&amp;#34;
    (Obj.tag (Obj.repr key)) (Weak.check w 0)
    (Ephem…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In OCaml before 4.14.5, when the key of an ephemeron is a closure with `Infix_tag` (a function of a mutually recursive group that is not the first function), the mark phase does not keep the ephemeron&amp;#39;s data alive, although the key is alive. The clean phase does treat the key as alive, so it leaves the data field filled. The sweep phase then frees the data block. After a major collection the ephemeron&amp;#39;s data field still points to the freed block.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This looks like the part of [#7810](https://github.com/ocaml/ocaml/issues/7810) that PR [#9742](https://github.com/ocaml/ocaml/pull/9742) did not cover. PR [#9742](https://github.com/ocaml/ocaml/pull/9742) fixed the clean phase and the minor collector. It did not change `mark_ephe_aux`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Please note that the CVSS score high is under the conditions:
- *if* the application is using ephemerons,
- and *if* the application is available over the network,
- and *if* the attacker can find a way to exploit the memory safety issue in an attack chain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Reproduction&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ocaml
[@@@alert &amp;#34;-old_ephemeron_api&amp;#34;]
let infix n = let rec f () = n and g () = f () in g&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;let build key n =
  let e = Ephemeron.K1.create () in
  let w = Weak.create 1 in
  let d = ref n in
  Ephemeron.K1.set_key e key;
  Ephemeron.K1.set_data e d;
  Weak.set w 0 (Some d);
  (e, w)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;let run key =
  let (e, w) = build key 1 in
  Gc.full_major ();
  Printf.printf &amp;#34;tag=%d weak=%b check_key=%b check_data=%b\n&amp;#34;
    (Obj.tag (Obj.repr key)) (Weak.check w 0)
    (Ephem…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-30</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 12:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OSEC-2026-24 — Multiple issues in command quoting on Windows</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-24</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-R7FKP7RG Win32 quote_cmd_filename misses pipe/redirect metacharacters&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-SRZZ62SD Windows batch-file argument injection via maybe_quote/make_cmdline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-JPEWMPAB Win32 argument quoting leaves embedded CR/LF unescaped&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also includes the fix for [OSEC-2026-05](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/OSEC-2026-05)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Filename.quote_command` returns a quoted command line, suitable for use as an argument to `Sys.command`, `Unix.system`, and the `Unix.open_process` functions.
However on Windows certain characters weren&amp;#39;t properly escaped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Unix.create_process` can invoke `.bat` or `.cmd` programs on Windows, and certain characters were accepted that cannot be quoted safely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Filename.quote_command` has been updated to correctly quote arguments.
`Unix.create_process*` has been updated to reject arguments that cannot be safely quoted by raising `Failure`:
&amp;gt;  if the program [prog] is a [.bat] or [.cmd]
&amp;gt;  script and either [prog] or [args] contain characters that cannot be
&amp;gt;  securely passed to a script, such as [&amp;#34; | &amp;amp; , ; &amp;lt; = &amp;gt; ^ % &amp;#34;].
&amp;gt;  If you really need to pass these characters to a script, consider
&amp;gt;  using {!Unix.system} instead.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you use `Filename.quote_command` on Windows with user supplied arguments.
If you use `Unix.create_process*` or `Unix.open_process*` on Windows with `.bat` or `.cmd` programs, and user supplied arguments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Timeline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- 2026-08-24: vulnerability was found
- 2026-08-27: forwarded report to security@ocaml.org…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-R7FKP7RG Win32 quote_cmd_filename misses pipe/redirect metacharacters&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-SRZZ62SD Windows batch-file argument injection via maybe_quote/make_cmdline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-JPEWMPAB Win32 argument quoting leaves embedded CR/LF unescaped&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also includes the fix for [OSEC-2026-05](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/OSEC-2026-05)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Filename.quote_command` returns a quoted command line, suitable for use as an argument to `Sys.command`, `Unix.system`, and the `Unix.open_process` functions.
However on Windows certain characters weren&amp;#39;t properly escaped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Unix.create_process` can invoke `.bat` or `.cmd` programs on Windows, and certain characters were accepted that cannot be quoted safely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Filename.quote_command` has been updated to correctly quote arguments.
`Unix.create_process*` has been updated to reject arguments that cannot be safely quoted by raising `Failure`:
&amp;gt;  if the program [prog] is a [.bat] or [.cmd]
&amp;gt;  script and either [prog] or [args] contain characters that cannot be
&amp;gt;  securely passed to a script, such as [&amp;#34; | &amp;amp; , ; &amp;lt; = &amp;gt; ^ % &amp;#34;].
&amp;gt;  If you really need to pass these characters to a script, consider
&amp;gt;  using {!Unix.system} instead.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you use `Filename.quote_command` on Windows with user supplied arguments.
If you use `Unix.create_process*` or `Unix.open_process*` on Windows with `.bat` or `.cmd` programs, and user supplied arguments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Timeline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- 2026-08-24: vulnerability was found
- 2026-08-27: forwarded report to security@ocaml.org…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-24</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 21:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OSEC-2026-23 — Multiple issues in Marshal</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-23</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several issues have been discovered in the Marshal module:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-K7NTK0FT Stale obj_counter across unmarshal calls enables null/freed intern_obj_table indexing&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-2NJYQWEX Custom block size wraparound in CODE_CUSTOM_LEN allocation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-PJC00M7X Unmarshaler accepts forged Closure_tag metadata without validation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a followup for [OSEC-2026-01](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/OSEC-2026-01)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Corrupted or malicious marshaled data that causes undefined behaviour in the runtime system when unmarshaled. input_value should either fail cleanly or produce a well-formed OCaml object, without corrupting the runtime system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consequently, this excludes well-formed marshaled data that produces an OCaml object that is not of the type expected by the OCaml code and causes the Ocaml code to crash or misbehave.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you use one of the affected bindings `Marshal.from_channel`, `Marshal.from_bytes`, `Marshal.from_string`, `Stdlib.input_value` (or a wrapper in a library, such as `Lwt_io.read_value`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Please note that Marshal is not type safe, and you have to be careful if you use the deserialization on untrusted input (due to type confusion, and remote code execution by design - you can use Marshal for code).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is recommended to use Marshal only for communication between trusted processes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Timeline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- 2026-08-24: vulnerability was found
- 2026-08-27: forwarded report to security@ocaml.org
- 2026-09-29: fix merged to trunk&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several issues have been discovered in the Marshal module:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-K7NTK0FT Stale obj_counter across unmarshal calls enables null/freed intern_obj_table indexing&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-2NJYQWEX Custom block size wraparound in CODE_CUSTOM_LEN allocation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-PJC00M7X Unmarshaler accepts forged Closure_tag metadata without validation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a followup for [OSEC-2026-01](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/OSEC-2026-01)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Corrupted or malicious marshaled data that causes undefined behaviour in the runtime system when unmarshaled. input_value should either fail cleanly or produce a well-formed OCaml object, without corrupting the runtime system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Consequently, this excludes well-formed marshaled data that produces an OCaml object that is not of the type expected by the OCaml code and causes the Ocaml code to crash or misbehave.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you use one of the affected bindings `Marshal.from_channel`, `Marshal.from_bytes`, `Marshal.from_string`, `Stdlib.input_value` (or a wrapper in a library, such as `Lwt_io.read_value`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Please note that Marshal is not type safe, and you have to be careful if you use the deserialization on untrusted input (due to type confusion, and remote code execution by design - you can use Marshal for code).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is recommended to use Marshal only for communication between trusted processes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Timeline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- 2026-08-24: vulnerability was found
- 2026-08-27: forwarded report to security@ocaml.org
- 2026-09-29: fix merged to trunk&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-23</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 21:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OSEC-2026-22 — Integer overflow in Unix.map_file</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-22</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-6W9NPC2Q mmap dimension product integer overflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use `caml_umul_overflow` instead of `*` when multiplying bigarray dimensions, which detects integer overflows and raise `Failure`.
Negative positions are also rejected by raising `Invalid_argument`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If either the dimensions or the file size in a call to `Unix.map_file` from your code is user controllable then you are potentially affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Score notes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is in a library, and the CVSS score is calculated [under worst case assumptions](https://www.first.org/cvss/v4.0/user-guide#Assessing-Vulnerabilities-in-Software-Libraries-and-Similar). For an actual application the score will depend on how much an attacker can control the input to this function (if at all).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Timeline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- 2026-08-24: vulnerability was found
- 2026-08-27: forwarded report to security@ocaml.org
- 2026-09-29: fix merged to trunk&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-6W9NPC2Q mmap dimension product integer overflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use `caml_umul_overflow` instead of `*` when multiplying bigarray dimensions, which detects integer overflows and raise `Failure`.
Negative positions are also rejected by raising `Invalid_argument`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If either the dimensions or the file size in a call to `Unix.map_file` from your code is user controllable then you are potentially affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Score notes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is in a library, and the CVSS score is calculated [under worst case assumptions](https://www.first.org/cvss/v4.0/user-guide#Assessing-Vulnerabilities-in-Software-Libraries-and-Similar). For an actual application the score will depend on how much an attacker can control the input to this function (if at all).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Timeline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- 2026-08-24: vulnerability was found
- 2026-08-27: forwarded report to security@ocaml.org
- 2026-09-29: fix merged to trunk&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-22</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 21:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OSEC-2026-18 — Marshal integer overflow leads to out-of-heap read</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-18</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An integer overflow in the length-validation logic of OCaml&amp;#39;s Marshal deserializer allows a crafted serialized object to bypass all bounds checks added by the CVE-2026-28364 fix, producing **heap out-of-bounds reads** from `Marshal.from_bytes` / `Marshal.from_string` (and the C API `caml_input_value_from_block`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`runtime/intern.c` validates declared data length against the input buffer with unsigned 64-bit addition that can wrap:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```c
/* caml_input_val_from_bytes, intern.c:1038 */
if (ofs + h.header_len + h.data_len &amp;gt; caml_string_length(str))
  caml_failwith(&amp;#34;input_val_from_string: bad length&amp;#34;);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`h.data_len` is fully attacker-controlled (8-byte field read straight from the stream for `Intext_magic_number_big`). With `data_len &amp;gt;= 2^64 - (ofs + h.header_len)`, the sum wraps to a small value and the check passes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The CVE-2026-28364 fix introduced:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```c
/* intern.c:1043 (added by the fix) */
s-&amp;gt;intern_src_end = s-&amp;gt;intern_src + h.data_len;   /* wraps to a pointer BEFORE the buffer */
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`intern_src_end` wraps to a location *before* `intern_src`, so every `intern_check_read()` bound added by the fix (`len &amp;gt; end - src` with a negative diff promoted to a huge `uintnat`) evaluates **false** for any realistic length. The parser (`intern_rec`) then honors attacker-controlled read lengths (`readblock` up to `Max_wosize` bytes) against memory far beyond the input buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The OCaml-side wrapper validation in `stdlib/marshal.ml` is bypassed by the same wrap, via…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An integer overflow in the length-validation logic of OCaml&amp;#39;s Marshal deserializer allows a crafted serialized object to bypass all bounds checks added by the CVE-2026-28364 fix, producing **heap out-of-bounds reads** from `Marshal.from_bytes` / `Marshal.from_string` (and the C API `caml_input_value_from_block`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`runtime/intern.c` validates declared data length against the input buffer with unsigned 64-bit addition that can wrap:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```c
/* caml_input_val_from_bytes, intern.c:1038 */
if (ofs + h.header_len + h.data_len &amp;gt; caml_string_length(str))
  caml_failwith(&amp;#34;input_val_from_string: bad length&amp;#34;);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`h.data_len` is fully attacker-controlled (8-byte field read straight from the stream for `Intext_magic_number_big`). With `data_len &amp;gt;= 2^64 - (ofs + h.header_len)`, the sum wraps to a small value and the check passes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The CVE-2026-28364 fix introduced:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```c
/* intern.c:1043 (added by the fix) */
s-&amp;gt;intern_src_end = s-&amp;gt;intern_src + h.data_len;   /* wraps to a pointer BEFORE the buffer */
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`intern_src_end` wraps to a location *before* `intern_src`, so every `intern_check_read()` bound added by the fix (`len &amp;gt; end - src` with a negative diff promoted to a huge `uintnat`) evaluates **false** for any realistic length. The parser (`intern_rec`) then honors attacker-controlled read lengths (`readblock` up to `Max_wosize` bytes) against memory far beyond the input buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The OCaml-side wrapper validation in `stdlib/marshal.ml` is bypassed by the same wrap, via…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-18</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OSEC-2026-26 — runtime_events user event name-based type confusion</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-26</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-DTBY2HWS&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Custom events maintains a cache of user events, it is possible to have a corrupt stream that has a valid message with one message type (which can be custom/unit/span/int) and then has the same event with a different message type.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This would never be encountered in a real program but can lead to a crash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validate event type against expected type, report a corrupt stream on mismatch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the runtime events producer and consumer run in separate processes, and the producer can be tricked into producing malformed data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Timeline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- 2026-08-24: vulnerability was found
- 2026-08-27: forwarded report to security@ocaml.org
- 2027-10-20: fix merged to trunk&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-DTBY2HWS&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Custom events maintains a cache of user events, it is possible to have a corrupt stream that has a valid message with one message type (which can be custom/unit/span/int) and then has the same event with a different message type.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This would never be encountered in a real program but can lead to a crash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validate event type against expected type, report a corrupt stream on mismatch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the runtime events producer and consumer run in separate processes, and the producer can be tricked into producing malformed data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Timeline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- 2026-08-24: vulnerability was found
- 2026-08-27: forwarded report to security@ocaml.org
- 2027-10-20: fix merged to trunk&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-26</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 21:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OSEC-2026-25 — Heap buffer overflow in the OCaml `runtime_events` consumer when parsing an oversized custom user event</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-25</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-0JXJVEVY&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Custom events maintains a cache of user events, it is possible to have a corrupt stream that has a valid message with one message type (which can be custom/unit/span/int) and then has the same event with a different message type.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This would never be encountered in a real program but can lead to a crash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Check message lengths for all runtime event types, report a corrupt stream on mismatch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the runtime events producer and consumer run in separate processes, and the producer can be tricked into producing malformed data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Timeline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- 2026-08-24: vulnerability was found
- 2026-08-27: forwarded report to security@ocaml.org
- 2027-09-05: fix merged to trunk&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-0JXJVEVY&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Custom events maintains a cache of user events, it is possible to have a corrupt stream that has a valid message with one message type (which can be custom/unit/span/int) and then has the same event with a different message type.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This would never be encountered in a real program but can lead to a crash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Check message lengths for all runtime event types, report a corrupt stream on mismatch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the runtime events producer and consumer run in separate processes, and the producer can be tricked into producing malformed data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Timeline&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- 2026-08-24: vulnerability was found
- 2026-08-27: forwarded report to security@ocaml.org
- 2027-09-05: fix merged to trunk&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-25</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 21:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OSEC-2026-21 — Str partial-match stale capture registers underflow</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-21</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-KKC4QS4S Str partial-match stale capture registers underflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Str.string_partial_match` records the beginning and end of a captured group.
There was an implicit assumption that `beginning &amp;lt;= end`.
However if it reached the end of the matched string but not the end of the regexp, it was possible for the beginning of the group to be matched at iteration N of the star operator, and the end of the group to be matched at iteration N-1, resulting in `beginning &amp;gt; end`.
`Str.matched_group` is safe, it fails with an `Invalid_argument` on groups with `beginning &amp;gt; end`, but `Str.replace_matched` can crash, trying to memcpy `end - beginning` bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The example in the ANT is `ab` partially matched against `\(\(a\)b\)+`. Group 2 has `beginning = 2` and `end = 1`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix is to record groups with `beginning &amp;gt; end` as not matched.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All of the following conditions are necessary:
  * you need to use `Str.string_partial_match`
    * if you don&amp;#39;t use this function you are not affected
  * you need to use one of `Str.{replace_matched,global_replace,replace_first}` on the same regexp after a call to `Str.string_partial_match`.
    * If you use `Str.group_beginning` and `Str.group_end` and do your own string manipulation that is safe, because the String module would raise on out of bounds accesses. Similarly `Str.matched_group` is safe (uses `String` functions in its OCaml implementation)
  * the match replacement must reference a group &amp;gt; 0
    * if the repl…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: ocaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ANT-2026-KKC4QS4S Str partial-match stale capture registers underflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Str.string_partial_match` records the beginning and end of a captured group.
There was an implicit assumption that `beginning &amp;lt;= end`.
However if it reached the end of the matched string but not the end of the regexp, it was possible for the beginning of the group to be matched at iteration N of the star operator, and the end of the group to be matched at iteration N-1, resulting in `beginning &amp;gt; end`.
`Str.matched_group` is safe, it fails with an `Invalid_argument` on groups with `beginning &amp;gt; end`, but `Str.replace_matched` can crash, trying to memcpy `end - beginning` bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The example in the ANT is `ab` partially matched against `\(\(a\)b\)+`. Group 2 has `beginning = 2` and `end = 1`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix is to record groups with `beginning &amp;gt; end` as not matched.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Am I affected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All of the following conditions are necessary:
  * you need to use `Str.string_partial_match`
    * if you don&amp;#39;t use this function you are not affected
  * you need to use one of `Str.{replace_matched,global_replace,replace_first}` on the same regexp after a call to `Str.string_partial_match`.
    * If you use `Str.group_beginning` and `Str.group_end` and do your own string manipulation that is safe, because the String module would raise on out of bounds accesses. Similarly `Str.matched_group` is safe (uses `String` functions in its OCaml implementation)
  * the match replacement must reference a group &amp;gt; 0
    * if the repl…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-21</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 21:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OSEC-2026-09 — Albatross-console memory exhaustion</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-09</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: albatross&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Albatross-console doesn&amp;#39;t properly terminate when looping over the ringbuffer. This leads to denial of service and memory exhaustion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Scenario&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user that has access to albatross-console either via the unix domain socket (requires root:albatross by default) or via albatross-tls-endpoint (requires a valid certificate and a running unikernel) can send a specially crafted query for console logs that will make albatross-console hang and eventually exhaust memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Detailed description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Albatross-console receives console messages from running unikernels via named pipes. These console messages are stored in memory in a ring buffer with a non-configurable default size of 1024 lines. A client query the console output of a unikernel with either a count or a timestamp for limiting the output. A bug in the ring buffer logic exists so that when the ring buffer is full (has 1024 lines) the termination logic doesn&amp;#39;t work properly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When using a timestamp to limit then a timestamp earlier than all recorded console output in the ring buffer bypasses the termination logic, and albatross-console will repeatedly loop over the ring buffer accumulating the entries in a list indefinitely eventually exhausting memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If using a count the termination logic doesn&amp;#39;t take into consideration how many entries there actually are if the ring buffer is full. Using a very large or negative count will make albatross-console loop over the ring buffer accumulating entries in a list until the length o…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opam: albatross&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Albatross-console doesn&amp;#39;t properly terminate when looping over the ringbuffer. This leads to denial of service and memory exhaustion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Scenario&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user that has access to albatross-console either via the unix domain socket (requires root:albatross by default) or via albatross-tls-endpoint (requires a valid certificate and a running unikernel) can send a specially crafted query for console logs that will make albatross-console hang and eventually exhaust memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Detailed description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Albatross-console receives console messages from running unikernels via named pipes. These console messages are stored in memory in a ring buffer with a non-configurable default size of 1024 lines. A client query the console output of a unikernel with either a count or a timestamp for limiting the output. A bug in the ring buffer logic exists so that when the ring buffer is full (has 1024 lines) the termination logic doesn&amp;#39;t work properly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When using a timestamp to limit then a timestamp earlier than all recorded console output in the ring buffer bypasses the termination logic, and albatross-console will repeatedly loop over the ring buffer accumulating the entries in a list indefinitely eventually exhausting memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If using a count the termination logic doesn&amp;#39;t take into consideration how many entries there actually are if the ring buffer is full. Using a very large or negative count will make albatross-console loop over the ring buffer accumulating entries in a list until the length o…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/osec-2026-09</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 08:59:44 +0000</pubDate>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
