Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-285

Weakness Discouraged

Improper Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

Dimensions

  • Behavior-Property: Improper
  • Behavior-Type: Authorization
Mapping guidance

CWE-285 is high-level and lower-level CWEs can frequently be used instead. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).

Look at CWE-285's children and descendants.

Relationships and members
ChildOf: CWE-284 · View CWE-1000
  • Behavior-Type: Access Control
ChildOf: CWE-284 · View CWE-1340
Modes of introduction
Implementation

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.

Architecture and Design

Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.

Operation
Detection methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.

Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.

Effectiveness: Limited

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.

Effectiveness: Moderate

These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Web Application Scanner

Web Services Scanner

Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Host Application Interface Scanner

Fuzz Tester

Framework-based Fuzzer

Forced Path Execution

Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Notes

Terminology

Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.

Content history
Submission: 7 Pernicious Kingdoms · 2006-07-19 · CWE Draft 3
Modification: Eric Dalci · Cigital · 2008-07-01 · CWE 1.0

updated Time_of_Introduction

Modification: · Veracode · 2008-08-15 · CWE 1.0

Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2008-09-08 · CWE 1.0

updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-01-12 · CWE 1.2

updated Common_Consequences, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-03-10 · CWE 1.3

updated Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-05-27 · CWE 1.4

updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-07-27 · CWE 1.5

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-10-29 · CWE 1.6

updated Type

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-12-28 · CWE 1.7

updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-02-16 · CWE 1.8

updated Alternate_Terms, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-04-05 · CWE 1.8.1

updated Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-06-21 · CWE 1.9

updated Common_Consequences, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-09-27 · CWE 1.10

updated Description

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-03-24 · CWE 1.12

Changed name and description; clarified difference between "access control" and "authorization."

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-03-29 · CWE 1.12

updated Background_Details, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-06-01 · CWE 1.13

updated Common_Consequences, Observed_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2012-05-11 · CWE 2.2

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2012-10-30 · CWE 2.3

updated Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2013-07-17 · CWE 2.5

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2014-07-30 · CWE 2.8

updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2015-12-07 · CWE 2.9

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-11-08 · CWE 3.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2018-03-27 · CWE 3.1

updated References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-01-03 · CWE 3.2

updated Related_Attack_Patterns

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-06-20 · CWE 3.3

updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-02-24 · CWE 4.0

updated References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-08-20 · CWE 4.2

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-12-10 · CWE 4.3

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-03-15 · CWE 4.4

updated Alternate_Terms

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-07-20 · CWE 4.5

updated Related_Attack_Patterns

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-10-28 · CWE 4.6

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-04-28 · CWE 4.7

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-10-13 · CWE 4.9

updated Observed_Examples

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-01-31 · CWE 4.10

updated Description, Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-04-27 · CWE 4.11

updated References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-06-29 · CWE 4.12

updated Mapping_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-09-09 · CWE 4.18

updated Detection_Factors, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-12-11 · CWE 4.19

updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Relationships, Terminology_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-04-30 · CWE 4.20

updated Mapping_Notes, Observed_Examples

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-10-28 · CWE 5.0

updated Dimensions, References, Relationships

2980 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

CVE-2026-134006 (GCVE-0-2026-134006)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-21 18:30 – Updated: 2026-11-21 18:30
VLAI
Title
Moonshot AI Kimi Code Plan Mode Permission Guard planService.ts guardToolExecution improper authorization
Summary
A weakness has been identified in Moonshot AI Kimi Code up to 2.7.2. This vulnerability affects the function guardToolExecution of the file packages/agent-core-v2/src/features/plan/planService.ts of the component Plan Mode Permission Guard. Executing a manipulation can lead to improper authorization. The attack requires local access. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
CWE
  • CWE-285 - Improper Authorization
  • CWE-266 - Incorrect Privilege Assignment
Assigner
VulDB CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard B 83/100 over 3776 records in the last 180 days details
References
URL Tags
https://vuldb.com/vuln/441599 vdb-entrytechnical-description
https://vuldb.com/vuln/441599/cti signaturepermissions-required
https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-134006 third-party-advisory
https://vuldb.com/submit/1052054 third-party-advisory
https://mcniyfj5bw9b.feishu.cn/docx/B9lIdyhBAovYr… exploit
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Moonshot AI Kimi Code Affected: 2.7.0
Affected: 2.7.1
Affected: 2.7.2
    cpe:2.3:a:moonshot_ai:kimi_code:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133850 (GCVE-0-2026-133850)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:39 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34
VLAI
Title
flowintel: Stale Authorization Allows Notification Disclosure After Case Access Revocation
Summary
flowintel contains an authorization flaw in its recurring reminder notification subsystem. When a user is subscribed to recurring notifications for a case, the system does not re-verify the recipient's current access rights to that case before generating or displaying the notification. As a result, a user who previously had access to a private case and later had that access revoked can still: - Receive recurring reminder notifications containing case-related content. - View stored reminder notifications in their notification list, including notification counts, even though they no longer have permission to view the underlying case. The vulnerability affects both the notification creation path (recurring reminder generation) and the notification display path (listing and counting stored reminders). The issue arises because the authorization check performed at subscription time is not re-applied at delivery or retrieval time. Security impact is limited to information disclosure: an unauthorized user may observe case titles, reminder messages, and associated metadata that they no longer have permission to access. No integrity or availability impact is indicated by the patch. Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:20 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:21 UTC
CWE
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:20
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea 433c4d2d3f96…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
af6e91c8ac63 fix: [security] Recheck private case access for recurring 433c4d2d3f96…
Fix summary

The fix introduces an authorization re-check at two points: (1) before creating a recurring reminder notification, the system now verifies the recipient's current case visibility and skips delivery if access has been revoked; (2) when listing or counting stored notifications, the system now filters out case-related reminder notifications for which the viewing user no longer has case access. This ensures that both the creation and display paths enforce current authorization state rather than relying on a one-time check at subscription time.

Patch summary

In recurring_notification.py, the create_notification function now imports can_view_case and, for each recurring notification subscriber, fetches the User record and calls can_view_case(case, recipient); if the check fails, the notification is skipped via continue. In notification_core.py, the DEADLINE_ICONS tuple is extended to include the clock icon (fa-solid fa-clock), a new helper _is_case_deadline_notification is added to identify case-related deadline/reminder notifications by icon or notification_type, and _visible_deadline_notifications is updated to use this helper so that reminders for inaccessible cases are excluded from the returned list. The test file is updated to create a real Case object for the reminder notification fixture instead of using a hardcoded case_id.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: The application is a web-based platform accessed over the network. AC:L: No special race condition or complex setup is required; the user simply needs to have previously had case access and then have it revoked. AT:N: No manipulation of the target is needed. PR:L: An authenticated user with a valid account and prior case subscription is required. UI:N: Notifications are delivered and displayed automatically without requiring victim interaction. VC:L: Limited confidentiality impact; case-related notification content (titles, reminder messages) is exposed to a user who no longer has case access. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact is evidenced. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: The affected data resides within the same application scope; no cross-scope impact is indicated.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-285 The system performed an authorization check at subscription time but failed to re-enforce it at notification delivery and display time. The authorization decision was not re-evaluated when the user's access to the case changed, resulting in continued access to case-related notification content. This is a failure to properly enforce authorization at the point of access rather than a complete absence of authorization logic.
  • CWE-862 In the recurring notification creation path, no authorization check existed at all before generating the notification for a subscriber. The check was entirely absent, not merely insufficient, making CWE-862 a defensible secondary mapping for the creation path specifically.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-66 The notification subsystem operated with a lower security enforcement level than the case-access subsystem: it did not enforce the same access-control checks that governed case visibility. An attacker (or a user whose access was legitimately revoked) could exploit this misconfiguration to continue receiving case-related notification content. This is the closest CAPEC to the pattern of a component not enforcing the security level configured elsewhere in the application. The mapping is uncertain because no CAPEC specifically describes stale-authorization or missing re-authorization at delivery time; CAPEC-66 is selected as the best available match for a security-level enforcement gap between components.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the patch itself does not contain version strings.
  • The CAPEC-66 mapping is the closest available match; no CAPEC specifically covers stale-authorization or missing re-authorization at notification delivery time. This uncertainty is noted in the CAPEC rationale.
  • CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker is an authenticated user who previously had case access; the patch does not specify whether unauthenticated access is possible.
  • CVSS VC:L assumes the disclosed information is limited to notification content (case titles, reminder messages) rather than full case data; the patch only addresses notification visibility.
  • The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerability is exploitable remotely or requires local access; AV:N is assumed based on the web-application nature of the product.
  • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-17 09:16 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea): fix: [security] Recheck private case access for recurring https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea
  2. 2026-11-20 14:19 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133848 (GCVE-0-2026-133848)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:39 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:31
VLAI
Title
flowintel: Organization Admin Can Delete Platform Admin Accounts Due to Missing Privilege Hierarchy Check
Summary
flowintel contains an authorization flaw in its user deletion functionality. Organization-scoped administrators (org admins) are able to delete platform-level administrator accounts through both the browser-based admin interface and the REST API. The existing authorization logic verified that an org admin could only target users within their own organization, but it did not enforce the privilege hierarchy between organization admins and platform admins. As a result, an authenticated org admin could issue a deletion request against any platform-admin account belonging to the same organization, causing the target account, its sessions, and related records to be permanently removed. Impact: - Loss of platform-level administrative oversight - Potential disruption of platform-wide management functions - Removal of higher-privilege accounts that should be protected from lower-privilege roles Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:19 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 18:31 UTC
CWE
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:19
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb 05b89a0d2175…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
e3d0b2ab153d fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from deleting 05b89a0d2175…
Fix summary

The fix introduces an explicit privilege-hierarchy check in both the browser and API deletion routes. Before any session invalidation or account deletion is performed, the system now verifies whether the target user holds platform-admin capability. If the requester is a pure organization admin and the target is a platform admin, the request is rejected with a 403 response, preserving the intended authorization boundary while leaving legitimate deletion workflows unaffected.

Patch summary

Two lines added in app/admin/admin.py (delete_user function) and two lines added in app/admin/admin_api.py (API GET handler). In each location, after the existing same-organization check for pure org admins, a new condition checks user.is_admin() / user_to_delete.is_admin(). If true, a 403 JSON response is returned with an appropriate error message, preventing the deletion from proceeding. No other logic was modified.

CVSS rationale

AV:N - the vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web UI or REST API. AC:L - exploitation requires only a standard authenticated request targeting a platform-admin account; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N - no attack-target manipulation is needed. PR:L - the attacker must hold a valid organization-admin account. UI:N - no victim interaction is required; the org admin acts on their own behalf. VC:N - no confidential data is exposed. VI:N - the application's own data integrity is not corrupted; the deletion is a legitimate operation performed by an authenticated user. VA:H - platform-admin accounts and their sessions are permanently deleted, significantly degrading the availability of platform administration. SC:N - no cross-component confidentiality impact. SI:N - no cross-component integrity impact. SA:H - the broader platform administration and oversight functions lose availability when platform-admin accounts are removed.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-285 The authorization logic for the user-deletion endpoint verified organizational scope but failed to enforce the privilege hierarchy between organization admins and platform admins. The missing check allowed a lower-privilege role to perform an action (deleting a higher-privilege account) that should have been restricted, constituting an improper authorization decision.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-126 An authenticated organization admin leverages a missing authorization boundary to perform an action (deleting a platform-admin account) that is reserved for a higher-privilege role. This is a vertical privilege escalation: the actor gains the effective capability of a platform admin by removing platform-admin accounts. The mapping is the closest standard CAPEC; the attack does not involve traditional credential theft or token manipulation but rather an authorization logic gap that permits a lower-privilege actor to act at a higher privilege level.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (fixed in 4.1.0); the exact earliest affected version is not stated in the patch and is recorded as unspecified.
  • The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest standard pattern; the vulnerability is more precisely an authorization-logic gap than a classic privilege-escalation exploit, but no more specific CAPEC exists for missing privilege-hierarchy checks in multi-tenant admin systems.
  • CVSS VA:H and SA:H assume that deleting platform-admin accounts materially degrades the availability of platform-level administration; if the deployment has redundant platform admins, the practical impact may be lower.
  • The patch metadata lists affected_version as '0', which is treated as a placeholder; the actual lower bound of affected versions is unknown.
  • No evidence of active exploitation or public PoC was found in the patch or metadata.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-17 08:09 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb): fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from deleting https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb
  2. 2026-11-20 14:18 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133658 (GCVE-0-2026-133658)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:55 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:38
VLAI
Title
Flowintel Matrix Relay Authorization Bypass Allows Privilege Escalation and Bot Impersonation
Summary
Flowintel contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in its Matrix relay (bot) integration. When the relay forwarded API requests on behalf of a represented user, the authorization and permission checks evaluated the relay bot's elevated role while the request handlers acted as the lower-privileged represented user. This mismatch allowed users with restricted roles (e.g., Read Only) to perform write operations, directory lookups, calendar modifications, assignment changes, template creation, and import actions they were not authorized to perform. Additionally, relay authority was determined by matching editable user profile fields (name and email) rather than a protected, non-spoofable identifier. An ordinary user who modified their profile to match the expected bot name could be recognized as the trusted relay, enabling impersonation of the bot and potential access to its elevated privileges. Preconditions: - A valid Flowintel user account with a restricted role (e.g., Read Only) - Access to the Matrix relay integration or the ability to send API requests with the relay's API key and a MATRIX-ID header - For the impersonation vector: ability to edit one's own profile name fields Security impact: - Unauthorized write operations by users with read-only or otherwise restricted permissions - Potential impersonation of the trusted relay bot by ordinary users - Bypass of organization-level access controls and role-based restrictions - Unauthorized modification of cases, tasks, calendar events, templates, and user directory entries Affected versions: Flowintel prior to 4.1.0
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 10:45 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:23 UTC
CWE
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 10:45
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch dbf4ccb08942…
Confidence
high
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
48e9e1b847ec fix: [security] Matrix relays use the represented user's dbf4ccb08942…
Fix summary

The fix introduces a protected, non-editable is_bot database marker to identify trusted relay accounts, replacing the previous reliance on editable name and email fields. The user resolution function now returns the same principal for both authentication/permission checks and request handlers, ensuring that a represented user's actual role governs all operations. Relay requests without a valid MATRIX-ID, bot-to-bot requests, and ordinary API keys carrying a MATRIX-ID header are all refused. New bot accounts are assigned the Read Only role instead of Admin. Only administrators can edit or delete registered bot accounts, preventing OrgAdmins from resetting bot credentials. An operator script (bin/register_matrix_bot.py) provides explicit, ID-based bot registration without relying on profile fields.

Patch summary

Added an is_bot Boolean column to the User model via a new Alembic migration (default false). Replaced get_user_api() calls with a new get_user_from_api(headers) function that resolves a single acting user for both permission checks and handlers, enforcing that bot requests require a valid MATRIX-ID and that the resolved user is not itself a bot. Updated all API endpoints (admin, calendar, assignment, templating, tools) and permission decorators to use the new resolution function. Added is_bot checks in admin edit/delete handlers to restrict bot account management to administrators. Modified init_db.py to assign new bots the Read Only role and set is_bot=True. Added bin/register_matrix_bot.py for explicit operator registration by database user ID. Updated installation and user documentation to describe the new relay security model and upgrade procedure.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the Flowintel REST API. AC:L: Exploitation requires only sending a standard API request with the relay's API key and a MATRIX-ID header; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: The attacker needs a valid Flowintel user account with a restricted role (e.g., Read Only) and access to the relay's API key or the ability to send relay-formatted requests. UI:N: No user interaction is required; the attack is fully automated via API calls. VC:N: No direct confidentiality impact on the vulnerable component is evidenced. VI:N: The vulnerable component's own integrity is not directly compromised. VA:N: No availability impact. SC:N: No impact on other systems. SI:H: The primary impact is on data integrity, as restricted users can create, modify, or delete cases, tasks, calendar events, templates, and directory entries they should not have access to. SA:N: No impact on other systems' security.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-285 The primary vulnerability is that permission/role checks evaluated the relay bot's Admin role while the actual request handlers acted as the represented (lower-privileged) user. This mismatch in the authorization principal allowed restricted users to perform actions beyond their granted permissions.
  • CWE-287 The relay bot's identity was established by matching editable user profile fields (first_name, last_name) rather than a protected credential or marker. This allowed ordinary users to modify their profiles to match the expected bot identity and be recognized as the trusted relay, constituting an authentication weakness.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-126 The relay bot held Admin-level privileges that were incorrectly applied during authorization checks for requests intended to act on behalf of a lower-privileged user. An attacker with a restricted account exploited this privilege misalignment to perform unauthorized write operations. The secondary vector (editable name-based bot identification) further enabled privilege escalation by allowing impersonation of the high-privilege relay account. CAPEC-126 is the closest match as it covers scenarios where a system's privilege assignment or enforcement is misconfigured, allowing a lower-privileged actor to leverage higher privileges.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version 0, fixed_version 4.1.0); the exact earliest affected release is not confirmed by the patch alone.
  • CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs a valid user account and access to the relay's API key; if the relay's API key is trivially obtainable, PR could be lower.
  • The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest available pattern; the vulnerability combines authorization confusion (CWE-285) with weak identity binding (CWE-287), and no single CAPEC captures both aspects precisely.
  • The assumption that the Matrix relay is an external service sending requests with a shared API key is inferred from the code structure and documentation; the exact deployment topology is not fully specified in the patch.
  • CVSS SI:H is assigned based on the ability to perform unauthorized write operations; if the relay also exposes read operations beyond the user's scope, VC could be elevated, but the patch evidence primarily demonstrates write-privilege escalation.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 8 11 high 5
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-02 11:09 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d): fix: [security] Matrix relays use the represented user's https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch
  2. 2026-11-20 10:44 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133577 (GCVE-0-2026-133577)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 06:53 – Updated: 2026-11-20 13:49
VLAI
Title
Github.com/kuadrant/kuadrant-operator: github.com/kuadrant/wasm-shim: kuadrant-operator: authpolicy is silently bypassed (fail-open) when a tokenratelimitpolicy is combined with an authpolicy or a gateway-level ratelimitpolicy
Summary
A flaw was found in the Kuadrant WebAssembly (WASM) shim shipped in Red Hat Connectivity Link 1.5. When a TokenRateLimitPolicy is attached to an HTTPRoute that also has an AuthPolicy - or when a RateLimitPolicy with defaults or overrides is attached to the Gateway or listener of such routes - the shim's action pipeline fails to dispatch the authentication guard at request time, and the request is forwarded upstream. Unauthenticated requests return 200 OK instead of 401, and neither authentication nor rate limiting is enforced. Both policies continue to report Enforced, leaving no status-level indication of the failure.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 13:46 UTC
CWE
Assigner
redhat CNA under the redhat root
CNA scorecard B 82/100 over 1232 records in the last 180 days details
References
URL Tags
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-133577 vdb-entryx_refsource_REDHAT
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2577566 issue-trackingx_refsource_REDHAT
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Red Hat Red Hat Connectivity Link 1     cpe:/a:redhat:connectivity_link:1
Create a notification for this product.
Red Hat Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)     cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai
Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-11-20 05:11
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133480 (GCVE-0-2026-133480)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 03:30 – Updated: 2026-11-20 03:30
VLAI
Title
hrshadhin CloudSchool Student Data Access Check PublicController.php PublicController.checkSanity4Student authorization
Summary
A flaw has been found in hrshadhin CloudSchool up to 3.0.1. Affected by this issue is the function PublicController.checkSanity4Student of the file app/Http/Controllers/Backend/PublicController.php of the component Student Data Access Check. This manipulation of the argument student_id causes authorization bypass. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
CWE
Assigner
VulDB CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard B 83/100 over 3776 records in the last 180 days details
References
URL Tags
https://vuldb.com/vuln/440882 vdb-entrytechnical-description
https://vuldb.com/vuln/440882/cti signaturepermissions-required
https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-133480 third-party-advisory
https://vuldb.com/submit/1049151 third-party-advisory
https://github.com/hrshadhin/school-management-sy… exploitissue-tracking
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
hrshadhin CloudSchool Affected: 3.0.0
Affected: 3.0.1
    cpe:2.3:a:hrshadhin:cloudschool:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133177 (GCVE-0-2026-133177)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:11 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:47
VLAI
Title
MISP: Insufficient Authorization Allows Sync Users and External Feeds to Overwrite Organisation Details
Summary
MISP contains an authorization flaw in the sharing group capture logic. When a sharing group is re-captured with a newer modified timestamp and an updated roster, the application unconditionally overwrote the type, nationality, sector, and contacts fields of every organisation listed in the roster, including the host organisation. This behaviour was reachable by any user holding the perm_sync role, and additionally by any external server pulled from or any feed fetched, because those operations execute with the privileges of the site administrator who initiated them. As a result, a low-privileged sync user or a malicious/compromised external feed or pull source could silently corrupt organisation records on the receiving MISP instance without any site-admin or internal-sync authorization. The vulnerability does not disclose data or affect availability; the impact is limited to integrity of organisation metadata (type, nationality, sector, contacts). The fix restricts organisation detail updates to internal sync operations (pulls over links flagged as internal, or senders holding perm_sync_internal) and site administrators; all other sync, pull, and feed operations may only match existing organisations by UUID or create new ones, without modifying their stored details.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-19 14:09 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-19 14:47 UTC
CWE
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
MISP MISP Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.51 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-19 14:09
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/28120b549.patch d09428c54d1d…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
28120b549f6b fix: [security] Regular sync, pulls and feeds no longer edit d09428c54d1d…
Fix summary

The fix introduces a privilege gate on organisation detail updates during sharing group capture. A new static context flag (captureRemote) is set by Feed and Server pull code paths to indicate whether the capture originates from an internal link. A new authorization check (__mayUpdateOrgDetails) permits overwriting organisation fields only when the operation is an internal sync or the acting user holds perm_site_admin or perm_sync_internal. All other sync, pull, and feed operations are restricted to matching or creating organisations without editing their existing details.

Patch summary

In SharingGroup.php, a static $remoteCapture flag and captureRemote() wrapper are added; captureSG() now computes an $updateOrgDetails boolean via __mayUpdateOrgDetails() and passes it to captureSGOrgs(), which forwards it to Organisation::captureOrg() instead of the previous $force parameter. Feed.php wraps both downloadAndSaveEventFromFeed() and downloadFromFeedInitiator() in SharingGroup::captureRemote(false, ...). Server.php refactors pull() to detect the internal flag from the server record and wraps the actual pull in SharingGroup::captureRemote($internal, ...). A regression test class (OrganisationDetailsSyncScope) in tests/testregressions.py verifies that a plain sync user cannot modify org details, while an internal-sync user and a site admin can.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application; sync, pull, and feed operations occur over HTTP. AC:L: exploitation requires only pushing a sharing group with a newer modified date and a roster containing modified organisation details; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: no attack-target manipulation is required. PR:L: the attacker needs a low-privileged sync user account (perm_sync) or control of an external feed/pull source; no admin credentials are required. UI:N: no user interaction is needed; the overwrite occurs automatically during capture. VC:N: no confidential data is disclosed. VI:L: organisation metadata (type, nationality, sector, contacts) can be silently altered, a limited integrity impact. VA:N: no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: the impact is confined to the MISP instance's own organisation records with no cross-scope effect.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-862 The sharing group capture path performed organisation detail updates without checking whether the acting user or data source was authorized to modify those fields. Any sync user, external feed, or non-internal pull could overwrite organisation records, indicating a missing authorization check on the write operation.
  • CWE-285 The authorization model did not distinguish between creating/matching an organisation and editing its details during sync, pull, or feed operations. The privilege boundary between regular sync users and internal-sync/site-admin users was not enforced for organisation field updates.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-114 The application incorrectly adjusted the effective privilege level during sync, pull, and feed operations: external data sources and low-privileged sync users were granted the ability to modify organisation records that should have been restricted to site admins or internal-sync users. The attacker exploits this over-privileged code path by pushing a sharing group roster containing modified organisation details. CAPEC-114 is the closest match because the core issue is that the application's privilege model did not correctly scope what operations a given role or data source may perform on organisation records. Uncertainty: no CAPEC pattern specifically describes data-integrity abuse via a sync/replication channel, so CAPEC-114 is selected as the best available approximation.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the fix is applied to the main development branch and the exact version boundary is unknown.
  • PR:L assumes the attacker holds a sync user account (perm_sync) or controls an external feed/pull source; if the attacker must first compromise a feed, the effective privilege requirement could be higher.
  • VI:L assumes that overwriting organisation metadata (type, nationality, sector, contacts) constitutes a limited integrity impact; if downstream consumers rely on these fields for access decisions, the impact could be higher.
  • CAPEC-114 is selected as the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically models data-integrity abuse through a replication/sync channel, so the mapping is approximate.
  • The Co-Authored-By line credits Claude Opus 5.5 as a remediation developer; this is recorded as it appears in the commit metadata but the role is inferred from the co-authorship context.
  • AT:N assumes no special conditions on the target are needed beyond a standard MISP deployment with sync, pull, or feed functionality enabled.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-12 08:26 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (28120b549f6b3949d7354731cd483cc1e436cf8c): fix: [security] Regular sync, pulls and feeds no longer edit https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/28120b549.patch
  2. 2026-11-19 14:08 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/28120b549.patch
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133163 (GCVE-0-2026-133163)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-19 13:55 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:25
VLAI
Title
MISP: External Sync User Can Modify Protected Events Without Signature via Multiple Write Routes
Summary
MISP contains an authorization bypass affecting the event protection mechanism. In MISP, a protected event is designed to be modifiable only through the events/edit endpoint with a valid cryptographic signature. However, the protection check was enforced solely on that single route. All other write endpoints that operate on an event—attributes (add, edit, delete), objects (delete), events (populate, publish, unprotect, upload_sample, upload_analysis_file), tags (attach, detach), event reports (edit, delete), galaxy clusters (attach, detach), and cryptographic keys (add, delete)—lacked the equivalent check. As a result, an authenticated user holding the sync permission (perm_sync) who is neither a site administrator nor an internal sync user (perm_sync_internal), and who belongs to the same organization as the event's creator (orgc_id), could modify, delete, or add data to a protected event without providing a valid signature. This included the ability to unprotect the event entirely, publish it to other instances, and add cryptographic signing keys that would subsequently permit signed edits, effectively nullifying the protection mechanism. The vulnerability requires an authenticated sync user account within the event's creator organization. No user interaction or special network conditions are required; standard API calls to the affected endpoints are sufficient. The security impact is a loss of integrity over protected threat-intelligence events: an attacker can inject, alter, or remove attributes, objects, tags, reports, and galaxy cluster associations, and can remove the protection flag or add signing keys to enable persistent unauthorized modification.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-19 13:50 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-19 14:24 UTC
CWE
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
misp misp Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.51 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-19 13:50
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/e4fa73719.patch 5b0f387b75bb…
Confidence
high
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
e4fa7371938d fix: [security] Sync users change protected events only 5b0f387b75bb…
Fix summary

A shared authorization check (isProtectedFromSyncUser / assertNotProtectedFromSyncUser) was introduced in the Event model and enforced across all write paths. The check denies any non-internal, non-site-admin sync user from modifying a protected event through any route other than events/edit with a valid signature. The check is now invoked in the ACL component (modify, publish, tag), in the CryptographicKeys, Events, and Tags controllers, and in the Event, EventReport, Galaxy, and MispAttribute models, closing every previously unprotected write path.

Patch summary

Added Event::isProtectedFromSyncUser() and Event::assertNotProtectedFromSyncUser() methods that return true / throw ForbiddenException when the user has perm_sync but lacks perm_site_admin and perm_sync_internal, and the target event has protected=1. Inserted calls to these methods in: ACLComponent::canModifyEvent(), canPublishEvent(), canModifyTag(); CryptographicKeysController::add() and delete(); EventsController::populate(), upload_sample(), upload_analysis_file(); TagsController::__findObjectByUuid(); Event::userCanModifyEvent() and upload_stix(); EventReport::fetchIfAuthorized(); Galaxy::detachCluster() and detachClusterByTagId(); MispAttribute::deleteAttribute(). Also added the 'protected' field to the event query in upload_sample. Added a comprehensive regression test class (ProtectedEventSyncWrites) covering all affected routes plus control tests for internal sync users, org admins, and post-unprotect behavior.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: Exploitation requires only standard API calls with a valid sync user token; no race conditions, timing, or special configuration needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: An authenticated user with the sync permission (not site admin, not internal sync) in the event's creator organization is required. UI:N: No victim interaction is needed. VC:N: The sync user already has read access to the event; no additional confidentiality exposure. VI:H: The attacker can fully modify, delete, add, and unprotect event data, completely defeating the integrity guarantee of the protection mechanism. VA:N: No denial-of-service impact is evident. SC/SI/SA:N: No evidence in the patch of direct impact on subsequent systems; cross-instance impact via publish is possible but not explicitly addressed in the patch evidence.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-862 The event protection authorization check was present only on the events/edit route. All other write endpoints (attributes, objects, populate, publish, unprotect, tags, reports, galaxy clusters, cryptographic keys) lacked the equivalent check, allowing a sync user to bypass the protection mechanism entirely.
  • CWE-285 The authorization logic did not correctly account for the combination of sync-user role and event protection state across all code paths, resulting in an inconsistent enforcement of the protection policy.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-66 The access control policy for protected events was incorrectly configured: the protection check was applied to only one of many write endpoints. An attacker with a valid sync user account exploited the missing checks on the remaining endpoints to modify protected events. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed pattern of a partially enforced access control rule. Uncertainty: CAPEC-66 is a broad category; a more specific sub-pattern for 'inconsistent authorization enforcement across endpoints' does not exist in the CAPEC taxonomy, so this is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
  • Affected version range is unspecified; the patch does not include version tags or release boundaries. All MISP versions prior to this commit are assumed affected.
  • CVSS SI (subsequent system integrity) is set to N. In practice, a modified protected event could be published to other MISP instances, potentially affecting them, but the patch does not explicitly address or evidence this cross-instance impact.
  • CAPEC-66 is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC specifically covers 'inconsistent authorization enforcement across multiple endpoints of the same application'.
  • The assumption that the attacker must belong to the same organization as the event creator (orgc_id match) is based on the existing perm_modify_org and perm_publish checks that were already present; the new check is an additional gate on top of those.
  • The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5); it is listed as a tool credit rather than a human remediation developer.
  • The commit date (2026-11-11) is taken at face value from the patch metadata.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 7 11 high 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-11 12:12 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (e4fa7371938d51840ad098e3f727b74f1b5b0831): fix: [security] Sync users change protected events only https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/e4fa73719.patch
  2. 2026-11-19 13:49 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/e4fa73719.patch
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-132144 (GCVE-0-2026-132144)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 20:41 – Updated: 2026-11-18 20:54
VLAI
Title
MISP: Non-admin users can change login email under external authentication to capture a directory identity
Summary
MISP contains an authorization flaw in the user login-email change logic. When an external authentication backend is configured (LDAP, Shibboleth, ApacheSecureAuth, or CustomAuth), the login email address serves as the key by which the directory service resolves a user's identity, organization, and role on each login. The __canChangeLogin() method in UsersController only checked the MISP.disable_user_login_change setting and site-admin status; it did not account for whether an external authentication backend was active. As a result, any authenticated non-admin user (including org admins) could change their own login email to an address that matches a higher-privilege account in the external directory. On the user's next login, the external backend would resolve that email to the target directory identity, granting the attacker the organization and role associated with that identity. This constitutes an account-identity capture and privilege escalation: the attacker effectively assumes the identity of any directory account whose email they can guess or discover. The vulnerability requires an authenticated session with a valid API key or session token and a MISP instance configured with at least one external authentication backend. The impact is limited to the scope of the captured directory identity's privileges within MISP.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-18 13:14 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-18 20:53 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-285 - Improper Authorization
  • CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
misp misp Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.51 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-18 13:14
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873.patch 502df2ebb69b…
Confidence
high
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
a1fe5058dc75 fix: [security] Login e-mails are admin-only under external 502df2ebb69b…
Fix summary

The authorization check for changing a login email now explicitly denies the operation for non-site-admin users when any external authentication backend is active (Security.auth is set, ApacheSecureAuth.apacheEnv is configured, or Plugin.CustomAuth_enable is true). Only site administrators retain the ability to modify login emails in an external-authentication deployment, preventing non-admin users from redirecting their directory identity lookup to an arbitrary account.

Patch summary

In app/Controller/UsersController.php, the __canChangeLogin() method was restructured: after the existing site-admin bypass and MISP.disable_user_login_change check, three additional conditions are now required for non-admins to change their login email: Security.auth must be empty, ApacheSecureAuth.apacheEnv must be unset, and Plugin.CustomAuth_enable must be unset. A new regression test class LoginChangeExternalAuth in tests/testregressions.py verifies that self-service and org-admin email changes are refused when external auth is enabled, while site-admin changes remain permitted, and that self-service changes still work when no external auth is configured.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: The attack is a single API call to change the email field; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: No prior tampering of system data is required. PR:L: An authenticated non-admin user with a valid API key is sufficient. UI:N: No victim interaction is needed; the attacker acts on their own account. VC:L: The attacker gains read access to data visible to the captured identity. VI:H: The integrity of the identity-to-account binding is fundamentally broken; the attacker assumes a different identity and its privileges. VA:N: No denial-of-service impact. SC:N: No secondary-component confidentiality impact beyond what is captured. SI:H: The external directory's identity resolution is subverted for the attacker's session. SA:N: No availability impact on the directory service.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-285 The __canChangeLogin() authorization check failed to restrict the login-email change action based on the active authentication context. When external authentication was in use, the check should have denied non-admin email changes because the email is the directory identity key, but it only evaluated a single configuration flag.
  • CWE-639 The login email is a user-controlled key used by the external directory to resolve identity. Because non-admins could modify this key, they could redirect the directory lookup to an arbitrary account, bypassing the intended identity binding.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-126 The attacker, holding a low-privilege MISP account, changes their login email to match a higher-privilege directory account. On next login the external backend resolves the email to the target identity, granting the attacker the target's organization and role. This is a direct privilege escalation via identity capture. The mapping is the closest standard CAPEC; no more specific CAPEC for directory-identity capture exists in the CAPEC catalog.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; all versions prior to this commit that lack the external-auth check in __canChangeLogin() are assumed affected.
  • The vulnerability requires that at least one external authentication backend (Security.auth, ApacheSecureAuth, or CustomAuth) is configured; instances using only local MISP authentication are not affected by this specific issue.
  • The CVSS VC:L assumes the attacker gains data access scoped to the captured identity's permissions; a higher-privilege target could yield higher confidentiality impact.
  • CAPEC-126 (Privilege Escalation) is the closest standard mapping; no CAPEC specifically covers directory-identity capture via email-key substitution.
  • The SSVC technical_impact of 'total' assumes the captured directory identity's full privilege set is transferred to the attacker; if the target identity has limited privileges, the practical impact may be lower.
  • The commit date (2026-11-18) and AI co-authorship (Claude Opus 5.5) are noted from metadata but do not affect the vulnerability analysis.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 7 11 high 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-18 09:15 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873): fix: [security] Login e-mails are admin-only under external https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873.patch
  2. 2026-11-18 13:14 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873.patch
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-132137 (GCVE-0-2026-132137)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 20:15 – Updated: 2026-11-18 20:15
VLAI
Title
Relaticle Import Wizard MappingStep.php mapToField authorization
Summary
A vulnerability was identified in Relaticle up to 3.10.0. This affects the function mapToField of the file packages/ImportWizard/src/Livewire/Steps/MappingStep.php of the component Import Wizard. Such manipulation of the argument Target leads to authorization bypass. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure.
CWE
Assigner
VulDB CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard B 83/100 over 3776 records in the last 180 days details
References
URL Tags
https://vuldb.com/vuln/439437 vdb-entrytechnical-description
https://vuldb.com/vuln/439437/cti signaturepermissions-required
https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-132137 third-party-advisory
https://vuldb.com/submit/958679 third-party-advisory
https://github.com/Bob-wentao/relaticle-import-wi… exploit
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
n/a Relaticle Affected: 3.0
Affected: 3.1
Affected: 3.2
Affected: 3.3
Affected: 3.4
Affected: 3.5
Affected: 3.6
Affected: 3.7
Affected: 3.8
Affected: 3.9
Affected: 3.10.0
    cpe:2.3:a:relaticle:relaticle:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Show details on NVD website

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          "time": "2026-11-18T00:00:00.000Z",
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          "time": "2026-11-18T01:00:00.000Z",
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          "time": "2026-11-18T14:09:07.000Z",
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      "title": "Relaticle Import Wizard MappingStep.php mapToField authorization",
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    "assignerShortName": "VulDB",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-132137",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-18T20:15:16.615Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-11-18T13:03:28.960Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T20:15:16.615Z",
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Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs

In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.

CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting

An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.

CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing

An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.

CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values

The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.

CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files

An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.

CAPEC-39: Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens

In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.

CAPEC-402: Bypassing ATA Password Security

An adversary exploits a weakness in ATA security on a drive to gain access to the information the drive contains without supplying the proper credentials. ATA Security is often employed to protect hard disk information from unauthorized access. The mechanism requires the user to type in a password before the BIOS is allowed access to drive contents. Some implementations of ATA security will accept the ATA command to update the password without the user having authenticated with the BIOS. This occurs because the security mechanism assumes the user has first authenticated via the BIOS prior to sending commands to the drive. Various methods exist for exploiting this flaw, the most common being installing the ATA protected drive into a system lacking ATA security features (a.k.a. hot swapping). Once the drive is installed into the new system the BIOS can be used to reset the drive password.

CAPEC-45: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links

This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.

CAPEC-5: Blue Boxing

This type of attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for decades. A tone is sent by an adversary to impersonate a supervisor signal which has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line. While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in countries which have not upgraded Telco infrastructure and so are vulnerable to Blue boxing. Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong authorization for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.

{'xhtml:b': 'This attack pattern is included in CAPEC for historical purposes.'}

CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry

SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.

CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction

This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.

CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)

This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.

CAPEC-647: Collect Data from Registries

An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization to gather system-specific data and sensitive information within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist). These contain information about the system configuration, software, operating system, and security. The adversary can leverage information gathered in order to carry out further attacks.

CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)

An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables

This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.

CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing

An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.