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    159 vulnerabilities by flowintel

    CVE-2026-133855 (GCVE-0-2026-133855)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:32
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Unauthorized Disclosure of Linked Case References in Case History
    Summary
    flowintel contains an information disclosure vulnerability in its case history feature. When a user views the history of a case they are authorized to access, the history output includes references to other cases (linked, unlinked, or forked) without verifying whether the requesting user has permission to view those referenced cases. This exposes the identifiers and titles of cases that the user should not be able to discover. The vulnerability affects multiple output paths: - Browser-based case history view - API history endpoint - Plain-text history download - Markdown history download - Report timeline generation An authenticated user with access to any single case can enumerate the existence and identifiers of other cases by reading the history of a case they can access. This bypasses the intended per-case access control model and may reveal the existence of sensitive investigations, their identifiers, and associated metadata to unauthorized users. The raw audit storage is not modified; the issue is solely in the presentation layer failing to filter references to inaccessible cases before returning history data to the user. Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:43 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:22 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
    • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:43
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809 407e73d34f15…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    c44025ea6810 fix: [security] Filter linked case references from case 407e73d34f15…
    Fix summary

    A new visibility-aware history retrieval function was introduced that parses each history record for case references (link, unlink, fork events) and checks the requesting user's access to every referenced case before including that record in the output. Records referencing inaccessible cases are omitted from the response. The filtering is applied consistently across all history output paths (browser view, API, text download, Markdown download, and report timelines). Administrative users retain full unfiltered access. The raw audit log storage remains unchanged to preserve forensic integrity.

    Patch summary

    Added a new function get_visible_history() in common_core.py that: (1) verifies the user can view the current case, (2) groups raw history lines into logical records using timestamp-based event boundaries, (3) extracts referenced case IDs from link/unlink/fork messages using regex patterns, (4) checks can_view_case() for each referenced case, and (5) excludes records referencing inaccessible cases. Updated download_history(), download_history_md(), the browser history endpoint, the API history endpoint, and the report timeline generator to call get_visible_history() instead of the raw get_history(). Added helper functions _history_case_references() and _history_record_complete() to handle legacy multiline link records and ambiguous formats. Changed download_history() to serve content via BytesIO instead of reading a file path directly.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N - The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web application. AC:L - Exploitation requires only viewing the history of any accessible case; no special conditions or race conditions are needed. AT:N - No prior attack or manipulation of the target is required. PR:L - The attacker must be an authenticated user with access to at least one case. UI:N - No user interaction beyond normal application use is required. VC:L - The vulnerable component (case history endpoint) leaks limited information (case IDs and titles of referenced cases). VI:N - No integrity impact. VA:N - No availability impact. SC:L - Subsequent components (other cases) have their existence and identifiers exposed to unauthorized users. SI:N - No integrity impact on other systems. SA:N - No safety impact.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-200 The case history output exposes identifiers and titles of other cases to users who do not have authorization to view those cases. The sensitive data (case existence, IDs, titles) is disclosed through a legitimate endpoint without proper per-reference authorization checks.
    • CWE-862 The history retrieval functions did not perform authorization checks on the referenced cases embedded within the history records. The primary case access was verified, but the secondary cases referenced in link/unlink/fork events were not checked before inclusion in the response.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-128 The attacker leverages a legitimate application endpoint (case history) to discover metadata about other resources (case identifiers, titles, and relationships) that they are not authorized to access. This is the closest CAPEC pattern to the observed information disclosure through a functional endpoint. The mapping is approximate because CAPEC-128 typically refers to version/configuration discovery, whereas here the disclosed metadata is application data (case references) rather than system metadata. No more specific CAPEC pattern for cross-object information disclosure via a legitimate read endpoint exists in the CAPEC catalog.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is assumed to be all versions prior to 4.1.0 based on the explicit context providing affected_version '0' and fixed_version '4.1.0'. The exact earliest affected version is not confirmed by the patch itself.
    • The CAPEC-128 mapping is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically covers cross-object information disclosure through a legitimate read endpoint. The mapping is approximate.
    • CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs at least one valid authenticated session with access to any case. If the application allows unauthenticated history access in some deployment, PR would be N.
    • The patch commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
    • The vulnerability requires the attacker to already have access to at least one case; it does not allow access to cases with no prior relationship to the attacker's accessible cases beyond those referenced in history.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 12:50 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809): fix: [security] Filter linked case references from case https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809
    2. 2026-11-20 14:42 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133854 (GCVE-0-2026-133854)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:33
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Information Disclosure of Classification Usage via Missing Access Control
    Summary
    flowintel contains a vulnerability in the case and task classification usage endpoints that allows authenticated users to view classification data associated with cases they do not have permission to access. The affected endpoints, which provide lists of used taxonomies, tags, galaxies, clusters, and custom tags, did not properly enforce object-level access controls. While the endpoints required authentication, they failed to filter the returned data based on the requesting user's visibility permissions for the underlying cases. This allowed any authenticated user to enumerate classification usage across all cases, including private or restricted cases belonging to other organizations or users. This issue could lead to the disclosure of sensitive information, such as the existence of specific cases, the types of threats or indicators associated with them, and the relationships between different classification elements, potentially aiding an attacker in reconnaissance or targeting. Affected versions: < 4.1.0
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:42 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:22 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:42
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630 58589e54911e…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    fa7216e76041 fix: [security] Scope classification usage to visible cases 58589e54911e…
    Fix summary

    The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing object-level access controls on the classification usage endpoints. The fix ensures that the authenticated user's identity is passed to the data retrieval functions, which then filter the results to include only classifications associated with cases that the user is authorized to view. This prevents the disclosure of classification data from private or restricted cases to unauthorized users.

    Patch summary

    The patch modifies the case and task classification usage endpoints to pass the current authenticated user to the underlying data retrieval functions. A new helper function, _classification_usage_ids, is introduced to filter classification usage based on the user's permissions. This function joins the classification link models with the Case model and applies filters to ensure that only classifications associated with visible cases (public, member, or administrator access) are returned. The existing helper functions for retrieving used taxonomies, tags, galaxies, clusters, and custom tags are updated to use this new filtering logic.

    CVSS rationale

    The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L) and no attack requirements (AT:N). It requires low privileges (PR:L) as any authenticated user can exploit it. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The impact is primarily on the confidentiality of the vulnerable system (VI:H) as it allows unauthorized access to sensitive classification data. There is no impact on integrity or availability (VC:N, VA:N, SC:N, SI:N, SA:N).

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The endpoints lacked proper authorization checks to ensure that users could only view classification data associated with cases they had permission to access. This is a classic missing authorization vulnerability where the system failed to verify that the user had the necessary permissions to access the specific objects (cases) referenced by the classification data.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-126 The vulnerability allows an attacker to access classification data associated with cases they do not have permission to view by simply querying the endpoints. This aligns with the attack pattern of accessing functionality or data that is not properly restricted by identifiers or access controls. The uncertainty lies in the fact that the attacker does not need to guess specific IDs, but rather the lack of filtering exposes data across all cases, which is a broader form of improper restriction.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The CAPEC mapping is uncertain as the vulnerability is more about missing filtering than accessing specific IDs, but CAPEC-126 is the closest plausible match.
    • The CVSS vector assumes that the impact is primarily on confidentiality and that the vulnerability does not lead to integrity or availability impacts.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 10 11 medium 2
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 12:03 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630): fix: [security] Scope classification usage to visible cases https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630
    2. 2026-11-20 14:41 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133853 (GCVE-0-2026-133853)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:33
    VLAI
    Title
    FlowIntel Chatbot Shared MCP Session Allows Cross-User API Identity Confusion
    Summary
    FlowIntel's chatbot component used a single shared MCP (Model Context Protocol) session and process-wide environment variable to pass per-user API credentials to a child process. Because the session and the ambient FLOWINTEL_API_KEY environment variable were shared across all concurrent requests, a user's authenticated identity could be applied to another user's tool invocation, or a stale/ambient credential could be inherited by a new request. Preconditions: - An authenticated user with access to the chatbot interface. - Concurrent or overlapping chatbot tool invocations from different users, or a request made after another user's credentials were written to the process environment. Impact: - A lower-privilege user could read data belonging to a higher-privilege user (e.g., private investigation cases). - A user whose session was invalidated (deleted, password changed, key revoked) could still operate under a previously cached ambient credential. - The parent process environment was mutated with user-specific secrets, creating a persistent credential leak surface. Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:41 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:21 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-290 - Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
    • CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:41
    Model
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    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8 b2eb7327abee…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    9eec395cc73c fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities b2eb7327abee…
    Fix summary

    The shared persistent MCP session and process-wide API key mutation were removed. Each chatbot tool invocation now spawns its own short-lived MCP child process with credentials resolved fresh from the authenticated request context. If the user's identity or API key is unavailable, the invocation is rejected before any child process is launched, preventing fallback to ambient or stale credentials. Each transport is deterministically closed on success, failure, or timeout, eliminating residual credential exposure.

    Patch summary

    Removed the global _mcp_session, _mcp_loop, _mcp_thread, _mcp_current_api_key state and the _ensure_mcp() / _start_mcp_background() / _run_mcp_session() functions that maintained a single shared asyncio event loop and thread. Replaced with _mcp_environment() which resolves the user's API key from the authenticated session on every call and raises RuntimeError if unavailable, and _call_mcp_tool() which opens a per-invocation stdio transport, executes the tool, and closes the transport in all exit paths. Eliminated all os.environ mutations of FLOWINTEL_API_KEY. Added 33 regression tests in tests/chatbot/test_api_identity.py covering concurrent identity isolation, ambient-credential rejection, detached-user handling, key rotation, transport cleanup on failure/timeout, and real stdio child-process lifecycle.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N: the chatbot is a network-accessible Flask endpoint. AC:H: exploitation requires concurrent or carefully timed requests from two different users to trigger the shared-session race, or a specific sequence of credential writes to the process environment. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate target is needed. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated user with chatbot access. UI:N: no victim interaction beyond their own request is required. VC:H: a user can read another user's sensitive data (private cases, investigations). VI:N, VA:N: no integrity or availability impact is evidenced. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: no impact on separate components is demonstrated.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-290 The shared MCP session and process-wide environment variable allowed one user's authenticated identity (API key) to be applied to another user's tool invocation. The per-request identity was not isolated, effectively allowing identity confusion or spoofing between concurrent sessions.
    • CWE-200 Because credentials were shared across requests and written to the process environment, a user could access data (e.g., private cases) belonging to another user whose key was cached in the shared session or ambient environment.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-126 The closest available CAPEC. The shared MCP session acted as a single long-lived session whose credentials could be 'hijacked' by a concurrent request from a different user, causing the wrong identity to be used. No CAPEC specifically covers 'shared per-tenant credential state in a multi-user service,' so CAPEC-126 is the best approximation. Uncertainty: the attack does not involve a traditional network-level session token theft but rather a server-side shared-state race.
    Assumptions to verify
    • AC:H is assumed because reliable exploitation requires concurrent requests from two different authenticated users or a specific timing window around the shared session restart; a single sequential request may not trigger the identity confusion.
    • PR:L assumes any authenticated user with chatbot access can trigger the issue; the patch does not evidence a higher privilege requirement.
    • VC:H assumes the data accessed (private cases, investigations) constitutes high confidentiality impact; the patch tests reference 'PRIVATE ADMIN INVESTIGATION' as the sensitive resource.
    • CAPEC-126 (Session Hijacking) is the closest available mapping but does not precisely describe a server-side shared-credential race; no CAPEC specifically covers multi-tenant credential isolation failures in a shared in-process session.
    • The affected version range is taken from the explicit analyst context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
    • No evidence of active exploitation, public PoC, or in-the-wild abuse is present in the patch or metadata.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 10:37 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8): fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8
    2. 2026-11-20 14:41 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133852 (GCVE-0-2026-133852)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:40 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:33
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel Privileged Case Task Approval Bypass via Missing User Context and Template Creation
    Summary
    flowintel is a case management application that enforces an approval workflow for tasks in privileged cases. Tasks in such cases are required to start in a Requested status, meaning they must receive explicit approval before becoming active. A logic flaw in the task-creation path allowed tasks to be initialized with a Created status (bypassing the approval step) in two scenarios: - When a task was created from a template and no acting user was supplied, the privileged-case check was skipped entirely, leaving the task in Created status. - When a case was created from a template, all copied tasks were unconditionally assigned the Created status regardless of the case's privileged designation. An authenticated user with the ability to create tasks from templates or to instantiate cases from templates could therefore place tasks directly into an active state within privileged cases, circumventing the intended approval gate. This may expose restricted case content or permit actions that should require supervisory sign-off. Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:21 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:22 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:21
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1 ef4bf88c9ae2…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    fd23a3cb577b fix: [security] Require initial approval for privileged ef4bf88c9ae2…
    Fix summary

    The approval-workflow enforcement for privileged cases is now applied unconditionally at task creation time. The privileged-case check no longer depends on the presence of an acting user, and template-based case creation explicitly assigns the configured Requested status to tasks when the target case is privileged. Ordinary (non-privileged) cases retain the default Created status, preserving existing behavior.

    Patch summary

    Two one-line changes were made. In app/case/common_core.py, the condition guarding the Requested-status assignment was changed from 'if current_user and case.privileged_case' to 'if case.privileged_case', removing the dependency on a non-null user. In app/templating/TemplateCase.py, the hardcoded 'status_id=1' in the task-copy constructor was replaced with a conditional expression that selects the configured TASK_REQUESTED status when the case is privileged and falls back to 1 otherwise.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N: flowintel is a web application accessible over the network. AC:L: the bypass is triggered simply by the absence of a user context or by using the template-creation path; no race condition or special timing is needed. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate attack target is required. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated user with permission to create tasks from templates or instantiate cases from templates. UI:N: no victim interaction is required. VC:L: tasks in privileged cases become immediately accessible without approval, potentially exposing restricted case content. VI:L: the integrity of the approval workflow is compromised; tasks are in an unauthorized state. VA:N: no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: no secondary impacts on other systems are evidenced.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The approval workflow (a form of authorization gate) for privileged-case tasks was not enforced under certain code paths (no user context, template-based creation), allowing tasks to skip the required approval step. The narrowest defensible CWE is Missing Authorization because the security control (approval) was simply absent in those paths.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-108 The vulnerability is triggered by the absence of a user parameter, which causes the privileged-case authorization check to be skipped. An attacker who can influence whether a user context is supplied (e.g., via an API endpoint that does not enforce authentication for this code path) effectively tampers with the parameter to bypass the control. This is the closest CAPEC available; the mapping is uncertain because the primary defect is a missing check rather than active parameter manipulation, but CAPEC-108 best captures the 'missing/absent parameter leads to skipped validation' pattern.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The 'privileged case' designation implies a higher-sensitivity classification requiring supervisory approval; the exact business meaning is inferred from the code context and commit message.
    • PR:L assumes the attacker needs an authenticated account with template-creation permissions; the patch does not specify the exact role or permission required.
    • CAPEC-108 is the closest available mapping; the primary defect is a missing conditional check rather than active parameter manipulation, so the mapping is approximate.
    • The affected version range '0 to <4.1.0' is taken from the explicit analyst context; the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
    • VC:L assumes that bypassing the approval step exposes task content that would otherwise be restricted; the patch does not detail what content is protected.
    • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation, not as a credit.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 10:02 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1): fix: [security] Require initial approval for privileged https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1
    2. 2026-11-20 14:21 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133851 (GCVE-0-2026-133851)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:40 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34
    VLAI
    Title
    FlowIntel Alerting: Missing Private Case Authorization Check Allows Connector Owners to Access Revoked Case Data
    Summary
    FlowIntel's alerting module contained an authorization bypass in the alert access control logic. When an alert was linked to a private case, the system relied solely on connector ownership (user or organization) to determine access, without verifying that the requesting user still held valid membership in the associated private case. This meant that a user who was a connector owner of an alert could continue to read alert details, review history, raw payloads, and action comments, and could perform review-status updates or case-creation actions, even after their access to the linked private case had been revoked or they were never a member of that case. Additionally, a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap existed: after a review-status update or a competing case-creation claim was committed, the response could disclose private case identifiers or review history to a user whose access had been concurrently removed by another session linking the alert to a private case. Impact: - Unauthorized disclosure of private case data (review comments, raw payloads, action history) through alert endpoints. - Unauthorized modification of alert review status and creation of cases from alerts the user should no longer access. - Leakage of a competing case identifier to an unauthorized user during concurrent case-creation races. Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:20 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:22 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
    • CWE-362 - Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Inadequate Locking
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:20
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff e8226318f1d6…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    68d85c78e464 fix: [security] Enforce private case access for alert reviews e8226318f1d6…
    Fix summary

    The fix enforces private case visibility as a mandatory gate before any connector-ownership check can grant alert access. If an alert is linked to a private case and the user cannot view that case, access is denied regardless of ownership. A post-commit re-verification is added after review-status updates and after detecting a competing case-creation claim, ensuring that concurrent association changes do not result in unauthorized data disclosure in the response.

    Patch summary

    In can_user_view_alert, the private-case membership check was moved before the connector-ownership checks and made unconditional (no longer gated on case.is_private), so any user lacking case access is denied even if they own the connector. In update_review_status, a can_user_view_alert re-check is performed after the database commit and before returning the serialized alert, returning 403 if access was concurrently lost. In create_case_from_alert, after a competing claim is detected, a can_user_view_alert re-check gates the response that would otherwise return the winner's case_id. The unused import get_present_in_case was removed. 33 regression tests were added covering revoked access, connector scope, concurrent case-link transitions, and authorized-user preservation.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the FlowIntel web API. AC:L: No special race condition or complex setup is required; a connector owner whose case access was revoked can simply call the alert endpoints. AT:N: No manipulation of the target is needed. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated user with connector ownership of the alert. UI:N: No victim interaction is required. VC:L: Confidential impact is limited to alert-level data (review comments, raw payload, action history) rather than full case contents. VI:L: The attacker can modify review status and create cases, but cannot alter case data directly. VA:N: No availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: No impact on other systems.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The alert access function did not verify private case membership before granting access based on connector ownership. The authorization check for case-level access was either absent or insufficiently ordered, allowing a user with connector ownership to bypass the private case boundary.
    • CWE-362 The review-status update and case-creation paths did not re-verify authorization after the database commit, creating a TOCTOU window where a concurrent session could link the alert to a private case and the response would still disclose case data to an unauthorized user.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-114 The attacker directly requests alert API endpoints (review, case-creation, read) using a known alert identifier. Because the authorization logic did not enforce private case membership, the server returned sensitive case data and accepted state-changing actions. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed pattern of accessing a resource by directly specifying its identifier without the required authorization context. Uncertainty: the attack does not involve guessing URLs but rather exploiting a logic flaw in an existing authorized endpoint; however, CAPEC-114 remains the best available match for direct resource access bypassing intended access controls.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version '0', fixed_version '4.1.0'); no explicit changelog or release notes are available to confirm the exact first vulnerable release.
    • The CAPEC-114 mapping is the closest available pattern; the actual attack is a logic flaw in authorization ordering rather than classic forced browsing, but no more specific CAPEC exists for missing authorization checks in API endpoints.
    • CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker must be an authenticated user with connector ownership; if the product allows unauthenticated access to alert endpoints, PR would be N, but the patch evidence (session-based auth, API keys in tests) supports authenticated access.
    • The TOCTOU component (CWE-362) requires a concurrent session to link the alert to a private case at the precise moment of the response; this is a secondary vector and the primary issue is the missing authorization check (CWE-862).
    • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used to assist in development; no credit is assigned for this as it is not a person or organization.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 09:50 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff): fix: [security] Enforce private case access for alert reviews https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff
    2. 2026-11-20 14:20 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133850 (GCVE-0-2026-133850)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:39 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Stale Authorization Allows Notification Disclosure After Case Access Revocation
    Summary
    flowintel contains an authorization flaw in its recurring reminder notification subsystem. When a user is subscribed to recurring notifications for a case, the system does not re-verify the recipient's current access rights to that case before generating or displaying the notification. As a result, a user who previously had access to a private case and later had that access revoked can still: - Receive recurring reminder notifications containing case-related content. - View stored reminder notifications in their notification list, including notification counts, even though they no longer have permission to view the underlying case. The vulnerability affects both the notification creation path (recurring reminder generation) and the notification display path (listing and counting stored reminders). The issue arises because the authorization check performed at subscription time is not re-applied at delivery or retrieval time. Security impact is limited to information disclosure: an unauthorized user may observe case titles, reminder messages, and associated metadata that they no longer have permission to access. No integrity or availability impact is indicated by the patch. Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:20 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:21 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:20
    Model
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    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea 433c4d2d3f96…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    af6e91c8ac63 fix: [security] Recheck private case access for recurring 433c4d2d3f96…
    Fix summary

    The fix introduces an authorization re-check at two points: (1) before creating a recurring reminder notification, the system now verifies the recipient's current case visibility and skips delivery if access has been revoked; (2) when listing or counting stored notifications, the system now filters out case-related reminder notifications for which the viewing user no longer has case access. This ensures that both the creation and display paths enforce current authorization state rather than relying on a one-time check at subscription time.

    Patch summary

    In recurring_notification.py, the create_notification function now imports can_view_case and, for each recurring notification subscriber, fetches the User record and calls can_view_case(case, recipient); if the check fails, the notification is skipped via continue. In notification_core.py, the DEADLINE_ICONS tuple is extended to include the clock icon (fa-solid fa-clock), a new helper _is_case_deadline_notification is added to identify case-related deadline/reminder notifications by icon or notification_type, and _visible_deadline_notifications is updated to use this helper so that reminders for inaccessible cases are excluded from the returned list. The test file is updated to create a real Case object for the reminder notification fixture instead of using a hardcoded case_id.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N: The application is a web-based platform accessed over the network. AC:L: No special race condition or complex setup is required; the user simply needs to have previously had case access and then have it revoked. AT:N: No manipulation of the target is needed. PR:L: An authenticated user with a valid account and prior case subscription is required. UI:N: Notifications are delivered and displayed automatically without requiring victim interaction. VC:L: Limited confidentiality impact; case-related notification content (titles, reminder messages) is exposed to a user who no longer has case access. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact is evidenced. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: The affected data resides within the same application scope; no cross-scope impact is indicated.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-285 The system performed an authorization check at subscription time but failed to re-enforce it at notification delivery and display time. The authorization decision was not re-evaluated when the user's access to the case changed, resulting in continued access to case-related notification content. This is a failure to properly enforce authorization at the point of access rather than a complete absence of authorization logic.
    • CWE-862 In the recurring notification creation path, no authorization check existed at all before generating the notification for a subscriber. The check was entirely absent, not merely insufficient, making CWE-862 a defensible secondary mapping for the creation path specifically.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-66 The notification subsystem operated with a lower security enforcement level than the case-access subsystem: it did not enforce the same access-control checks that governed case visibility. An attacker (or a user whose access was legitimately revoked) could exploit this misconfiguration to continue receiving case-related notification content. This is the closest CAPEC to the pattern of a component not enforcing the security level configured elsewhere in the application. The mapping is uncertain because no CAPEC specifically describes stale-authorization or missing re-authorization at delivery time; CAPEC-66 is selected as the best available match for a security-level enforcement gap between components.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the patch itself does not contain version strings.
    • The CAPEC-66 mapping is the closest available match; no CAPEC specifically covers stale-authorization or missing re-authorization at notification delivery time. This uncertainty is noted in the CAPEC rationale.
    • CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker is an authenticated user who previously had case access; the patch does not specify whether unauthenticated access is possible.
    • CVSS VC:L assumes the disclosed information is limited to notification content (case titles, reminder messages) rather than full case data; the patch only addresses notification visibility.
    • The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerability is exploitable remotely or requires local access; AV:N is assumed based on the web-application nature of the product.
    • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 09:16 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea): fix: [security] Recheck private case access for recurring https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea
    2. 2026-11-20 14:19 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea
    Show details on NVD website

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                      },
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                        "cweId": "CWE-862",
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    CVE-2026-133849 (GCVE-0-2026-133849)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:39 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Insecure Direct Object Reference in Task Calendar Access Control
    Summary
    A vulnerability exists in the flowintel application's calendar functionality that allows unauthorized access to private case data. The task calendar queries failed to enforce visibility checks on the parent case associated with tasks. Specifically, tasks assigned to a user or belonging to the user's organization were returned in calendar views (including browser and API ICS feeds) without verifying whether the user had permission to view the parent case. This allowed users to potentially discover and access details of private cases they were not authorized to view, leading to information disclosure. The issue affected the default task visibility logic and the assigned-only task queries. The fix ensures that case visibility is rechecked in addition to task assignment or organization membership, preventing the exposure of private case data in calendar outputs. Affected versions: flowintel < 4.1.0
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:19 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:20 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
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    bcp-05-x-02
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    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:19
    Model
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    Input
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    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    98196d0523d4 fix: [security] Recheck private case access in task calendars 618096dd6233…
    Fix summary

    The vulnerability is remediated by adding explicit case visibility checks to the task calendar queries. The fix ensures that tasks are only visible if the user has permission to view the parent case, in addition to being assigned to the task or belonging to the same organization. This prevents the disclosure of private case data in calendar views and ICS feeds.

    Patch summary

    The patch modifies the `_tasks_visible_to_user_query` and `_tasks_assigned_to_user_query` functions in `app/calendar/calendar_core.py`. It replaces the previous outer join and filter logic with subqueries for task assignment and organization membership. A new filter condition is added to ensure that the case is not private or that the user has membership in the case's organization. This enforces case-level access control in calendar task queries.

    CVSS rationale

    The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L) and no attack requirements (AT:N). It requires low privileges (PR:L) as any authenticated user can trigger the issue. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The impact is high on integrity (VI:H) due to unauthorized disclosure of private case data, but no impact on confidentiality (VC:N) or availability (VA:N) of the primary system, and no secondary impacts (SC:N, SI:N, SA:N).

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-639 The vulnerability allows access to resources (private case data) based on user-controlled inputs (task assignment or organization membership) without verifying the authorization context (case visibility). This is a classic authorization bypass where the application fails to enforce proper access controls on the parent resource.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-126 The vulnerability allows users to access private case data by interacting with calendar endpoints that do not properly enforce case-level authorization. While not a direct URL manipulation, the effect is similar to forced browsing where the application fails to restrict access to resources based on the user's privileges. The uncertainty lies in the specific mechanism, but the impact is unauthorized access to restricted data.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The CAPEC mapping is uncertain as the specific attack pattern is not explicitly detailed in the patch, but CAPEC-126 is the closest plausible match for unauthorized access to restricted data.
    • The CVSS vector assumes that the primary impact is on integrity (VI:H) due to unauthorized disclosure, but confidentiality (VC:N) is marked as none based on the assumption that the data is not considered highly sensitive in this context. This may need adjustment based on the sensitivity of the case data.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 10 11 medium 2
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 08:41 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (98196d0523d4e1136014574ff0b526da1d92381b): fix: [security] Recheck private case access in task calendars https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/98196d0523d4e1136014574ff0b526da1d92381b
    2. 2026-11-20 14:19 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/98196d0523d4e1136014574ff0b526da1d92381b
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133848 (GCVE-0-2026-133848)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:39 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:31
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Organization Admin Can Delete Platform Admin Accounts Due to Missing Privilege Hierarchy Check
    Summary
    flowintel contains an authorization flaw in its user deletion functionality. Organization-scoped administrators (org admins) are able to delete platform-level administrator accounts through both the browser-based admin interface and the REST API. The existing authorization logic verified that an org admin could only target users within their own organization, but it did not enforce the privilege hierarchy between organization admins and platform admins. As a result, an authenticated org admin could issue a deletion request against any platform-admin account belonging to the same organization, causing the target account, its sessions, and related records to be permanently removed. Impact: - Loss of platform-level administrative oversight - Potential disruption of platform-wide management functions - Removal of higher-privilege accounts that should be protected from lower-privilege roles Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:19 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 18:31 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:19
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    Input
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    Confidence
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    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    e3d0b2ab153d fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from deleting 05b89a0d2175…
    Fix summary

    The fix introduces an explicit privilege-hierarchy check in both the browser and API deletion routes. Before any session invalidation or account deletion is performed, the system now verifies whether the target user holds platform-admin capability. If the requester is a pure organization admin and the target is a platform admin, the request is rejected with a 403 response, preserving the intended authorization boundary while leaving legitimate deletion workflows unaffected.

    Patch summary

    Two lines added in app/admin/admin.py (delete_user function) and two lines added in app/admin/admin_api.py (API GET handler). In each location, after the existing same-organization check for pure org admins, a new condition checks user.is_admin() / user_to_delete.is_admin(). If true, a 403 JSON response is returned with an appropriate error message, preventing the deletion from proceeding. No other logic was modified.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N - the vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web UI or REST API. AC:L - exploitation requires only a standard authenticated request targeting a platform-admin account; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N - no attack-target manipulation is needed. PR:L - the attacker must hold a valid organization-admin account. UI:N - no victim interaction is required; the org admin acts on their own behalf. VC:N - no confidential data is exposed. VI:N - the application's own data integrity is not corrupted; the deletion is a legitimate operation performed by an authenticated user. VA:H - platform-admin accounts and their sessions are permanently deleted, significantly degrading the availability of platform administration. SC:N - no cross-component confidentiality impact. SI:N - no cross-component integrity impact. SA:H - the broader platform administration and oversight functions lose availability when platform-admin accounts are removed.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-285 The authorization logic for the user-deletion endpoint verified organizational scope but failed to enforce the privilege hierarchy between organization admins and platform admins. The missing check allowed a lower-privilege role to perform an action (deleting a higher-privilege account) that should have been restricted, constituting an improper authorization decision.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-126 An authenticated organization admin leverages a missing authorization boundary to perform an action (deleting a platform-admin account) that is reserved for a higher-privilege role. This is a vertical privilege escalation: the actor gains the effective capability of a platform admin by removing platform-admin accounts. The mapping is the closest standard CAPEC; the attack does not involve traditional credential theft or token manipulation but rather an authorization logic gap that permits a lower-privilege actor to act at a higher privilege level.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (fixed in 4.1.0); the exact earliest affected version is not stated in the patch and is recorded as unspecified.
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    • CVSS VA:H and SA:H assume that deleting platform-admin accounts materially degrades the availability of platform-level administration; if the deployment has redundant platform admins, the practical impact may be lower.
    • The patch metadata lists affected_version as '0', which is treated as a placeholder; the actual lower bound of affected versions is unknown.
    • No evidence of active exploitation or public PoC was found in the patch or metadata.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 08:09 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb): fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from deleting https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb
    2. 2026-11-20 14:18 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133847 (GCVE-0-2026-133847)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:38 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Missing Authorization Check Allows Organization Admin to Edit Platform Admin Accounts via Browser Interface
    Summary
    flowintel contains an authorization bypass in the browser-based admin user editing interface. The edit_user view in the admin panel verified that a non-platform-admin user could only edit accounts belonging to their own organization, but it did not verify that the target account was not a platform-admin account. As a result, an authenticated user holding an organization-admin role could open the edit form for any platform-admin account and submit modifications, including changes to credentials, roles, or other account attributes. The API layer already enforced a restriction preventing non-admin users from targeting admin accounts, but the browser-based admin view lacked the equivalent check, creating an inconsistent authorization boundary. Impact: - Unauthorized modification of platform-admin account data (integrity) - Potential lockout or privilege manipulation of platform administrators (availability) - Escalation of an organization-admin role to effectively control platform-level administration Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:23 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:21 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:23
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90 2fdb8a47ac79…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    db694be89ed4 fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from editing 2fdb8a47ac79…
    Fix summary

    The fix adds an explicit authorization check in the browser-based user edit view that rejects the request before rendering or processing the form when the target account is a platform-admin account and the current user is not a platform administrator. This aligns the browser interface with the existing API-level restriction, ensuring that only platform administrators can modify platform-admin accounts.

    Patch summary

    Three lines are inserted in the edit_user function in app/admin/admin.py, immediately after the same-organization check and before the non-admin permission check. The added code calls user_modif.is_admin() on the target user; if true, it flashes an error message ('Only administrators can edit Admin users.') and redirects to the admin users list, preventing the form from being rendered or processed. No other files or logic are modified.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N: web-based admin interface accessible over the network. AC:L: the attacker simply navigates to the edit URL for a known admin account; no race conditions or special timing required. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate attack target. PR:L: requires an authenticated account with organization-admin privileges. UI:N: no victim interaction beyond the attacker's own browser session. VC:N: the primary impact is modification, not disclosure; the attacker already has visibility into the user list. VI:H: the attacker can alter platform-admin credentials, roles, or settings. VA:H: the attacker can disable or lock out platform administrators. SC:N: no impact on separate components. SI:H: integrity of admin account records is compromised. SA:N: no impact on the security authority of other components.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The edit_user view was missing an authorization check that would prevent a non-platform-admin user from targeting a platform-admin account. The check existed in the API layer but was absent in the browser-based view, constituting a missing authorization control for a specific operation.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-100 The attack exploits an incomplete authorization logic in the admin user-edit view: the same-organization check passes for a platform-admin account that happens to share the organization, but the missing admin-target check allows the lower-privileged user to proceed. This is a logic flaw in the access-control flow. CAPEC-100 is the closest available pattern; the exact CAPEC for a single missing check in a multi-step authorization flow is not explicitly defined in the CAPEC catalog, so this is the best plausible match.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the exact starting version is not independently confirmed by the patch alone.
    • The assumption that the API layer already enforced the admin-target restriction is taken from the commit message; the API code is not included in the patch for independent verification.
    • CAPEC-100 is selected as the closest plausible attack pattern; no CAPEC entry precisely describes a single missing authorization check in a multi-step view function, so this mapping carries moderate uncertainty.
    • CVSS VC is set to None on the assumption that the attacker already has visibility into the user list in the admin panel; if the edit form reveals additional sensitive fields not otherwise visible, VC could be Low.
    • The patch does not include the full edit_user function or surrounding context; the analysis assumes the three added lines are the complete remediation for this specific authorization gap.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 07:44 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90): fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from editing https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90
    2. 2026-11-20 14:22 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133846 (GCVE-0-2026-133846)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:38 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:35
    VLAI
    Title
    FlowIntel Missing Authorization Check Allows Unauthorized Revival of Completed Privileged Cases via Task Reopening
    Summary
    FlowIntel contains an authorization bypass in its task management workflow. When a user reopens a completed task (by toggling its completion state or changing its status to a non-finished value) or creates a new task within a completed privileged case, the parent case is automatically revived (un-completed, status reset to Created, finish date cleared). The system failed to enforce the required Admin or Case Admin privilege check before performing this case revival side effect. A user with basic task-level permissions (e.g., editor, queuer, or queue admin) could trigger the revival of a completed privileged case through the browser interface or the REST API, without holding the elevated role required for case-level operations. This could disrupt case lifecycle management, clear completion metadata, and potentially expose the case to further unauthorized modifications. The vulnerability affects both the browser-based task completion/status-change endpoints and the corresponding API endpoints, as well as the task creation flow. Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:22 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:21 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:22
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c f7e85e27691e…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    7eb9fa76d460 fix: [security] Enforce privileged case permissions on task f7e85e27691e…
    Fix summary

    The fix introduces explicit authorization checks (can_reopen_case and can_reopen_task) that require Admin or Case Admin privileges before a completed privileged case can be revived as a side effect of task reopening or task creation. Denial is enforced at the core model layer and at both the browser and API endpoint layers, with audit logging of denied attempts. Legitimate task creation is preserved, but the automatic case revival is suppressed for unauthorized users.

    Patch summary

    Added can_reopen_case() and can_reopen_task() methods to TaskCore.py that verify Admin or Case Admin role when the parent case is both completed and privileged. Inserted permission checks in complete_task() and create_task() in TaskCore.py. Added 403 denial responses with audit log entries in task.py (browser endpoints for task completion and status change) and task_api.py (API endpoints for task completion and status change). Added 134 lines of regression tests covering role boundaries, UUID aliases, status IDs, API identity, Matrix delegation, denial side effects, and legitimate reopening workflows.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N - exploitable over the network via web UI or REST API. AC:L - the attack requires only a standard task completion toggle or status change request; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N - no manipulation of the target system is needed. PR:L - requires an authenticated user with basic task permissions (editor, queuer, or queue admin). UI:N - no victim interaction required. VC:N - no new confidential data is exposed; the case data was already accessible. VI:L - the case state is modified (completed flag cleared, status reset, finish date removed), which is a limited integrity impact on case lifecycle metadata. VA:N - no denial of service; the case remains accessible. SC/SI/SA:N - no secondary system impact identified.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The system failed to enforce an authorization check before allowing a completed privileged case to be revived as a side effect of task reopening or task creation. The permission check for case-level operations was entirely absent from the task-level code paths.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-114 The attacker performs an action (task reopening or task creation) that they are partially authorized to perform, but the system fails to enforce the higher-level authorization required for the side effect (privileged case revival). This is closest to forced browsing in the sense that the user effectively triggers an unauthorized state change on a resource (the case) they do not have full authority over. Uncertainty: the user IS authorized to interact with the task itself; the missing check is on the implicit case-level side effect, making this a partial rather than pure forced-browsing scenario.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version 0, fixed_version 4.1.0); the exact starting version of the vulnerable code is not confirmed by the patch alone.
    • CAPEC-114 (Forced Browsing) is the closest available mapping; the actual weakness is a missing authorization check on a side effect of an authorized action, which does not map precisely to any single CAPEC entry.
    • CVSS VI:L assumes the case state modification (revival) constitutes a limited integrity impact; if downstream workflows depend on case completion state, the practical impact could be higher.
    • The patch references a 'Matrix delegation' mechanism for API identity; the exact trust model for delegated requests is not fully documented in the patch.
    • PR:L assumes the attacker needs at minimum an editor-level account; the patch tests confirm editor, queuer, and queue_admin roles are affected.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-16 08:28 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c): fix: [security] Enforce privileged case permissions on task https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c
    2. 2026-11-20 14:22 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133844 (GCVE-0-2026-133844)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:38 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:35
    VLAI
    Title
    FlowIntel Case Serialization Exposes Unauthorized Connector Metadata to Authenticated Users
    Summary
    FlowIntel, a threat intelligence case management platform, contains an information disclosure vulnerability in its case serialization logic. When a case is rendered via the REST API or browser views, all connector instances associated with that case were included in the response regardless of the requesting user's permissions. This means that any authenticated user with read access to a case could observe connector metadata belonging to other users (personal-scope connectors) or other organizations (org-scope connectors), including connector URLs, descriptions, UUIDs, and potentially embedded API credentials. Preconditions: - An authenticated user account with at least read access to the affected case - The case must have connector instances attached that belong to other users or organizations Impact: - Disclosure of personal connector endpoints and credentials of other users - Disclosure of organization-scoped connector metadata across organizational boundaries - Enumeration of connector infrastructure (URLs, UUIDs, descriptions) not intended for the viewer Affected versions: < 4.1.0
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:28 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:20 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-668 - Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
    • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:28
    Model
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    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/2ff99ca6ed81687fe28d57961d158e0804271416 49d10b72d8d9…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    2ff99ca6ed81 fix: [security] Filter case connector metadata by viewer 49d10b72d8d9…
    Fix summary

    The fix introduces viewer-scoped authorization checks during case serialization. Connector instances are now filtered based on the acting user's permissions: administrators and assigned case-administrators retain full visibility, while regular users only see connectors whose sharing scope (personal, org, or global) grants them access. When no authenticated user context is available, connector metadata is omitted entirely. Credential-use checks for module execution remain unchanged.

    Patch summary

    In app/db_class/db.py, the to_json method's connector serialization was changed from an unconditional query of all Case_Connector_Instance records to a conditional block that: (1) returns an empty list if user is None or unauthenticated; (2) imports can_access_all_case_connectors and is_instance_visible_to_user; (3) filters the connector list so only instances passing the visibility predicate are serialized. A new test file tests/case/test_case_connector_visibility.py (250 lines, 22 tests) validates API responses, browser views, Matrix delegation, scope changes, access revocation, fork behavior, and module-context credential isolation.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N - exploitable over the network via standard API or browser endpoints. AC:L - no special conditions; any case view triggers the disclosure. AT:N - no attack-target manipulation required. PR:L - requires a low-privilege authenticated user with case read access. UI:N - no victim interaction beyond the attacker's own request. VC:L - limited confidential data (connector URLs, descriptions, UUIDs, possibly API keys) is exposed. VI:N, VA:N - no integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N - no secondary-system impact evidenced.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-668 Connector metadata belonging to one user or organization (personal or org scope) was exposed to users in a different sphere (other users, other organizations) because the serialization path lacked per-viewer authorization filtering.
    • CWE-862 The to_json serialization method did not perform any authorization check on connector instances before including them in the response, effectively missing the access-control gate that should restrict visibility to the acting user.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-1 The closest plausible CAPEC is Software Feature Discovery: an authenticated user can enumerate connector instances attached to a case and learn their URLs, descriptions, UUIDs, and potentially credentials that were not intended for their access level. The attack is passive (simply viewing a case) and requires no special tooling. Uncertainty: no CAPEC specifically models 'viewing an object to discover embedded metadata of other tenants'; CAPEC-1 is the best available match for unauthorized information enumeration through a legitimate interface.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version '0', fixed_version '4.1.0'); the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
    • PR:L assumes the attacker needs only a low-privilege authenticated account with case read access; the patch does not specify whether anonymous access to case endpoints is possible, but the fix explicitly omits connectors when user is None, implying unauthenticated access to the case object may exist.
    • VC:L assumes the exposed connector metadata (URLs, descriptions, UUIDs, possibly API keys) constitutes limited but meaningful confidential information; the tests reference 'DO-NOT-EXPOSE-GLOBAL-KEY' and 'DO-NOT-EXPOSE-PERSONAL-KEY' suggesting credentials may be present in connector metadata.
    • CAPEC-1 is selected as the closest available attack pattern; no CAPEC precisely models cross-tenant metadata leakage through a legitimate read endpoint.
    • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used to generate the patch but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
    • No evidence of active exploitation, public PoC, or in-the-wild abuse is present in the patch or metadata.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-16 06:56 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (2ff99ca6ed81687fe28d57961d158e0804271416): fix: [security] Filter case connector metadata by viewer https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/2ff99ca6ed81687fe28d57961d158e0804271416
    2. 2026-11-20 14:27 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/2ff99ca6ed81687fe28d57961d158e0804271416
    Show details on NVD website

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                    "patchSummary": "In app/db_class/db.py, the to_json method\u0027s connector serialization was changed from an unconditional query of all Case_Connector_Instance records to a conditional block that: (1) returns an empty list if user is None or unauthenticated; (2) imports can_access_all_case_connectors and is_instance_visible_to_user; (3) filters the connector list so only instances passing the visibility predicate are serialized. A new test file tests/case/test_case_connector_visibility.py (250 lines, 22 tests) validates API responses, browser views, Matrix delegation, scope changes, access revocation, fork behavior, and module-context credential isolation.",
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    CVE-2026-133843 (GCVE-0-2026-133843)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:37 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:35
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Insecure Direct Object Reference in MISP Correlation Feature
    Summary
    flowintel contains a vulnerability in the MISP correlation feature that allows unauthorized disclosure of case identifiers. The application failed to enforce proper access controls when generating correlation lists for MISP attributes. Specifically, the system did not verify whether the requesting user had permission to view the source case or the matching cases returned in the correlation results. This lack of authorization checks allowed authenticated users to potentially discover the existence of cases they do not have access to, leading to information disclosure. The vulnerability affects the following components: - Case correlation logic - API endpoints for retrieving correlation attributes - MISP object handling Affected versions: < 4.1.0
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:27 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:20 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:27
    Model
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    Input
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    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    6a96e374ea1f fix: [security] Restrict MISP correlations to visible cases e50cb204bae2…
    Fix summary

    The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing strict access control checks on both the source case and the resulting correlation list. The system now verifies that the acting user has permission to view the source case before processing correlations. Additionally, the resulting list of matching case IDs is filtered to include only cases that the user is authorized to access. This ensures that no unauthorized case identifiers are disclosed to the user.

    Patch summary

    The patch modifies the check_correlation_attr function in CaseCore.py to accept a user parameter and enforce visibility checks. It introduces a helper function _get_misp_attribute_case_id to correctly resolve case ownership. The function now verifies that the user is authenticated and can view the source case. It also filters the resulting case IDs using CommonModel.check_user_in_private_cases to ensure only visible cases are returned. The API endpoints in case_api.py and case_misp.py are updated to pass the current user to the correlation function, ensuring that access control is consistently enforced across all entry points.

    CVSS rationale

    The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low attack complexity (AC:L) and no attack requirements (AT:N). It requires low privileges (PR:L) as any authenticated user can exploit it. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The impact is limited to information disclosure (VI:L) as it reveals case identifiers, but does not affect confidentiality of case contents or integrity/availability. There is no impact on the scope (SC:N) or other systems (SI:N, SA:N).

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-639 The vulnerability allows users to access case identifiers they should not be able to see due to missing authorization checks on the correlation results. This is a classic case of authorization bypass where the application fails to verify that the user has permission to access the returned data.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-126 The vulnerability allows users to access resources (case identifiers) they are not authorized to view by exploiting the lack of access control checks in the correlation feature. This aligns with the Forced Browsing attack pattern, where an attacker accesses resources by directly manipulating URLs or parameters without proper authorization.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The vulnerability is assumed to be exploitable by any authenticated user with access to the MISP correlation feature.
    • The impact is limited to information disclosure of case identifiers and does not extend to the contents of the cases.
    • The CAPEC mapping to Forced Browsing is the closest plausible match, but the exact attack pattern may vary depending on the specific exploitation scenario.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 9 11 medium 3
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-16 06:34 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (6a96e374ea1fb7cc547777ac2cd5fa98b6622da9): fix: [security] Restrict MISP correlations to visible cases https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6a96e374ea1fb7cc547777ac2cd5fa98b6622da9
    2. 2026-11-20 14:27 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6a96e374ea1fb7cc547777ac2cd5fa98b6622da9
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133841 (GCVE-0-2026-133841)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:37 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:35
    VLAI
    Title
    FlowIntel Information Disclosure of Linked Private Case Metadata via Unfiltered Case Serialization
    Summary
    FlowIntel contains an authorization bypass in its case serialization logic that allows an authenticated user to view metadata of private cases they do not have access to. When a case is linked to another case, the JSON representation of the source case included the ID, title, and description of every linked case regardless of the requesting user's permissions. This affected multiple access paths: - Browser views (case detail, case info, search, calendar) - REST API endpoints (get case, list cases, search, title lookup, completed/not-completed lists) - Internal tooling and connector module context building An attacker with valid credentials and access to any case that contains a link to a private case could enumerate the private case's identifier, title, and description without holding a membership or role on that private case. The exposure occurred because the serialization method did not receive or evaluate the acting user's identity before including linked-case data in the response. Security impact: - Disclosure of private case identifiers, titles, and descriptions to unauthorized users - Facilitation of further targeted attacks against the exposed private cases - Bypass of the intended per-case access control model Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:27 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:20 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
    • CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:27
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e6c780d97cd669500d05f1c911b2038f0dc91335 727879b87960…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    e6c780d97cd6 fix: [security] Filter linked cases by viewer permissions 727879b87960…
    Fix summary

    The serialization method now accepts the acting user as a parameter and filters linked cases based on the user's authorization. When an authenticated user is provided, only linked cases the user is permitted to view are included. When no user is provided (internal or anonymous callers), the method fails closed by excluding all private linked cases. All call sites across browser views, API endpoints, calendar, search, tools, and internal core operations were updated to pass the resolved user identity, ensuring consistent enforcement regardless of the access path.

    Patch summary

    Modified the case serialization method in the database model to accept an optional user parameter. When a user is supplied and authenticated, linked cases are filtered through an existing permission-check function. When no user is supplied, only non-private linked cases are returned. Updated approximately 15 call sites across app/case/case.py, app/case/case_api.py, app/case/CaseCore.py, app/calendar/calendar.py, app/tools/tools_core.py, and app/db_class/db.py to pass the current or API-resolved user. In the API single-case endpoint, the user is now explicitly extracted from API headers and passed to both the authorization check and the serializer. Added a new test file (tests/case/test_case_link_visibility.py) with 171 lines covering API and browser filtering, identity separation between session and API key, Matrix delegation, anonymous/anonymous-user fail-closed behavior, and dynamic permission changes.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N - exploitable over the network via HTTP API or browser. AC:L - no special race conditions or complex setup; any user with access to a case linked to a private case triggers the disclosure. AT:N - no attack-target manipulation required. PR:L - requires a low-privilege authenticated user with access to at least one case that has a link to a private case. UI:N - no victim interaction beyond the attacker's own request. VC:L - limited confidentiality impact: case IDs, titles, and descriptions are exposed, but full case content, tasks, and objects are not. VI:N, VA:N - no integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N - no impact on subsequent components; the data belongs to the same application.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The case serialization method did not perform an authorization check on linked private cases before including their metadata in the response. The permission model existed for direct case access but was not applied to transitively referenced (linked) case data.
    • CWE-200 The result of the missing authorization check was the exposure of private case IDs, titles, and descriptions to users who had no membership or role on those private cases.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-12 The closest available CAPEC pattern. An authenticated user makes a legitimate request for a case they can access, and the application's response inadvertently discloses metadata (IDs, titles, descriptions) of private cases the user is not authorized to view. The uncertainty is that CAPEC-12 typically refers to version or configuration metadata discovery, whereas this is an authorization-failure-driven data exposure. No CAPEC specifically models 'information disclosure through unfiltered relational data in API responses,' making CAPEC-12 the best available approximation.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is assumed to be all versions prior to 4.1.0 based on the explicit context; no earlier version boundary is specified in the patch.
    • PR:L assumes the attacker needs at minimum a low-privilege account with access to one case that is linked to a private case; if no such link exists in a deployment, the vulnerability is not triggerable.
    • VC:L assumes that exposure of case ID, title, and description constitutes a low (not high) confidentiality impact; if titles or descriptions contain highly sensitive operational details, impact could be higher.
    • CAPEC-12 is the closest available mapping but does not precisely model authorization-failure-driven relational data exposure; uncertainty is noted in the CAPEC rationale.
    • The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerability was reported externally or found internally; no finder or reporter credit is assigned.
    • UI:N assumes the attacker initiates the request themselves; no victim interaction is required.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-12 16:30 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (e6c780d97cd669500d05f1c911b2038f0dc91335): fix: [security] Filter linked cases by viewer permissions https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e6c780d97cd669500d05f1c911b2038f0dc91335
    2. 2026-11-20 14:26 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e6c780d97cd669500d05f1c911b2038f0dc91335
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133840 (GCVE-0-2026-133840)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:36 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:36
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel Missing Authorization Check Allows Unauthorized File-to-Note Conversion on Restricted Tasks
    Summary
    flowintel contains an authorization bypass in the file-to-note conversion feature for case tasks. When a task is in a restricted workflow state (Requested, Rejected, or Request Review) within a privileged case, the conversion endpoint did not enforce elevated role requirements. Any authenticated user with basic case membership (e.g., editor or queuer) could invoke the conversion action, causing the system to read the attached file contents and create a note on the restricted task. This bypasses the intended workflow restriction that only Admin, Case Admin, or Queue Admin roles may modify tasks in those states. An attacker with a low-privilege account in a privileged case could: - Extract file contents into note format, potentially circumventing file-level access controls - Create unauthorized notes that alter the task's note count, modification timestamp, and case history - Disrupt the review/approval workflow on restricted tasks The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with at least editor-level access to the affected case and a task in one of the restricted states. Affected versions: flowintel < 4.1.0
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:26 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:20 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:26
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/be3ea802d58ae6d71bf4c90f698d53d6080dce40 916e5d7a7034…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    be3ea802d58a fix: [security] Restrict file conversion on privileged tasks 916e5d7a7034…
    Fix summary

    The fix introduces an authorization gate that checks whether the target task is in a restricted state (Requested, Rejected, or Request Review) and, if so, verifies that the current user holds an elevated role (Admin, Case Admin, or Queue Admin) before proceeding with file content reading or note creation. Additionally, a null-check for the task object was added to prevent processing when the task target does not exist, returning a 404 response. Audit logging is recorded on denial.

    Patch summary

    In app/case/task.py, the convert_file_to_note function was modified to: (1) add a null check for the task object alongside the existing file check, returning 404 if either is missing; (2) insert a new authorization check after the existing case-membership verification that calls TaskModel.is_task_restricted(task) and TaskModel.can_edit_requested_task(current_user), returning a 403 with an audit log entry if the task is restricted and the user lacks elevated privileges. A new test file (tests/case/test_restricted_task_file_conversion.py, 220 lines) adds regression coverage for role-based denial, permitted conversion by elevated roles, unrestricted task conversion, denial side-effect verification, browser identity enforcement, mismatched target rejection, and error-state preservation.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N: The vulnerability is in a web application endpoint accessible over the network. AC:L: Exploitation requires a simple authenticated API call with no special conditions. AT:N: No attack target manipulation is needed. PR:L: Requires an authenticated user with at least editor-level case membership. UI:N: No user interaction required. VC:N: The file is already attached to the task and accessible to case members; the primary issue is the unauthorized note creation action rather than new data disclosure. VI:L: Unauthorized notes can be created on restricted tasks, altering task metadata (note count, last modification, case history). VA:N: No availability impact. SC:N/SI:L/SA:N: Secondary impact is limited to the integrity of the case/task data model (notes, history entries) with no cross-component or availability effects.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The convert_file_to_note endpoint lacked an authorization check for restricted task states. The existing case-membership check was insufficient; no role-based verification was performed before reading file contents or creating notes on tasks in Requested, Rejected, or Request Review states. The fix adds the missing authorization gate.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-66 The privilege model for the file-to-note conversion action was incompletely configured: it enforced case membership but did not enforce the elevated role requirement for restricted task states. An attacker with a lower-privilege role (editor/queuer) could perform an action reserved for higher-privilege roles (Admin, Case Admin, Queue Admin). CAPEC-66 is the closest match as it describes exploiting a misconfigured or incomplete privilege enforcement. Uncertainty: no dedicated CAPEC for 'missing role check on a specific endpoint' exists; CAPEC-66 is the best available approximation.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); no explicit version boundary tag is provided in the patch.
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    • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used to generate the patch but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
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    1. 2026-11-16 09:42 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (be3ea802d58ae6d71bf4c90f698d53d6080dce40): fix: [security] Restrict file conversion on privileged tasks https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/be3ea802d58ae6d71bf4c90f698d53d6080dce40
    2. 2026-11-20 14:26 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/be3ea802d58ae6d71bf4c90f698d53d6080dce40
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133839 (GCVE-0-2026-133839)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:36 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:36
    VLAI
    Title
    FlowIntel Missing Authorization Check Allows Unauthorized Deletion of Evidence Files from Restricted Privileged Tasks
    Summary
    FlowIntel contains a missing authorization vulnerability in its task file deletion functionality. When a privileged task is in a restricted state (Requested, Rejected, or Request Review), any authenticated user with basic case membership (e.g., editor or queuer) was able to delete evidence files associated with that task via both the browser interface and the REST API. The deletion operation should have been restricted to users holding Admin, Case Admin, or Queue Admin roles. The vulnerability affects the core file deletion logic, the browser-facing task endpoint, and the API task endpoint. No role-based restriction was enforced prior to performing disk removal, database record deletion, timeline event removal, or history log updates. An attacker with a low-privilege case membership could destroy evidence files, corrupt investigation timelines, and alter case history, compromising the integrity of ongoing investigations. Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:18 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:19 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:18
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7142a49da22f1079bcbd043bc33eb7cdfabc81a7 de01c727664b…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    7142a49da22f fix: [security] Restrict evidence deletion on privileged de01c727664b…
    Fix summary

    The fix enforces role-based authorization before any file deletion side effects occur. It verifies that the file belongs to the specified task (preventing task substitution) and that, when the task is in a restricted state, the requesting user holds Admin, Case Admin, or Queue Admin privileges. Denial is returned with a 403 status and an audit log entry before any disk, database, timeline, or history modification takes place. The check is applied consistently across the core model, the browser endpoint, and the API endpoint.

    Patch summary

    Three source files are modified. In TaskCore.py, the delete_file method gains two guards: a file-to-task ownership check (file.task_id must equal task.id) and a restricted-state permission check (is_task_restricted and can_edit_requested_task). In task.py and task_api.py, the respective delete_file handlers insert the same restricted-state permission check after the existing case-membership check, returning a 403 JSON response and writing an audit log entry on denial. A new test file (207 lines) adds 116 regression tests covering role-based denial, permitted deletion by approvers, task-substitution prevention, API identity vs session identity, Matrix delegation, read-only denial, non-member denial, and unrestricted-task deletion by editors.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web UI or REST API. AC:L: No special race conditions, timing, or configuration are needed; a simple authenticated request suffices. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: The attacker needs a low-privilege authenticated account with case membership (editor or queuer). UI:N: No victim interaction is required. VC:N: No confidential data is exposed. VI:H: Evidence files are permanently deleted from disk and database, and timeline/history records are altered, severely compromising investigation integrity. VA:N: The system remains operational; the impact is data destruction (integrity) rather than service unavailability. SC/SI/SA:N: No impact on other components or systems is evidenced.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The file deletion endpoints and core method lacked an authorization check for restricted-state tasks. Any case member could invoke deletion regardless of role, which is a textbook missing authorization control. CWE-862 is the narrowest defensible mapping because the specific check (role-based restriction for privileged restricted tasks) was simply absent.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-126 The attacker accesses a resource (file deletion endpoint) that they are not authorized to invoke based on their role. While CAPEC-126 typically describes URL guessing, the underlying pattern is the same: the application fails to enforce authorization on a known endpoint, allowing an authenticated but low-privilege user to perform an operation they should not. This is the closest CAPEC to a missing role-based authorization check on a known API/browser endpoint. Uncertainty: a more precise CAPEC for 'missing authorization on a known endpoint' does not exist in the CAPEC catalog, so CAPEC-126 is the best available match.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version 0, fixed_version 4.1.0); no intermediate version boundaries are confirmed.
    • CAPEC-126 is selected as the closest available attack pattern; a more specific CAPEC for missing role-based authorization on a known endpoint does not exist in the catalog.
    • CVSS VI is rated High based on the permanent destruction of evidence files and alteration of investigation records; if the deployment context limits the scope of affected tasks, the impact could be lower.
    • The patch references a 'can_edit_requested_task' permission and 'is_task_restricted' state check; the exact role hierarchy and whether Queue Admin is a distinct role from Case Admin is assumed from the commit message and test fixtures.
    • No evidence of active exploitation or public disclosure is present in the patch; SSVC exploitation is set to none.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-16 09:15 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (7142a49da22f1079bcbd043bc33eb7cdfabc81a7): fix: [security] Restrict evidence deletion on privileged https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7142a49da22f1079bcbd043bc33eb7cdfabc81a7
    2. 2026-11-20 14:17 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7142a49da22f1079bcbd043bc33eb7cdfabc81a7
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133838 (GCVE-0-2026-133838)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:36 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:36
    VLAI
    Title
    FlowIntel Missing Authorization on Restricted Task Modification Paths
    Summary
    FlowIntel contains an authorization bypass that allows non-approver case members to modify restricted tasks (those in Requested, Rejected, or Request Review status) through several indirect code paths that lacked the required approver permission check. Affected operations include: - Self-unassignment from a restricted task - Reordering tasks, including indirectly moving restricted sibling tasks - Linking or unlinking MISP objects and attributes to/from restricted tasks - Creating MISP objects or standalone attributes with task IDs referencing restricted tasks - Deleting MISP objects or attributes that are linked to restricted tasks - Executing modules on restricted tasks A user with case member access (but without Admin, Case Admin, or Queue Admin privileges) could exploit these paths to alter the state of tasks that are supposed to be locked pending approval, effectively bypassing the intended approval workflow and potentially manipulating associated MISP data. Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:17 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:19 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:17
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/cbc1a72fd3a343ca288617b5ff70065a19c7c8c7 829a9498c0f0…
    Confidence
    high
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    cbc1a72fd3a3 fix: [security] Require approver permissions for restricted 829a9498c0f0…
    Fix summary

    The fix enforces approver-level permission checks (is_task_restricted and can_edit_requested_task) before any state change on restricted tasks across all affected code paths. Checks are applied at both the model layer (TaskCore, CaseCore) and the API/view layer (case_api, case_misp, task), rejecting forbidden operations with a 403 response before any partial writes occur. Reordering additionally validates every affected restricted sibling task, and module execution requires approver permission before dispatch.

    Patch summary

    Added a new check_task_link_permissions method in CaseCore that validates approver permissions for all tasks whose MISP links will change. Added is_task_restricted/can_edit_requested_task guards in TaskCore.remove_assign_task, TaskCore.change_order (including sibling task validation), and TaskCore.call_module_task_no_instance. Wrapped API handlers in case_api.py, case_misp.py, and task.py with try/except PermissionError blocks returning 403. Added permission checks to MISP object/attribute creation (create_misp_object, create_standalone_attribute), deletion (delete_object, delete_standalone_attr), task linking/unlinking, and task reordering endpoints. Refactored task ID resolution into get_misp_link_task_ids to centralize authorization before writes.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N - web application accessible over network. AC:L - straightforward API calls, no race conditions or special timing. AT:N - no attack target manipulation. PR:L - requires authenticated case member account (not admin). UI:N - no user interaction needed. VC:N - no data disclosure. VI:L - task state (assignments, ordering, MISP links) can be modified, bypassing approval workflow. VA:N - no denial of service. SC:N - no cross-component confidentiality impact. SI:L - MISP objects/attributes linked to tasks can be created, deleted, or relinked. SA:N - no cross-component security impact. Overall impact is limited to workflow integrity within a single case.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 Multiple code paths that modify restricted task state (unassignment, reordering, MISP link changes, module execution) lacked the authorization check that other paths enforced. The fix adds the missing is_task_restricted/can_edit_requested_task checks to these paths, confirming the root cause was absent authorization validation.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-100 The attacker leverages their legitimate case member role to perform operations (task state changes, MISP link modifications) that should require approver-level privileges. The system incorrectly trusted the case membership check as sufficient authorization for all task-related operations, failing to enforce the higher privilege requirement on restricted tasks. CAPEC-100 is the closest match as it describes exploiting a system's trust in a user's privilege level to perform actions beyond what that level should allow. Uncertainty: no CAPEC specifically covers 'missing authorization on secondary code paths'; CAPEC-100 is the best available approximation.
    Assumptions to verify
    • Assumes the application is deployed as a network-accessible web service (AV:N).
    • Assumes case member access is the minimum privilege required (PR:L); the patch references Admin, Case Admin, and Queue Admin as the required roles for restricted task modification.
    • Assumes no data confidentiality is exposed through the affected paths (VC:N, SC:N); the operations modify state but do not return restricted data.
    • CAPEC-100 is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC specifically describes 'missing authorization on secondary code paths'.
    • The affected_version '0' from metadata is interpreted as 'all versions prior to 4.1.0' per semver convention.
    • Assumes the vulnerability requires an authenticated user with at least case member access; unauthenticated access is not indicated by the patch.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 high 6
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 13:54 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (cbc1a72fd3a343ca288617b5ff70065a19c7c8c7): fix: [security] Require approver permissions for restricted https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/cbc1a72fd3a343ca288617b5ff70065a19c7c8c7
    2. 2026-11-20 14:17 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/cbc1a72fd3a343ca288617b5ff70065a19c7c8c7
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133837 (GCVE-0-2026-133837)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-20 14:35 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:36
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel Missing Authorization Check Allows Non-Approvers to Complete Privileged Tasks
    Summary
    flowintel contains an authorization bypass in its task completion workflow for privileged cases. Users with lower-privilege roles (editor, queuer) were able to mark tasks as completed without the required approver review (Admin, Case Admin, or Queue Admin), undermining the approval workflow. The vulnerability was exploitable through multiple paths: - Direct task completion via browser UI or REST API - Changing a task's status to "Finished", which implicitly completed the task - Creating a new task in a privileged case with the completed flag already set - Using UUID aliases or Matrix delegation to reach the same endpoints Preconditions: - An authenticated user with at least editor or queuer role - A privileged case with tasks in a non-completed state Security impact: - Bypass of the mandatory approver review process for privileged cases - Unauthorized modification of task completion state - Potential to mark sensitive work as finished without proper oversight Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:17 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:18 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:17
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/dbd58d8762c824bcc27f912fe3f8497f416a7c16 1febf5744025…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    dbd58d8762c8 fix: [security] Require approver review to complete 1febf5744025…
    Fix summary

    The fix enforces approver-level authorization (Admin, Case Admin, or Queue Admin) before allowing task completion in privileged cases across all code paths (browser, API, and shared core). It also prevents status changes to "Finished" from bypassing the denied completion check, and blocks creation of privileged tasks with the completed flag pre-set. Audit logging is added for all denied attempts.

    Patch summary

    Added a new can_complete_task() method in TaskCore.py that checks whether the user has approver permissions for privileged cases. Inserted authorization checks in complete_task(), change_task_status(), and create_task() in the core model. Added corresponding 403 responses with audit logging in task.py (browser) and task_api.py (REST API) for both completion and status-change endpoints. Modified create_task() to force completed=False for privileged cases. Added 224 lines of regression tests covering role enforcement, UUID aliases, API identity, Matrix delegation, denial side effects, and standard task workflows.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N - exploitable over network via API or browser. AC:L - no special conditions; any authenticated editor/queuer can invoke the endpoint. AT:N - no attack target manipulation needed. PR:L - requires a low-privilege authenticated user (editor or queuer). UI:N - no user interaction required. VC:N - no confidentiality impact. VI:H - the attacker can mark privileged tasks as completed, bypassing the mandatory approval workflow, which is a significant integrity violation. VA:N - no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N - impact is confined to the vulnerable component (flowintel task management); no cross-component scope impact is evidenced.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The task completion and status-change endpoints did not verify that the requesting user held approver-level permissions before allowing privileged tasks to be marked as completed. The authorization check was entirely absent for the privileged-case completion path.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-126 The closest plausible CAPEC is Forced Browsing, as the attacker accesses a functionality (task completion in privileged cases) that is restricted to approver roles. The user invokes the completion endpoint or status-change endpoint without holding the required privilege level. Uncertainty: this is not a classic URL-guessing scenario but rather a missing server-side authorization check on an accessible endpoint; CAPEC-100 (Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Security Levels) is also plausible but CAPEC-126 better captures the act of accessing restricted functionality.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The 'privileged_case' flag is the sole mechanism distinguishing cases that require approver review; no other access-control layer is implied by the patch.
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (fixed in 4.1.0); the exact earliest affected version is not stated in the patch.
    • CAPEC-126 (Forced Browsing) is the closest available mapping; the actual weakness is a missing server-side authorization check rather than a classic forced-browsing URL-guessing scenario.
    • CVSS VI:H assumes that bypassing the approval workflow for privileged cases constitutes a high integrity impact; if the organization considers this a lower-severity workflow violation, VI could be reduced to L.
    • The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerability was reported externally or discovered internally; no finder or reporter credit is assigned.
    • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which may indicate AI-assisted development but does not constitute a credit role.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-16 08:00 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (dbd58d8762c824bcc27f912fe3f8497f416a7c16): fix: [security] Require approver review to complete https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/dbd58d8762c824bcc27f912fe3f8497f416a7c16
    2. 2026-11-20 14:16 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/dbd58d8762c824bcc27f912fe3f8497f416a7c16
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133855 (GCVE-0-2026-133855)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:32
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Unauthorized Disclosure of Linked Case References in Case History
    Summary
    flowintel contains an information disclosure vulnerability in its case history feature. When a user views the history of a case they are authorized to access, the history output includes references to other cases (linked, unlinked, or forked) without verifying whether the requesting user has permission to view those referenced cases. This exposes the identifiers and titles of cases that the user should not be able to discover. The vulnerability affects multiple output paths: - Browser-based case history view - API history endpoint - Plain-text history download - Markdown history download - Report timeline generation An authenticated user with access to any single case can enumerate the existence and identifiers of other cases by reading the history of a case they can access. This bypasses the intended per-case access control model and may reveal the existence of sensitive investigations, their identifiers, and associated metadata to unauthorized users. The raw audit storage is not modified; the issue is solely in the presentation layer failing to filter references to inaccessible cases before returning history data to the user. Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:43 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:22 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
    • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:43
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809 407e73d34f15…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    c44025ea6810 fix: [security] Filter linked case references from case 407e73d34f15…
    Fix summary

    A new visibility-aware history retrieval function was introduced that parses each history record for case references (link, unlink, fork events) and checks the requesting user's access to every referenced case before including that record in the output. Records referencing inaccessible cases are omitted from the response. The filtering is applied consistently across all history output paths (browser view, API, text download, Markdown download, and report timelines). Administrative users retain full unfiltered access. The raw audit log storage remains unchanged to preserve forensic integrity.

    Patch summary

    Added a new function get_visible_history() in common_core.py that: (1) verifies the user can view the current case, (2) groups raw history lines into logical records using timestamp-based event boundaries, (3) extracts referenced case IDs from link/unlink/fork messages using regex patterns, (4) checks can_view_case() for each referenced case, and (5) excludes records referencing inaccessible cases. Updated download_history(), download_history_md(), the browser history endpoint, the API history endpoint, and the report timeline generator to call get_visible_history() instead of the raw get_history(). Added helper functions _history_case_references() and _history_record_complete() to handle legacy multiline link records and ambiguous formats. Changed download_history() to serve content via BytesIO instead of reading a file path directly.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N - The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web application. AC:L - Exploitation requires only viewing the history of any accessible case; no special conditions or race conditions are needed. AT:N - No prior attack or manipulation of the target is required. PR:L - The attacker must be an authenticated user with access to at least one case. UI:N - No user interaction beyond normal application use is required. VC:L - The vulnerable component (case history endpoint) leaks limited information (case IDs and titles of referenced cases). VI:N - No integrity impact. VA:N - No availability impact. SC:L - Subsequent components (other cases) have their existence and identifiers exposed to unauthorized users. SI:N - No integrity impact on other systems. SA:N - No safety impact.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-200 The case history output exposes identifiers and titles of other cases to users who do not have authorization to view those cases. The sensitive data (case existence, IDs, titles) is disclosed through a legitimate endpoint without proper per-reference authorization checks.
    • CWE-862 The history retrieval functions did not perform authorization checks on the referenced cases embedded within the history records. The primary case access was verified, but the secondary cases referenced in link/unlink/fork events were not checked before inclusion in the response.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-128 The attacker leverages a legitimate application endpoint (case history) to discover metadata about other resources (case identifiers, titles, and relationships) that they are not authorized to access. This is the closest CAPEC pattern to the observed information disclosure through a functional endpoint. The mapping is approximate because CAPEC-128 typically refers to version/configuration discovery, whereas here the disclosed metadata is application data (case references) rather than system metadata. No more specific CAPEC pattern for cross-object information disclosure via a legitimate read endpoint exists in the CAPEC catalog.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is assumed to be all versions prior to 4.1.0 based on the explicit context providing affected_version '0' and fixed_version '4.1.0'. The exact earliest affected version is not confirmed by the patch itself.
    • The CAPEC-128 mapping is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically covers cross-object information disclosure through a legitimate read endpoint. The mapping is approximate.
    • CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs at least one valid authenticated session with access to any case. If the application allows unauthenticated history access in some deployment, PR would be N.
    • The patch commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
    • The vulnerability requires the attacker to already have access to at least one case; it does not allow access to cases with no prior relationship to the attacker's accessible cases beyond those referenced in history.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 12:50 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809): fix: [security] Filter linked case references from case https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809
    2. 2026-11-20 14:42 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133854 (GCVE-0-2026-133854)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:33
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Information Disclosure of Classification Usage via Missing Access Control
    Summary
    flowintel contains a vulnerability in the case and task classification usage endpoints that allows authenticated users to view classification data associated with cases they do not have permission to access. The affected endpoints, which provide lists of used taxonomies, tags, galaxies, clusters, and custom tags, did not properly enforce object-level access controls. While the endpoints required authentication, they failed to filter the returned data based on the requesting user's visibility permissions for the underlying cases. This allowed any authenticated user to enumerate classification usage across all cases, including private or restricted cases belonging to other organizations or users. This issue could lead to the disclosure of sensitive information, such as the existence of specific cases, the types of threats or indicators associated with them, and the relationships between different classification elements, potentially aiding an attacker in reconnaissance or targeting. Affected versions: < 4.1.0
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:42 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:22 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
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    bcp-05-x-02
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    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:42
    Model
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    Input
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    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    fa7216e76041 fix: [security] Scope classification usage to visible cases 58589e54911e…
    Fix summary

    The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing object-level access controls on the classification usage endpoints. The fix ensures that the authenticated user's identity is passed to the data retrieval functions, which then filter the results to include only classifications associated with cases that the user is authorized to view. This prevents the disclosure of classification data from private or restricted cases to unauthorized users.

    Patch summary

    The patch modifies the case and task classification usage endpoints to pass the current authenticated user to the underlying data retrieval functions. A new helper function, _classification_usage_ids, is introduced to filter classification usage based on the user's permissions. This function joins the classification link models with the Case model and applies filters to ensure that only classifications associated with visible cases (public, member, or administrator access) are returned. The existing helper functions for retrieving used taxonomies, tags, galaxies, clusters, and custom tags are updated to use this new filtering logic.

    CVSS rationale

    The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L) and no attack requirements (AT:N). It requires low privileges (PR:L) as any authenticated user can exploit it. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The impact is primarily on the confidentiality of the vulnerable system (VI:H) as it allows unauthorized access to sensitive classification data. There is no impact on integrity or availability (VC:N, VA:N, SC:N, SI:N, SA:N).

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The endpoints lacked proper authorization checks to ensure that users could only view classification data associated with cases they had permission to access. This is a classic missing authorization vulnerability where the system failed to verify that the user had the necessary permissions to access the specific objects (cases) referenced by the classification data.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-126 The vulnerability allows an attacker to access classification data associated with cases they do not have permission to view by simply querying the endpoints. This aligns with the attack pattern of accessing functionality or data that is not properly restricted by identifiers or access controls. The uncertainty lies in the fact that the attacker does not need to guess specific IDs, but rather the lack of filtering exposes data across all cases, which is a broader form of improper restriction.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The CAPEC mapping is uncertain as the vulnerability is more about missing filtering than accessing specific IDs, but CAPEC-126 is the closest plausible match.
    • The CVSS vector assumes that the impact is primarily on confidentiality and that the vulnerability does not lead to integrity or availability impacts.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 10 11 medium 2
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 12:03 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630): fix: [security] Scope classification usage to visible cases https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630
    2. 2026-11-20 14:41 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133853 (GCVE-0-2026-133853)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:33
    VLAI
    Title
    FlowIntel Chatbot Shared MCP Session Allows Cross-User API Identity Confusion
    Summary
    FlowIntel's chatbot component used a single shared MCP (Model Context Protocol) session and process-wide environment variable to pass per-user API credentials to a child process. Because the session and the ambient FLOWINTEL_API_KEY environment variable were shared across all concurrent requests, a user's authenticated identity could be applied to another user's tool invocation, or a stale/ambient credential could be inherited by a new request. Preconditions: - An authenticated user with access to the chatbot interface. - Concurrent or overlapping chatbot tool invocations from different users, or a request made after another user's credentials were written to the process environment. Impact: - A lower-privilege user could read data belonging to a higher-privilege user (e.g., private investigation cases). - A user whose session was invalidated (deleted, password changed, key revoked) could still operate under a previously cached ambient credential. - The parent process environment was mutated with user-specific secrets, creating a persistent credential leak surface. Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:41 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:21 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-290 - Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
    • CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
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    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:41
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    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8 b2eb7327abee…
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    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    9eec395cc73c fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities b2eb7327abee…
    Fix summary

    The shared persistent MCP session and process-wide API key mutation were removed. Each chatbot tool invocation now spawns its own short-lived MCP child process with credentials resolved fresh from the authenticated request context. If the user's identity or API key is unavailable, the invocation is rejected before any child process is launched, preventing fallback to ambient or stale credentials. Each transport is deterministically closed on success, failure, or timeout, eliminating residual credential exposure.

    Patch summary

    Removed the global _mcp_session, _mcp_loop, _mcp_thread, _mcp_current_api_key state and the _ensure_mcp() / _start_mcp_background() / _run_mcp_session() functions that maintained a single shared asyncio event loop and thread. Replaced with _mcp_environment() which resolves the user's API key from the authenticated session on every call and raises RuntimeError if unavailable, and _call_mcp_tool() which opens a per-invocation stdio transport, executes the tool, and closes the transport in all exit paths. Eliminated all os.environ mutations of FLOWINTEL_API_KEY. Added 33 regression tests in tests/chatbot/test_api_identity.py covering concurrent identity isolation, ambient-credential rejection, detached-user handling, key rotation, transport cleanup on failure/timeout, and real stdio child-process lifecycle.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N: the chatbot is a network-accessible Flask endpoint. AC:H: exploitation requires concurrent or carefully timed requests from two different users to trigger the shared-session race, or a specific sequence of credential writes to the process environment. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate target is needed. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated user with chatbot access. UI:N: no victim interaction beyond their own request is required. VC:H: a user can read another user's sensitive data (private cases, investigations). VI:N, VA:N: no integrity or availability impact is evidenced. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: no impact on separate components is demonstrated.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-290 The shared MCP session and process-wide environment variable allowed one user's authenticated identity (API key) to be applied to another user's tool invocation. The per-request identity was not isolated, effectively allowing identity confusion or spoofing between concurrent sessions.
    • CWE-200 Because credentials were shared across requests and written to the process environment, a user could access data (e.g., private cases) belonging to another user whose key was cached in the shared session or ambient environment.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-126 The closest available CAPEC. The shared MCP session acted as a single long-lived session whose credentials could be 'hijacked' by a concurrent request from a different user, causing the wrong identity to be used. No CAPEC specifically covers 'shared per-tenant credential state in a multi-user service,' so CAPEC-126 is the best approximation. Uncertainty: the attack does not involve a traditional network-level session token theft but rather a server-side shared-state race.
    Assumptions to verify
    • AC:H is assumed because reliable exploitation requires concurrent requests from two different authenticated users or a specific timing window around the shared session restart; a single sequential request may not trigger the identity confusion.
    • PR:L assumes any authenticated user with chatbot access can trigger the issue; the patch does not evidence a higher privilege requirement.
    • VC:H assumes the data accessed (private cases, investigations) constitutes high confidentiality impact; the patch tests reference 'PRIVATE ADMIN INVESTIGATION' as the sensitive resource.
    • CAPEC-126 (Session Hijacking) is the closest available mapping but does not precisely describe a server-side shared-credential race; no CAPEC specifically covers multi-tenant credential isolation failures in a shared in-process session.
    • The affected version range is taken from the explicit analyst context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
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    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 10:37 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8): fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8
    2. 2026-11-20 14:41 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133852 (GCVE-0-2026-133852)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:40 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:33
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel Privileged Case Task Approval Bypass via Missing User Context and Template Creation
    Summary
    flowintel is a case management application that enforces an approval workflow for tasks in privileged cases. Tasks in such cases are required to start in a Requested status, meaning they must receive explicit approval before becoming active. A logic flaw in the task-creation path allowed tasks to be initialized with a Created status (bypassing the approval step) in two scenarios: - When a task was created from a template and no acting user was supplied, the privileged-case check was skipped entirely, leaving the task in Created status. - When a case was created from a template, all copied tasks were unconditionally assigned the Created status regardless of the case's privileged designation. An authenticated user with the ability to create tasks from templates or to instantiate cases from templates could therefore place tasks directly into an active state within privileged cases, circumventing the intended approval gate. This may expose restricted case content or permit actions that should require supervisory sign-off. Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:21 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:22 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:21
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1 ef4bf88c9ae2…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    fd23a3cb577b fix: [security] Require initial approval for privileged ef4bf88c9ae2…
    Fix summary

    The approval-workflow enforcement for privileged cases is now applied unconditionally at task creation time. The privileged-case check no longer depends on the presence of an acting user, and template-based case creation explicitly assigns the configured Requested status to tasks when the target case is privileged. Ordinary (non-privileged) cases retain the default Created status, preserving existing behavior.

    Patch summary

    Two one-line changes were made. In app/case/common_core.py, the condition guarding the Requested-status assignment was changed from 'if current_user and case.privileged_case' to 'if case.privileged_case', removing the dependency on a non-null user. In app/templating/TemplateCase.py, the hardcoded 'status_id=1' in the task-copy constructor was replaced with a conditional expression that selects the configured TASK_REQUESTED status when the case is privileged and falls back to 1 otherwise.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N: flowintel is a web application accessible over the network. AC:L: the bypass is triggered simply by the absence of a user context or by using the template-creation path; no race condition or special timing is needed. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate attack target is required. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated user with permission to create tasks from templates or instantiate cases from templates. UI:N: no victim interaction is required. VC:L: tasks in privileged cases become immediately accessible without approval, potentially exposing restricted case content. VI:L: the integrity of the approval workflow is compromised; tasks are in an unauthorized state. VA:N: no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: no secondary impacts on other systems are evidenced.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The approval workflow (a form of authorization gate) for privileged-case tasks was not enforced under certain code paths (no user context, template-based creation), allowing tasks to skip the required approval step. The narrowest defensible CWE is Missing Authorization because the security control (approval) was simply absent in those paths.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-108 The vulnerability is triggered by the absence of a user parameter, which causes the privileged-case authorization check to be skipped. An attacker who can influence whether a user context is supplied (e.g., via an API endpoint that does not enforce authentication for this code path) effectively tampers with the parameter to bypass the control. This is the closest CAPEC available; the mapping is uncertain because the primary defect is a missing check rather than active parameter manipulation, but CAPEC-108 best captures the 'missing/absent parameter leads to skipped validation' pattern.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The 'privileged case' designation implies a higher-sensitivity classification requiring supervisory approval; the exact business meaning is inferred from the code context and commit message.
    • PR:L assumes the attacker needs an authenticated account with template-creation permissions; the patch does not specify the exact role or permission required.
    • CAPEC-108 is the closest available mapping; the primary defect is a missing conditional check rather than active parameter manipulation, so the mapping is approximate.
    • The affected version range '0 to <4.1.0' is taken from the explicit analyst context; the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
    • VC:L assumes that bypassing the approval step exposes task content that would otherwise be restricted; the patch does not detail what content is protected.
    • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation, not as a credit.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 10:02 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1): fix: [security] Require initial approval for privileged https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1
    2. 2026-11-20 14:21 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133851 (GCVE-0-2026-133851)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:40 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34
    VLAI
    Title
    FlowIntel Alerting: Missing Private Case Authorization Check Allows Connector Owners to Access Revoked Case Data
    Summary
    FlowIntel's alerting module contained an authorization bypass in the alert access control logic. When an alert was linked to a private case, the system relied solely on connector ownership (user or organization) to determine access, without verifying that the requesting user still held valid membership in the associated private case. This meant that a user who was a connector owner of an alert could continue to read alert details, review history, raw payloads, and action comments, and could perform review-status updates or case-creation actions, even after their access to the linked private case had been revoked or they were never a member of that case. Additionally, a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap existed: after a review-status update or a competing case-creation claim was committed, the response could disclose private case identifiers or review history to a user whose access had been concurrently removed by another session linking the alert to a private case. Impact: - Unauthorized disclosure of private case data (review comments, raw payloads, action history) through alert endpoints. - Unauthorized modification of alert review status and creation of cases from alerts the user should no longer access. - Leakage of a competing case identifier to an unauthorized user during concurrent case-creation races. Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:20 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:22 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
    • CWE-362 - Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Inadequate Locking
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:20
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff e8226318f1d6…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    68d85c78e464 fix: [security] Enforce private case access for alert reviews e8226318f1d6…
    Fix summary

    The fix enforces private case visibility as a mandatory gate before any connector-ownership check can grant alert access. If an alert is linked to a private case and the user cannot view that case, access is denied regardless of ownership. A post-commit re-verification is added after review-status updates and after detecting a competing case-creation claim, ensuring that concurrent association changes do not result in unauthorized data disclosure in the response.

    Patch summary

    In can_user_view_alert, the private-case membership check was moved before the connector-ownership checks and made unconditional (no longer gated on case.is_private), so any user lacking case access is denied even if they own the connector. In update_review_status, a can_user_view_alert re-check is performed after the database commit and before returning the serialized alert, returning 403 if access was concurrently lost. In create_case_from_alert, after a competing claim is detected, a can_user_view_alert re-check gates the response that would otherwise return the winner's case_id. The unused import get_present_in_case was removed. 33 regression tests were added covering revoked access, connector scope, concurrent case-link transitions, and authorized-user preservation.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the FlowIntel web API. AC:L: No special race condition or complex setup is required; a connector owner whose case access was revoked can simply call the alert endpoints. AT:N: No manipulation of the target is needed. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated user with connector ownership of the alert. UI:N: No victim interaction is required. VC:L: Confidential impact is limited to alert-level data (review comments, raw payload, action history) rather than full case contents. VI:L: The attacker can modify review status and create cases, but cannot alter case data directly. VA:N: No availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: No impact on other systems.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The alert access function did not verify private case membership before granting access based on connector ownership. The authorization check for case-level access was either absent or insufficiently ordered, allowing a user with connector ownership to bypass the private case boundary.
    • CWE-362 The review-status update and case-creation paths did not re-verify authorization after the database commit, creating a TOCTOU window where a concurrent session could link the alert to a private case and the response would still disclose case data to an unauthorized user.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-114 The attacker directly requests alert API endpoints (review, case-creation, read) using a known alert identifier. Because the authorization logic did not enforce private case membership, the server returned sensitive case data and accepted state-changing actions. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed pattern of accessing a resource by directly specifying its identifier without the required authorization context. Uncertainty: the attack does not involve guessing URLs but rather exploiting a logic flaw in an existing authorized endpoint; however, CAPEC-114 remains the best available match for direct resource access bypassing intended access controls.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version '0', fixed_version '4.1.0'); no explicit changelog or release notes are available to confirm the exact first vulnerable release.
    • The CAPEC-114 mapping is the closest available pattern; the actual attack is a logic flaw in authorization ordering rather than classic forced browsing, but no more specific CAPEC exists for missing authorization checks in API endpoints.
    • CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker must be an authenticated user with connector ownership; if the product allows unauthenticated access to alert endpoints, PR would be N, but the patch evidence (session-based auth, API keys in tests) supports authenticated access.
    • The TOCTOU component (CWE-362) requires a concurrent session to link the alert to a private case at the precise moment of the response; this is a secondary vector and the primary issue is the missing authorization check (CWE-862).
    • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used to assist in development; no credit is assigned for this as it is not a person or organization.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 09:50 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff): fix: [security] Enforce private case access for alert reviews https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff
    2. 2026-11-20 14:20 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133850 (GCVE-0-2026-133850)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:39 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Stale Authorization Allows Notification Disclosure After Case Access Revocation
    Summary
    flowintel contains an authorization flaw in its recurring reminder notification subsystem. When a user is subscribed to recurring notifications for a case, the system does not re-verify the recipient's current access rights to that case before generating or displaying the notification. As a result, a user who previously had access to a private case and later had that access revoked can still: - Receive recurring reminder notifications containing case-related content. - View stored reminder notifications in their notification list, including notification counts, even though they no longer have permission to view the underlying case. The vulnerability affects both the notification creation path (recurring reminder generation) and the notification display path (listing and counting stored reminders). The issue arises because the authorization check performed at subscription time is not re-applied at delivery or retrieval time. Security impact is limited to information disclosure: an unauthorized user may observe case titles, reminder messages, and associated metadata that they no longer have permission to access. No integrity or availability impact is indicated by the patch. Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:20 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:21 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:20
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea 433c4d2d3f96…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    af6e91c8ac63 fix: [security] Recheck private case access for recurring 433c4d2d3f96…
    Fix summary

    The fix introduces an authorization re-check at two points: (1) before creating a recurring reminder notification, the system now verifies the recipient's current case visibility and skips delivery if access has been revoked; (2) when listing or counting stored notifications, the system now filters out case-related reminder notifications for which the viewing user no longer has case access. This ensures that both the creation and display paths enforce current authorization state rather than relying on a one-time check at subscription time.

    Patch summary

    In recurring_notification.py, the create_notification function now imports can_view_case and, for each recurring notification subscriber, fetches the User record and calls can_view_case(case, recipient); if the check fails, the notification is skipped via continue. In notification_core.py, the DEADLINE_ICONS tuple is extended to include the clock icon (fa-solid fa-clock), a new helper _is_case_deadline_notification is added to identify case-related deadline/reminder notifications by icon or notification_type, and _visible_deadline_notifications is updated to use this helper so that reminders for inaccessible cases are excluded from the returned list. The test file is updated to create a real Case object for the reminder notification fixture instead of using a hardcoded case_id.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N: The application is a web-based platform accessed over the network. AC:L: No special race condition or complex setup is required; the user simply needs to have previously had case access and then have it revoked. AT:N: No manipulation of the target is needed. PR:L: An authenticated user with a valid account and prior case subscription is required. UI:N: Notifications are delivered and displayed automatically without requiring victim interaction. VC:L: Limited confidentiality impact; case-related notification content (titles, reminder messages) is exposed to a user who no longer has case access. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact is evidenced. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: The affected data resides within the same application scope; no cross-scope impact is indicated.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-285 The system performed an authorization check at subscription time but failed to re-enforce it at notification delivery and display time. The authorization decision was not re-evaluated when the user's access to the case changed, resulting in continued access to case-related notification content. This is a failure to properly enforce authorization at the point of access rather than a complete absence of authorization logic.
    • CWE-862 In the recurring notification creation path, no authorization check existed at all before generating the notification for a subscriber. The check was entirely absent, not merely insufficient, making CWE-862 a defensible secondary mapping for the creation path specifically.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-66 The notification subsystem operated with a lower security enforcement level than the case-access subsystem: it did not enforce the same access-control checks that governed case visibility. An attacker (or a user whose access was legitimately revoked) could exploit this misconfiguration to continue receiving case-related notification content. This is the closest CAPEC to the pattern of a component not enforcing the security level configured elsewhere in the application. The mapping is uncertain because no CAPEC specifically describes stale-authorization or missing re-authorization at delivery time; CAPEC-66 is selected as the best available match for a security-level enforcement gap between components.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the patch itself does not contain version strings.
    • The CAPEC-66 mapping is the closest available match; no CAPEC specifically covers stale-authorization or missing re-authorization at notification delivery time. This uncertainty is noted in the CAPEC rationale.
    • CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker is an authenticated user who previously had case access; the patch does not specify whether unauthenticated access is possible.
    • CVSS VC:L assumes the disclosed information is limited to notification content (case titles, reminder messages) rather than full case data; the patch only addresses notification visibility.
    • The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerability is exploitable remotely or requires local access; AV:N is assumed based on the web-application nature of the product.
    • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 09:16 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea): fix: [security] Recheck private case access for recurring https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea
    2. 2026-11-20 14:19 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133849 (GCVE-0-2026-133849)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:39 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Insecure Direct Object Reference in Task Calendar Access Control
    Summary
    A vulnerability exists in the flowintel application's calendar functionality that allows unauthorized access to private case data. The task calendar queries failed to enforce visibility checks on the parent case associated with tasks. Specifically, tasks assigned to a user or belonging to the user's organization were returned in calendar views (including browser and API ICS feeds) without verifying whether the user had permission to view the parent case. This allowed users to potentially discover and access details of private cases they were not authorized to view, leading to information disclosure. The issue affected the default task visibility logic and the assigned-only task queries. The fix ensures that case visibility is rechecked in addition to task assignment or organization membership, preventing the exposure of private case data in calendar outputs. Affected versions: flowintel < 4.1.0
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:19 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:20 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:19
    Model
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    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/98196d0523d4e1136014574ff0b526da1d92381b 618096dd6233…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    98196d0523d4 fix: [security] Recheck private case access in task calendars 618096dd6233…
    Fix summary

    The vulnerability is remediated by adding explicit case visibility checks to the task calendar queries. The fix ensures that tasks are only visible if the user has permission to view the parent case, in addition to being assigned to the task or belonging to the same organization. This prevents the disclosure of private case data in calendar views and ICS feeds.

    Patch summary

    The patch modifies the `_tasks_visible_to_user_query` and `_tasks_assigned_to_user_query` functions in `app/calendar/calendar_core.py`. It replaces the previous outer join and filter logic with subqueries for task assignment and organization membership. A new filter condition is added to ensure that the case is not private or that the user has membership in the case's organization. This enforces case-level access control in calendar task queries.

    CVSS rationale

    The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L) and no attack requirements (AT:N). It requires low privileges (PR:L) as any authenticated user can trigger the issue. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The impact is high on integrity (VI:H) due to unauthorized disclosure of private case data, but no impact on confidentiality (VC:N) or availability (VA:N) of the primary system, and no secondary impacts (SC:N, SI:N, SA:N).

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-639 The vulnerability allows access to resources (private case data) based on user-controlled inputs (task assignment or organization membership) without verifying the authorization context (case visibility). This is a classic authorization bypass where the application fails to enforce proper access controls on the parent resource.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-126 The vulnerability allows users to access private case data by interacting with calendar endpoints that do not properly enforce case-level authorization. While not a direct URL manipulation, the effect is similar to forced browsing where the application fails to restrict access to resources based on the user's privileges. The uncertainty lies in the specific mechanism, but the impact is unauthorized access to restricted data.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The CAPEC mapping is uncertain as the specific attack pattern is not explicitly detailed in the patch, but CAPEC-126 is the closest plausible match for unauthorized access to restricted data.
    • The CVSS vector assumes that the primary impact is on integrity (VI:H) due to unauthorized disclosure, but confidentiality (VC:N) is marked as none based on the assumption that the data is not considered highly sensitive in this context. This may need adjustment based on the sensitivity of the case data.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 10 11 medium 2
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 08:41 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (98196d0523d4e1136014574ff0b526da1d92381b): fix: [security] Recheck private case access in task calendars https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/98196d0523d4e1136014574ff0b526da1d92381b
    2. 2026-11-20 14:19 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/98196d0523d4e1136014574ff0b526da1d92381b
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133848 (GCVE-0-2026-133848)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:39 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:31
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Organization Admin Can Delete Platform Admin Accounts Due to Missing Privilege Hierarchy Check
    Summary
    flowintel contains an authorization flaw in its user deletion functionality. Organization-scoped administrators (org admins) are able to delete platform-level administrator accounts through both the browser-based admin interface and the REST API. The existing authorization logic verified that an org admin could only target users within their own organization, but it did not enforce the privilege hierarchy between organization admins and platform admins. As a result, an authenticated org admin could issue a deletion request against any platform-admin account belonging to the same organization, causing the target account, its sessions, and related records to be permanently removed. Impact: - Loss of platform-level administrative oversight - Potential disruption of platform-wide management functions - Removal of higher-privilege accounts that should be protected from lower-privilege roles Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:19 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 18:31 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:19
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb 05b89a0d2175…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    e3d0b2ab153d fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from deleting 05b89a0d2175…
    Fix summary

    The fix introduces an explicit privilege-hierarchy check in both the browser and API deletion routes. Before any session invalidation or account deletion is performed, the system now verifies whether the target user holds platform-admin capability. If the requester is a pure organization admin and the target is a platform admin, the request is rejected with a 403 response, preserving the intended authorization boundary while leaving legitimate deletion workflows unaffected.

    Patch summary

    Two lines added in app/admin/admin.py (delete_user function) and two lines added in app/admin/admin_api.py (API GET handler). In each location, after the existing same-organization check for pure org admins, a new condition checks user.is_admin() / user_to_delete.is_admin(). If true, a 403 JSON response is returned with an appropriate error message, preventing the deletion from proceeding. No other logic was modified.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N - the vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web UI or REST API. AC:L - exploitation requires only a standard authenticated request targeting a platform-admin account; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N - no attack-target manipulation is needed. PR:L - the attacker must hold a valid organization-admin account. UI:N - no victim interaction is required; the org admin acts on their own behalf. VC:N - no confidential data is exposed. VI:N - the application's own data integrity is not corrupted; the deletion is a legitimate operation performed by an authenticated user. VA:H - platform-admin accounts and their sessions are permanently deleted, significantly degrading the availability of platform administration. SC:N - no cross-component confidentiality impact. SI:N - no cross-component integrity impact. SA:H - the broader platform administration and oversight functions lose availability when platform-admin accounts are removed.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-285 The authorization logic for the user-deletion endpoint verified organizational scope but failed to enforce the privilege hierarchy between organization admins and platform admins. The missing check allowed a lower-privilege role to perform an action (deleting a higher-privilege account) that should have been restricted, constituting an improper authorization decision.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-126 An authenticated organization admin leverages a missing authorization boundary to perform an action (deleting a platform-admin account) that is reserved for a higher-privilege role. This is a vertical privilege escalation: the actor gains the effective capability of a platform admin by removing platform-admin accounts. The mapping is the closest standard CAPEC; the attack does not involve traditional credential theft or token manipulation but rather an authorization logic gap that permits a lower-privilege actor to act at a higher privilege level.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (fixed in 4.1.0); the exact earliest affected version is not stated in the patch and is recorded as unspecified.
    • The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest standard pattern; the vulnerability is more precisely an authorization-logic gap than a classic privilege-escalation exploit, but no more specific CAPEC exists for missing privilege-hierarchy checks in multi-tenant admin systems.
    • CVSS VA:H and SA:H assume that deleting platform-admin accounts materially degrades the availability of platform-level administration; if the deployment has redundant platform admins, the practical impact may be lower.
    • The patch metadata lists affected_version as '0', which is treated as a placeholder; the actual lower bound of affected versions is unknown.
    • No evidence of active exploitation or public PoC was found in the patch or metadata.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 08:09 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb): fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from deleting https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb
    2. 2026-11-20 14:18 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-133847 (GCVE-0-2026-133847)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:38 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Missing Authorization Check Allows Organization Admin to Edit Platform Admin Accounts via Browser Interface
    Summary
    flowintel contains an authorization bypass in the browser-based admin user editing interface. The edit_user view in the admin panel verified that a non-platform-admin user could only edit accounts belonging to their own organization, but it did not verify that the target account was not a platform-admin account. As a result, an authenticated user holding an organization-admin role could open the edit form for any platform-admin account and submit modifications, including changes to credentials, roles, or other account attributes. The API layer already enforced a restriction preventing non-admin users from targeting admin accounts, but the browser-based admin view lacked the equivalent check, creating an inconsistent authorization boundary. Impact: - Unauthorized modification of platform-admin account data (integrity) - Potential lockout or privilege manipulation of platform administrators (availability) - Escalation of an organization-admin role to effectively control platform-level administration Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:23 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:21 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:23
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90 2fdb8a47ac79…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    db694be89ed4 fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from editing 2fdb8a47ac79…
    Fix summary

    The fix adds an explicit authorization check in the browser-based user edit view that rejects the request before rendering or processing the form when the target account is a platform-admin account and the current user is not a platform administrator. This aligns the browser interface with the existing API-level restriction, ensuring that only platform administrators can modify platform-admin accounts.

    Patch summary

    Three lines are inserted in the edit_user function in app/admin/admin.py, immediately after the same-organization check and before the non-admin permission check. The added code calls user_modif.is_admin() on the target user; if true, it flashes an error message ('Only administrators can edit Admin users.') and redirects to the admin users list, preventing the form from being rendered or processed. No other files or logic are modified.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N: web-based admin interface accessible over the network. AC:L: the attacker simply navigates to the edit URL for a known admin account; no race conditions or special timing required. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate attack target. PR:L: requires an authenticated account with organization-admin privileges. UI:N: no victim interaction beyond the attacker's own browser session. VC:N: the primary impact is modification, not disclosure; the attacker already has visibility into the user list. VI:H: the attacker can alter platform-admin credentials, roles, or settings. VA:H: the attacker can disable or lock out platform administrators. SC:N: no impact on separate components. SI:H: integrity of admin account records is compromised. SA:N: no impact on the security authority of other components.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The edit_user view was missing an authorization check that would prevent a non-platform-admin user from targeting a platform-admin account. The check existed in the API layer but was absent in the browser-based view, constituting a missing authorization control for a specific operation.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-100 The attack exploits an incomplete authorization logic in the admin user-edit view: the same-organization check passes for a platform-admin account that happens to share the organization, but the missing admin-target check allows the lower-privileged user to proceed. This is a logic flaw in the access-control flow. CAPEC-100 is the closest available pattern; the exact CAPEC for a single missing check in a multi-step authorization flow is not explicitly defined in the CAPEC catalog, so this is the best plausible match.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the exact starting version is not independently confirmed by the patch alone.
    • The assumption that the API layer already enforced the admin-target restriction is taken from the commit message; the API code is not included in the patch for independent verification.
    • CAPEC-100 is selected as the closest plausible attack pattern; no CAPEC entry precisely describes a single missing authorization check in a multi-step view function, so this mapping carries moderate uncertainty.
    • CVSS VC is set to None on the assumption that the attacker already has visibility into the user list in the admin panel; if the edit form reveals additional sensitive fields not otherwise visible, VC could be Low.
    • The patch does not include the full edit_user function or surrounding context; the analysis assumes the three added lines are the complete remediation for this specific authorization gap.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 07:44 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90): fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from editing https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90
    2. 2026-11-20 14:22 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90
    Show details on NVD website

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          ],
          "title": "flowintel: Missing Authorization Check Allows Organization Admin to Edit Platform Admin Accounts via Browser Interface",
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    CVE-2026-133846 (GCVE-0-2026-133846)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:38 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:35
    VLAI
    Title
    FlowIntel Missing Authorization Check Allows Unauthorized Revival of Completed Privileged Cases via Task Reopening
    Summary
    FlowIntel contains an authorization bypass in its task management workflow. When a user reopens a completed task (by toggling its completion state or changing its status to a non-finished value) or creates a new task within a completed privileged case, the parent case is automatically revived (un-completed, status reset to Created, finish date cleared). The system failed to enforce the required Admin or Case Admin privilege check before performing this case revival side effect. A user with basic task-level permissions (e.g., editor, queuer, or queue admin) could trigger the revival of a completed privileged case through the browser interface or the REST API, without holding the elevated role required for case-level operations. This could disrupt case lifecycle management, clear completion metadata, and potentially expose the case to further unauthorized modifications. The vulnerability affects both the browser-based task completion/status-change endpoints and the corresponding API endpoints, as well as the task creation flow. Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:22 UTC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:21 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
    CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:22
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c f7e85e27691e…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    7eb9fa76d460 fix: [security] Enforce privileged case permissions on task f7e85e27691e…
    Fix summary

    The fix introduces explicit authorization checks (can_reopen_case and can_reopen_task) that require Admin or Case Admin privileges before a completed privileged case can be revived as a side effect of task reopening or task creation. Denial is enforced at the core model layer and at both the browser and API endpoint layers, with audit logging of denied attempts. Legitimate task creation is preserved, but the automatic case revival is suppressed for unauthorized users.

    Patch summary

    Added can_reopen_case() and can_reopen_task() methods to TaskCore.py that verify Admin or Case Admin role when the parent case is both completed and privileged. Inserted permission checks in complete_task() and create_task() in TaskCore.py. Added 403 denial responses with audit log entries in task.py (browser endpoints for task completion and status change) and task_api.py (API endpoints for task completion and status change). Added 134 lines of regression tests covering role boundaries, UUID aliases, status IDs, API identity, Matrix delegation, denial side effects, and legitimate reopening workflows.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N - exploitable over the network via web UI or REST API. AC:L - the attack requires only a standard task completion toggle or status change request; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N - no manipulation of the target system is needed. PR:L - requires an authenticated user with basic task permissions (editor, queuer, or queue admin). UI:N - no victim interaction required. VC:N - no new confidential data is exposed; the case data was already accessible. VI:L - the case state is modified (completed flag cleared, status reset, finish date removed), which is a limited integrity impact on case lifecycle metadata. VA:N - no denial of service; the case remains accessible. SC/SI/SA:N - no secondary system impact identified.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The system failed to enforce an authorization check before allowing a completed privileged case to be revived as a side effect of task reopening or task creation. The permission check for case-level operations was entirely absent from the task-level code paths.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-114 The attacker performs an action (task reopening or task creation) that they are partially authorized to perform, but the system fails to enforce the higher-level authorization required for the side effect (privileged case revival). This is closest to forced browsing in the sense that the user effectively triggers an unauthorized state change on a resource (the case) they do not have full authority over. Uncertainty: the user IS authorized to interact with the task itself; the missing check is on the implicit case-level side effect, making this a partial rather than pure forced-browsing scenario.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version 0, fixed_version 4.1.0); the exact starting version of the vulnerable code is not confirmed by the patch alone.
    • CAPEC-114 (Forced Browsing) is the closest available mapping; the actual weakness is a missing authorization check on a side effect of an authorized action, which does not map precisely to any single CAPEC entry.
    • CVSS VI:L assumes the case state modification (revival) constitutes a limited integrity impact; if downstream workflows depend on case completion state, the practical impact could be higher.
    • The patch references a 'Matrix delegation' mechanism for API identity; the exact trust model for delegated requests is not fully documented in the patch.
    • PR:L assumes the attacker needs at minimum an editor-level account; the patch tests confirm editor, queuer, and queue_admin roles are affected.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-16 08:28 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c): fix: [security] Enforce privileged case permissions on task https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c
    2. 2026-11-20 14:22 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c
    Show details on NVD website

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    GCVE-1-2026-20423 (CVE-2026-133855)

    Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 14:44
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Unauthorized Disclosure of Linked Case References in Case History
    Summary
    flowintel contains an information disclosure vulnerability in its case history feature. When a user views the history of a case they are authorized to access, the history output includes references to other cases (linked, unlinked, or forked) without verifying whether the requesting user has permission to view those referenced cases. This exposes the identifiers and titles of cases that the user should not be able to discover. The vulnerability affects multiple output paths: - Browser-based case history view - API history endpoint - Plain-text history download - Markdown history download - Report timeline generation An authenticated user with access to any single case can enumerate the existence and identifiers of other cases by reading the history of a case they can access. This bypasses the intended per-case access control model and may reveal the existence of sensitive investigations, their identifiers, and associated metadata to unauthorized users. The raw audit storage is not modified; the issue is solely in the presentation layer failing to filter references to inaccessible cases before returning history data to the user. Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:43 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
    • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
    Assigner
    CIRCL GNA GNA-1
    GNA scorecard A 92/100 over 319 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:43
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809 407e73d34f15…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    c44025ea6810 fix: [security] Filter linked case references from case 407e73d34f15…
    Fix summary

    A new visibility-aware history retrieval function was introduced that parses each history record for case references (link, unlink, fork events) and checks the requesting user's access to every referenced case before including that record in the output. Records referencing inaccessible cases are omitted from the response. The filtering is applied consistently across all history output paths (browser view, API, text download, Markdown download, and report timelines). Administrative users retain full unfiltered access. The raw audit log storage remains unchanged to preserve forensic integrity.

    Patch summary

    Added a new function get_visible_history() in common_core.py that: (1) verifies the user can view the current case, (2) groups raw history lines into logical records using timestamp-based event boundaries, (3) extracts referenced case IDs from link/unlink/fork messages using regex patterns, (4) checks can_view_case() for each referenced case, and (5) excludes records referencing inaccessible cases. Updated download_history(), download_history_md(), the browser history endpoint, the API history endpoint, and the report timeline generator to call get_visible_history() instead of the raw get_history(). Added helper functions _history_case_references() and _history_record_complete() to handle legacy multiline link records and ambiguous formats. Changed download_history() to serve content via BytesIO instead of reading a file path directly.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N - The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web application. AC:L - Exploitation requires only viewing the history of any accessible case; no special conditions or race conditions are needed. AT:N - No prior attack or manipulation of the target is required. PR:L - The attacker must be an authenticated user with access to at least one case. UI:N - No user interaction beyond normal application use is required. VC:L - The vulnerable component (case history endpoint) leaks limited information (case IDs and titles of referenced cases). VI:N - No integrity impact. VA:N - No availability impact. SC:L - Subsequent components (other cases) have their existence and identifiers exposed to unauthorized users. SI:N - No integrity impact on other systems. SA:N - No safety impact.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-200 The case history output exposes identifiers and titles of other cases to users who do not have authorization to view those cases. The sensitive data (case existence, IDs, titles) is disclosed through a legitimate endpoint without proper per-reference authorization checks.
    • CWE-862 The history retrieval functions did not perform authorization checks on the referenced cases embedded within the history records. The primary case access was verified, but the secondary cases referenced in link/unlink/fork events were not checked before inclusion in the response.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-128 The attacker leverages a legitimate application endpoint (case history) to discover metadata about other resources (case identifiers, titles, and relationships) that they are not authorized to access. This is the closest CAPEC pattern to the observed information disclosure through a functional endpoint. The mapping is approximate because CAPEC-128 typically refers to version/configuration discovery, whereas here the disclosed metadata is application data (case references) rather than system metadata. No more specific CAPEC pattern for cross-object information disclosure via a legitimate read endpoint exists in the CAPEC catalog.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The affected version range is assumed to be all versions prior to 4.1.0 based on the explicit context providing affected_version '0' and fixed_version '4.1.0'. The exact earliest affected version is not confirmed by the patch itself.
    • The CAPEC-128 mapping is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically covers cross-object information disclosure through a legitimate read endpoint. The mapping is approximate.
    • CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs at least one valid authenticated session with access to any case. If the application allows unauthenticated history access in some deployment, PR would be N.
    • The patch commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
    • The vulnerability requires the attacker to already have access to at least one case; it does not allow access to cases with no prior relationship to the attacker's accessible cases beyond those referenced in history.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 12:50 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809): fix: [security] Filter linked case references from case https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809
    2. 2026-11-20 14:42 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809

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                    "cvssRationale": "AV:N - The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web application. AC:L - Exploitation requires only viewing the history of any accessible case; no special conditions or race conditions are needed. AT:N - No prior attack or manipulation of the target is required. PR:L - The attacker must be an authenticated user with access to at least one case. UI:N - No user interaction beyond normal application use is required. VC:L - The vulnerable component (case history endpoint) leaks limited information (case IDs and titles of referenced cases). VI:N - No integrity impact. VA:N - No availability impact. SC:L - Subsequent components (other cases) have their existence and identifiers exposed to unauthorized users. SI:N - No integrity impact on other systems. SA:N - No safety impact.",
                    "fixSummary": "A new visibility-aware history retrieval function was introduced that parses each history record for case references (link, unlink, fork events) and checks the requesting user\u0027s access to every referenced case before including that record in the output. Records referencing inaccessible cases are omitted from the response. The filtering is applied consistently across all history output paths (browser view, API, text download, Markdown download, and report timelines). Administrative users retain full unfiltered access. The raw audit log storage remains unchanged to preserve forensic integrity.",
                    "generatedAt": "2026-11-20T14:43:12.693948Z",
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    GCVE-1-2026-20422 (CVE-2026-133854)

    Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 14:44
    VLAI
    Title
    flowintel: Information Disclosure of Classification Usage via Missing Access Control
    Summary
    flowintel contains a vulnerability in the case and task classification usage endpoints that allows authenticated users to view classification data associated with cases they do not have permission to access. The affected endpoints, which provide lists of used taxonomies, tags, galaxies, clusters, and custom tags, did not properly enforce object-level access controls. While the endpoints required authentication, they failed to filter the returned data based on the requesting user's visibility permissions for the underlying cases. This allowed any authenticated user to enumerate classification usage across all cases, including private or restricted cases belonging to other organizations or users. This issue could lead to the disclosure of sensitive information, such as the existence of specific cases, the types of threats or indicators associated with them, and the relationships between different classification elements, potentially aiding an attacker in reconnaissance or targeting. Affected versions: < 4.1.0
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:42 UTC
    CWE
    Assigner
    CIRCL GNA GNA-1
    GNA scorecard A 92/100 over 319 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:42
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630 58589e54911e…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    fa7216e76041 fix: [security] Scope classification usage to visible cases 58589e54911e…
    Fix summary

    The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing object-level access controls on the classification usage endpoints. The fix ensures that the authenticated user's identity is passed to the data retrieval functions, which then filter the results to include only classifications associated with cases that the user is authorized to view. This prevents the disclosure of classification data from private or restricted cases to unauthorized users.

    Patch summary

    The patch modifies the case and task classification usage endpoints to pass the current authenticated user to the underlying data retrieval functions. A new helper function, _classification_usage_ids, is introduced to filter classification usage based on the user's permissions. This function joins the classification link models with the Case model and applies filters to ensure that only classifications associated with visible cases (public, member, or administrator access) are returned. The existing helper functions for retrieving used taxonomies, tags, galaxies, clusters, and custom tags are updated to use this new filtering logic.

    CVSS rationale

    The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L) and no attack requirements (AT:N). It requires low privileges (PR:L) as any authenticated user can exploit it. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The impact is primarily on the confidentiality of the vulnerable system (VI:H) as it allows unauthorized access to sensitive classification data. There is no impact on integrity or availability (VC:N, VA:N, SC:N, SI:N, SA:N).

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-862 The endpoints lacked proper authorization checks to ensure that users could only view classification data associated with cases they had permission to access. This is a classic missing authorization vulnerability where the system failed to verify that the user had the necessary permissions to access the specific objects (cases) referenced by the classification data.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-126 The vulnerability allows an attacker to access classification data associated with cases they do not have permission to view by simply querying the endpoints. This aligns with the attack pattern of accessing functionality or data that is not properly restricted by identifiers or access controls. The uncertainty lies in the fact that the attacker does not need to guess specific IDs, but rather the lack of filtering exposes data across all cases, which is a broader form of improper restriction.
    Assumptions to verify
    • The CAPEC mapping is uncertain as the vulnerability is more about missing filtering than accessing specific IDs, but CAPEC-126 is the closest plausible match.
    • The CVSS vector assumes that the impact is primarily on confidentiality and that the vulnerability does not lead to integrity or availability impacts.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 10 11 medium 2
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 12:03 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630): fix: [security] Scope classification usage to visible cases https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630
    2. 2026-11-20 14:41 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630

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    GCVE-1-2026-20421 (CVE-2026-133853)

    Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 14:44
    VLAI
    Title
    FlowIntel Chatbot Shared MCP Session Allows Cross-User API Identity Confusion
    Summary
    FlowIntel's chatbot component used a single shared MCP (Model Context Protocol) session and process-wide environment variable to pass per-user API credentials to a child process. Because the session and the ambient FLOWINTEL_API_KEY environment variable were shared across all concurrent requests, a user's authenticated identity could be applied to another user's tool invocation, or a stale/ambient credential could be inherited by a new request. Preconditions: - An authenticated user with access to the chatbot interface. - Concurrent or overlapping chatbot tool invocations from different users, or a request made after another user's credentials were written to the process environment. Impact: - A lower-privilege user could read data belonging to a higher-privilege user (e.g., private investigation cases). - A user whose session was invalidated (deleted, password changed, key revoked) could still operate under a previously cached ambient credential. - The parent process environment was mutated with user-specific secrets, creating a persistent credential leak surface. Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
    Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:41 UTC
    CWE
    • CWE-290 - Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
    • CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
    Assigner
    CIRCL GNA GNA-1
    GNA scorecard A 92/100 over 319 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
        cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    Create a notification for this product.
    GCVE extensions
    bcp-05-x-01
    AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
    Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

    Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

    ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
    Model Source Identifier
    qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
    bcp-05-x-02
    Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
    Generator
    patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:41
    Model
    qwen3.8:27b
    Input
    https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8 b2eb7327abee…
    Confidence
    medium
    Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
    9eec395cc73c fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities b2eb7327abee…
    Fix summary

    The shared persistent MCP session and process-wide API key mutation were removed. Each chatbot tool invocation now spawns its own short-lived MCP child process with credentials resolved fresh from the authenticated request context. If the user's identity or API key is unavailable, the invocation is rejected before any child process is launched, preventing fallback to ambient or stale credentials. Each transport is deterministically closed on success, failure, or timeout, eliminating residual credential exposure.

    Patch summary

    Removed the global _mcp_session, _mcp_loop, _mcp_thread, _mcp_current_api_key state and the _ensure_mcp() / _start_mcp_background() / _run_mcp_session() functions that maintained a single shared asyncio event loop and thread. Replaced with _mcp_environment() which resolves the user's API key from the authenticated session on every call and raises RuntimeError if unavailable, and _call_mcp_tool() which opens a per-invocation stdio transport, executes the tool, and closes the transport in all exit paths. Eliminated all os.environ mutations of FLOWINTEL_API_KEY. Added 33 regression tests in tests/chatbot/test_api_identity.py covering concurrent identity isolation, ambient-credential rejection, detached-user handling, key rotation, transport cleanup on failure/timeout, and real stdio child-process lifecycle.

    CVSS rationale

    AV:N: the chatbot is a network-accessible Flask endpoint. AC:H: exploitation requires concurrent or carefully timed requests from two different users to trigger the shared-session race, or a specific sequence of credential writes to the process environment. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate target is needed. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated user with chatbot access. UI:N: no victim interaction beyond their own request is required. VC:H: a user can read another user's sensitive data (private cases, investigations). VI:N, VA:N: no integrity or availability impact is evidenced. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: no impact on separate components is demonstrated.

    Weakness rationale
    • CWE-290 The shared MCP session and process-wide environment variable allowed one user's authenticated identity (API key) to be applied to another user's tool invocation. The per-request identity was not isolated, effectively allowing identity confusion or spoofing between concurrent sessions.
    • CWE-200 Because credentials were shared across requests and written to the process environment, a user could access data (e.g., private cases) belonging to another user whose key was cached in the shared session or ambient environment.
    Attack pattern rationale
    • CAPEC-126 The closest available CAPEC. The shared MCP session acted as a single long-lived session whose credentials could be 'hijacked' by a concurrent request from a different user, causing the wrong identity to be used. No CAPEC specifically covers 'shared per-tenant credential state in a multi-user service,' so CAPEC-126 is the best approximation. Uncertainty: the attack does not involve a traditional network-level session token theft but rather a server-side shared-state race.
    Assumptions to verify
    • AC:H is assumed because reliable exploitation requires concurrent requests from two different authenticated users or a specific timing window around the shared session restart; a single sequential request may not trigger the identity confusion.
    • PR:L assumes any authenticated user with chatbot access can trigger the issue; the patch does not evidence a higher privilege requirement.
    • VC:H assumes the data accessed (private cases, investigations) constitutes high confidentiality impact; the patch tests reference 'PRIVATE ADMIN INVESTIGATION' as the sensitive resource.
    • CAPEC-126 (Session Hijacking) is the closest available mapping but does not precisely describe a server-side shared-credential race; no CAPEC specifically covers multi-tenant credential isolation failures in a shared in-process session.
    • The affected version range is taken from the explicit analyst context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
    • No evidence of active exploitation, public PoC, or in-the-wild abuse is present in the patch or metadata.
    Model comparison

    Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
    The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

    Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
    qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
    bcp-05-x-03
    Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
    GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
    1. 2026-11-17 10:37 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8): fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8
    2. 2026-11-20 14:41 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8

    {
      "containers": {
        "cna": {
          "affected": [
            {
              "cpes": [
                "cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
              ],
              "modules": [
                "app/chatbot/chatbot_core.py"
              ],
              "product": "flowintel",
              "programFiles": [
                "app/chatbot/chatbot_core.py"
              ],
              "repo": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel",
              "vendor": "flowintel",
              "versions": [
                {
                  "lessThan": "4.1.0",
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "0",
                  "versionType": "semver"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "cpeApplicability": [
            {
              "nodes": [
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                      "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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                  "negate": false,
                  "operator": "OR"
                }
              ]
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          ],
          "credits": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "remediation developer",
              "value": "David Cruciani"
            }
          ],
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "FlowIntel\u0027s chatbot component used a single shared MCP (Model Context Protocol) session and process-wide environment variable to pass per-user API credentials to a child process. Because the session and the ambient FLOWINTEL_API_KEY environment variable were shared across all concurrent requests, a user\u0027s authenticated identity could be applied to another user\u0027s tool invocation, or a stale/ambient credential could be inherited by a new request.\n\nPreconditions:\n- An authenticated user with access to the chatbot interface.\n- Concurrent or overlapping chatbot tool invocations from different users, or a request made after another user\u0027s credentials were written to the process environment.\n\nImpact:\n- A lower-privilege user could read data belonging to a higher-privilege user (e.g., private investigation cases).\n- A user whose session was invalidated (deleted, password changed, key revoked) could still operate under a previously cached ambient credential.\n- The parent process environment was mutated with user-specific secrets, creating a persistent credential leak surface.\n\nAffected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0."
            }
          ],
          "impacts": [
            {
              "capecId": "CAPEC-126",
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "CAPEC-126 Session Hijacking"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "metrics": [
            {
              "cvssV4_0": {
                "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
                "attackRequirements": "NONE",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "baseScore": 6,
                "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
                "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
                "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
                "version": "4.0",
                "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
              },
              "format": "CVSS",
              "scenarios": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "GENERAL"
                }
              ]
            },
            {
              "format": "SSVC",
              "other": {
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                    },
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                    {
                      "Technical Impact": "partial"
                    }
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                  "role": "Supplier",
                  "timestamp": "2026-11-20T14:41:59Z",
                  "version": "2.0.3"
                },
                "type": "SSVC"
              },
              "scenarios": [
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                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "problemTypes": [
            {
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "cweId": "CWE-290",
                  "description": "CWE-290 Authentication Bypass by Spoofing",
                  "lang": "en",
                  "type": "CWE"
                }
              ]
            },
            {
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "cweId": "CWE-200",
                  "description": "CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor",
                  "lang": "en",
                  "type": "CWE"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "providerMetadata": {
            "orgId": "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000000"
          },
          "references": [
            {
              "name": "Security patch",
              "tags": [
                "patch"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8"
            }
          ],
          "solutions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "The shared persistent MCP session and process-wide API key mutation were removed. Each chatbot tool invocation now spawns its own short-lived MCP child process with credentials resolved fresh from the authenticated request context. If the user\u0027s identity or API key is unavailable, the invocation is rejected before any child process is launched, preventing fallback to ambient or stale credentials. Each transport is deterministically closed on success, failure, or timeout, eliminating residual credential exposure."
            }
          ],
          "title": "FlowIntel Chatbot Shared MCP Session Allows Cross-User API Identity Confusion",
          "x_gcve": [
            {
              "extensions": {
                "bcp-05-x-01": {
                  "ai_annotations": [
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                      "ai_level": "generated",
                      "description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
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                          "gna_source": 1,
                          "identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
                          "name": "qwen3.8:27b",
                          "source": "ollama"
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                      ],
                      "review_status": "full",
                      "scope": "record",
                      "tags": [
                        "ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated",
                        "ai-computer-assisted:classification"
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                "bcp-05-x-02": {
                  "x_patch2vuln": {
                    "assumptions": [
                      "AC:H is assumed because reliable exploitation requires concurrent requests from two different authenticated users or a specific timing window around the shared session restart; a single sequential request may not trigger the identity confusion.",
                      "PR:L assumes any authenticated user with chatbot access can trigger the issue; the patch does not evidence a higher privilege requirement.",
                      "VC:H assumes the data accessed (private cases, investigations) constitutes high confidentiality impact; the patch tests reference \u0027PRIVATE ADMIN INVESTIGATION\u0027 as the sensitive resource.",
                      "CAPEC-126 (Session Hijacking) is the closest available mapping but does not precisely describe a server-side shared-credential race; no CAPEC specifically covers multi-tenant credential isolation failures in a shared in-process session.",
                      "The affected version range is taken from the explicit analyst context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.",
                      "No evidence of active exploitation, public PoC, or in-the-wild abuse is present in the patch or metadata."
                    ],
                    "capecRationale": [
                      {
                        "capecId": "CAPEC-126",
                        "rationale": "The closest available CAPEC. The shared MCP session acted as a single long-lived session whose credentials could be \u0027hijacked\u0027 by a concurrent request from a different user, causing the wrong identity to be used. No CAPEC specifically covers \u0027shared per-tenant credential state in a multi-user service,\u0027 so CAPEC-126 is the best approximation. Uncertainty: the attack does not involve a traditional network-level session token theft but rather a server-side shared-state race."
                      }
                    ],
                    "commit": "9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8",
                    "confidence": "medium",
                    "credits": [
                      {
                        "lang": "en",
                        "type": "remediation developer",
                        "value": "David Cruciani"
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                    ],
                    "cvssRationale": "AV:N: the chatbot is a network-accessible Flask endpoint. AC:H: exploitation requires concurrent or carefully timed requests from two different users to trigger the shared-session race, or a specific sequence of credential writes to the process environment. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate target is needed. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated user with chatbot access. UI:N: no victim interaction beyond their own request is required. VC:H: a user can read another user\u0027s sensitive data (private cases, investigations). VI:N, VA:N: no integrity or availability impact is evidenced. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: no impact on separate components is demonstrated.",
                    "fixSummary": "The shared persistent MCP session and process-wide API key mutation were removed. Each chatbot tool invocation now spawns its own short-lived MCP child process with credentials resolved fresh from the authenticated request context. If the user\u0027s identity or API key is unavailable, the invocation is rejected before any child process is launched, preventing fallback to ambient or stale credentials. Each transport is deterministically closed on success, failure, or timeout, eliminating residual credential exposure.",
                    "generatedAt": "2026-11-20T14:41:59.093131Z",
                    "generator": "patch2vuln.py",
                    "model": "qwen3.8:27b",
                    "modelComparison": {
                      "potentialErrors": [],
                      "rankings": [
                        {
                          "agreementScore": 11,
                          "assumptionCount": 6,
                          "confidence": "medium",
                          "model": "qwen3.8:27b",
                          "score": 6
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                      ],
                      "selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
                      "selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
                      "selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
                    },
                    "patchSha256": "b2eb7327abee28d605ef02f5af16f090ce7a643bd63bf2a5836e30539adfbb81",
                    "patchSummary": "Removed the global _mcp_session, _mcp_loop, _mcp_thread, _mcp_current_api_key state and the _ensure_mcp() / _start_mcp_background() / _run_mcp_session() functions that maintained a single shared asyncio event loop and thread. Replaced with _mcp_environment() which resolves the user\u0027s API key from the authenticated session on every call and raises RuntimeError if unavailable, and _call_mcp_tool() which opens a per-invocation stdio transport, executes the tool, and closes the transport in all exit paths. Eliminated all os.environ mutations of FLOWINTEL_API_KEY. Added 33 regression tests in tests/chatbot/test_api_identity.py covering concurrent identity isolation, ambient-credential rejection, detached-user handling, key rotation, transport cleanup on failure/timeout, and real stdio child-process lifecycle.",
                    "patchTruncated": false,
                    "patches": [
                      {
                        "commit": "9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8",
                        "date": "Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:37:34 +0100",
                        "patchSha256": "b2eb7327abee28d605ef02f5af16f090ce7a643bd63bf2a5836e30539adfbb81",
                        "retrievedAt": "2026-11-20T14:41:10.165065Z",
                        "source": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8",
                        "sourceUrl": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8",
                        "subject": "fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities"
                      }
                    ],
                    "source": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8",
                    "ssvc": {
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                          "Technical Impact": "partial"
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                      "role": "Supplier",
                      "timestamp": "2026-11-20T14:41:59Z",
                      "version": "2.0.3"
                    },
                    "subject": "fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities",
                    "weaknessRationale": [
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                        "cweId": "CWE-290",
                        "rationale": "The shared MCP session and process-wide environment variable allowed one user\u0027s authenticated identity (API key) to be applied to another user\u0027s tool invocation. The per-request identity was not isolated, effectively allowing identity confusion or spoofing between concurrent sessions."
                      },
                      {
                        "cweId": "CWE-200",
                        "rationale": "Because credentials were shared across requests and written to the process environment, a user could access data (e.g., private cases) belonging to another user whose key was cached in the shared session or ambient environment."
                      }
                    ]
                  }
                },
                "bcp-05-x-03": {
                  "x_timeline": {
                    "events": [
                      {
                        "description": "Corrective change authored (9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8): fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities",
                        "id": "evt-fix-developed-1",
                        "references": [
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                        "timestamp": "2026-11-17T10:37:34Z",
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                        "type": "fix-available"
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                }
              },
              "recordType": "advisory",
              "vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20421"
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "cveMetadata": {
        "assignerOrgId": "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000000",
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-133853",
        "datePublished": "2026-11-20T14:44:12.578227Z",
        "dateReserved": "2026-11-20T14:44:25.304Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T14:44:26.385701Z",
        "state": "PUBLISHED",
        "vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20421"
      },
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }